Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

58. Minutes of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 24, 1980, 10:30–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Liberia (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • William Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
  • Parker Borg, Director, Office of West African Affairs

• OSD

  • James Woods, Director, African Region/ISA
  • Lt Colonel William Isom, Assistant for Central and West Africa/ISA

• JCS

  • Brig General James I. Granger, Assistant Deputy for International Negotiations, J–5
  • Lt Colonel Val Johnson, J–3

• DCI

  • Gray Cowan, NIO for Africa
  • [name not declassified]

• White House

  • Colonel William Odom

• NSC

  • Jerry Funk
  • Nicholas Spiliotes

MINUTES

Colonel Odom. The two objectives that we want to achieve this morning are: (1) to clarify the situation and make recommendations on how far contingency planning should proceed. (2) To evaluate available information in preparation for the upcoming PRC meeting on the overall U.S.-Liberian relationship.² (S)

DAS Harrop. What we would like to do is go over the urgent, immediate questions to consider evacuation on an ad referendum basis to the Secretary of State. The Secretary has serious reservations on the military approach and wants to explore the options further. We have formulated three options for potential action. (S)

Colonel Odom. I think we should proceed with the agenda and then discuss your options. (U)

Harrop. As you know, we had a confidential teleconference with Ambassador Smith last night.³ The Ambassador saw Sgt. Doe only four hours before the execution of the 13 former Cabinet members. After the executions there was a sense of total glee in the streets of Monrovia, a sort of Roman festival. Yesterday, Ambassador Smith saw Foreign Minister Matthews who had been receptive to our concerns up to this point. On this occasion, it appeared that Matthews had no authority in the deliberations over executions. He seemed unable to influence the decision of the Peoples’ Redemption Council (PRC). The PRC members are inexperienced and basically illiterate, non-commissioned officers. The civilians are not in control and it is unclear exactly what control Sgt. Doe exercises himself. The Embassy expects more executions sometime this weekend. Our Ambassador has been attempting to see Sgt. Doe since yesterday, but as of yet has been unsuccessful. (S)

I must stress that at no time have Americans or foreigners been the explicit objects of violence. Hostility and violence has been directed, for the most part, toward members of the former ruling elite. Currently, there are 80 people in confinement. The Embassy is concerned that we not give the PRC any impression that the U.S. opposes this revolution, or is in any way hostile to the new rulers. Most importantly, we must avoid giving any impression that we are involved in any counter-coup planning. The PRC is in an intensely paranoid state and our Ambassador is furthermore reluctant to evacuate Americans because it may imply our opposition to the regime and spark a reaction. (S)

Ambassador Smith views any presentation to the GOL on the asylum/deportation idea as imprudent. But he would like to begin moving on military contingency planning and would hope that a cover story for any military movement could be devised. Any public knowledge that American military planning was ongoing would have deleterious effects on the situation in Monrovia. (S)

Colonel Odom. Can I not draw the conclusion, however, from the available information, that the Ambassador has not made a choice as to whether contingency planning should go forward?

Harrop. I don’t think so. If I can read the relevant section of the transcript of our discussion with Ambassador Smith yesterday, it may shed some light on this. In response to a general question about evacuation preparation, Ambassador Smith said:

“We share concern at lengthy military lead time and recommend that forces be placed on alert. Even if alert status leaked, given other areas of crisis in the world, unless ground is carefully prepared here, news of alert could put us in jeopardy.

“We concur in despatch of LPH helicopter ships as well as placing airborne force on alert. Ship should have ability to communicate with Embassy in secure channel. We would not want to explain this action to Doe now and hope cover story could be arranged for its destination.

“We would like to come back to this important question later, but tend now to believe that the dangers of formally entering the warning phase of E and E plan outweigh the advantages. However, we plan to take many of the actions called for in the warning phase quietly. We can also take additional steps to reduce numbers of Americans slowly.” (S)

Colonel Odom. It still seems somewhat ambiguous. (U)

Harrop. In today’s communication, he tilts toward moving ahead with alert and prepositioning. (S)

Colonel Odom. Let us turn to CIA for anything additional you may want to add. (S)

Mr. Cowan. [less than 1 line not declassified] that more executions are expected on Saturday.⁴ [less than 1 line not declassified] We are concerned that once executions begin again, they will be most difficult to stop. There are two factors to keep in mind. First, the group in control does not understand diplomatic niceties. Diplomacy, in fact, is almost irrelevant. Second, the government is totally unpredictable and may act in ways which we would normally not expect. [classification marking not declassified]

Odom. A more explicit question is what are the immediate causes of these events? (S)

Cowan. There are two explanations: One is that it was a spontaneous act of a group of people sitting around and drinking beer. The other, which is unconfirmed and more unlikely, is that this had been in the works for almost a year. (S)

Odom. It seems to me that the spontaneous explanation is less than compelling because sustained executions require some degree of planning. (S)

Cowan. Basically, it comes down to upcountry Liberians out to get their oppressors of 133 years. (S)

Odom. There is no other evidence of foreign involvement? Is there no credence to reports that the Soviet Embassy was involved? (S)

Cowan. No, there is not, but there is potential for Soviet advantage. We are also concerned about possible demonstration effects in Sierra Leone and elsewhere on the Continent. (S)

Odom. Are other countries in a similar crisis meeting phase? What about the Germans, the British and the French? (S)

Harrop. In London the British told us they would be willing to participate in any joint diplomatic efforts.⁵ Nonetheless, it is an American problem. (S)

Parker Borg. No one has the same interests as we do in Liberia. (S)

Odom. How many troops do the Liberians have? (S)

Lt. Col. Val Johnson. 5,000 men, 5 of 100mm artillery pieces, some mortars, light machinery. We estimate it would take as little as 200 American troops to take over. (S)

Odom. But how organized are they? How large are the opposing forces? (S)

Col. William Isom. What we have here is a total breakdown in command and control. There are bands of armed privates, corporals and sergeants roaming around. What we are trying to do now is just maintain liaison with the military authorities. (S)

Cowan. It is even difficult to tell who the soldiers are because approximately 1500 uniforms were stolen. (S)

Odom. I would like to task DOD and CIA to get a better fix on what exactly is out there in the way of military organization and equipment. What will we be faced with? We need to tighten up our data base. Now, what about Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast? To what extent would these countries be good for exfiltration? Is it worthwhile investigating this route? Will Americans attempting to escape across the border be prevented from leaving? (S)

Borg. People who are upcountry could get across the border because it is quite permeable. (S)

Harrop. Any border sealing by Sierra Leone or Ivory Coast is unlikely. (S)

Cowan. The roads are bad and evacuation across the border is somewhat impracticable. (S)

Harrop. Evacuation by air or sea really are the only viable alternatives. (S)

Odom. Jerry Funk wants to mention something briefly about the asylum questions. (S)

Funk. In light of Ambassador Smith’s conversations, it appears that the idea mentioned at the IG yesterday is undesirable.⁶ What was floated was an approach to the GOL indicating our willingness to accept those they considered undesirable American-Liberians as refugees, subsequent to their deportation by Liberia. I would like to table this idea now and ask for comments. (S)

Cowan. How about domestic U.S. reaction? (S)

Funk. Congressman Solarz and his committee have been expressing great concern over the plight of Foreign Minister Dennis, and have asked why we did not give him asylum. (S)

Harrop. If the Americo-Liberians believe that a pogrom against them as a class is underway, then we will have serious asylum problems. I have talked to Congressman Solarz about the situation and am keeping him informed. (S)

Odom. For the record, I would like to bring out a discussion of the long-term political implications. I think the PRC would want to discuss this further. (S)

Borg. It depends on how we do it. If we do it by commercial aviation or military, there would be different effects. The reaction in Africa depends on how it is done. (S)

Odom. What about the Western press and Congress? Would they feel that the U.S. is picking up its tent and leaving? (S)

Harrop. I would not pose a question that way. This is not a case of our abandoning any of our facilities, private investment or relationship with Liberia. What we are considering is the evacuation of American citizens who may be in danger. (S)

Odom. O.K. I just wanted to bring it out and discover whether anyone thinks that this type of consideration should have any bearing on decision-making on evacuation. (S)

Cowan. [2 lines not declassified]

Odom. Mr. Harrop, can you present the three options which you brought along? (U)

Harrop. Option 1 calls for quiet departure by commercial carriers of non-essential American personnel, both private and official, and dependents. Option 2 is to place on alert U.S. aircraft, personnel and equipment required to land one battalion of men in Monrovia, as well as instructing an LPH to proceed to the area. Option 3 is to approach Sgt. Doe and inform him that we would like to gradually and temporarily reduce the number of Americans in the country and ask for Liberian support, making it clear that this in no way implies disapproval of the Liberian government. (S)

The Ambassador is proceeding in a limited way with Option 1. Because of his concern about raising suspicions in the GOL, he is not in a position to issue travel orders for American personnel. (S)

Odom. I take it that State does not support Option 3. (S)

Harrop. State does not have a firm position at this point. The Secretary wants to have a consideration of all the available options. (S)

Johnson. The options do not appear to be mutually incompatible. (S)

Odom. The essential choice is whether or not to announce to Doe our intention to draw down. (S)

Harrop. That is the crucial question. (U)

Odom. Then how far should we go with military preparation? (S)

Harrop. If we ask for Doe’s support, then we should tell him about the military preparation. The only way a draw down using commercial air or shipping is feasible, is with the cooperation of the government. (S)

Odom. Then we have an implicit choice as to whether we move more rapidly or slowly. There appears then to be two dimensions to the problem. (S)

Harrop. Yes, if we do not go to the government, then we must go slow. (S)

James Woods. A question on the facts. Yesterday at the IG we heard a figure of 4800 Americans in Liberia. The Mission has come back with a figure of about 3800. There are a lot of missionaries in Liberia. Do these figures include them or not? (S)

Harrop. We have to clarify the numbers and will do so. (U)

Borg. There is also a large category of Americans who are married to Liberians, but who are still legally American citizens. We would have to deal with them as well. (S)

Woods. It seems that we would not want to go with option 3. It could trigger a scenario we are trying to avoid. (S)

Harrop. That is quite true. (U)

Cowan. And what happens if he says no? (U)

Harrop. Before we finish this discussion we should consider the problem of leaks. In the 1980’s we cannot operate without this factor. If leaks are inevitable and Sgt. Doe and the PRC learn of our military preparations, we could indeed bring on the scenario we are trying to avoid. (S)

General Granger. I think that the preferred way is the commercial evacuation option. (U)

Harrop. It is the Ambassador’s judgment that evacuation must be done carefully, if at all, and it would be most imprudent to do anything to alienate the GOL at this time. There are considerable problems with harassment by unruly soldiers at the airport, a difficult hour-long drive to the airport, and the fact that the first battalion camp of Liberian troops is along the way. And, we don’t have much play in option 1. (U)

Borg. There are only two flights a week by PanAm and we have got to know how many other scheduled flights are flying. (S)

Odom. What are the JCS reactions to these options? (U)

General Granger. There appear to be a large number of scheduled flights in and out of Monrovia on different commercial carriers. (S)

Harrop. Aggregating people in the first phase of evacuation would be difficult and may cause some panic. (S)

Johnson. Right now we are in the planning phase. The next stage is issuance of a warning order for detailed planning. We have not done the detailed plans as of yet. (S)

Harrop. What kind of mobility would troops have when there? (S)

Johnson. They would be mobile with five days of supplies. It would take 14 C–141’s to bring the battalion in. We have an LPH in the Mediterranean which has just left Turkey and is heading toward France. Once it is in position off the coast of Spain, it will be six days time to Monrovia. (S)

Harrop. How long would it be to Monrovia as of today? (S)

Johnson. Twelve days and each day it gets closer. The LPH could handle the situation. It has 1100 Marines on board and could handle evacuees for a very short time, perhaps 24 hours. Since it takes two days to Dakar, there would have to be some other way of dealing with the evacuees. (S)

Isom. Basically, a reinforced company could take the airport without any problem. A battalion could probably secure the road from Monrovia to the airport. (S)

Odom. Can we send anything else along with it to receive the evacuees? (S)

Johnson. We will look into that. (U)

Odom. It would be useful to raise a question internally at DOD to see whether for some other reason this LPH could remain on course and not put into port. We also need to know what types of internal resistance that would be encountered and the feasibility of ground movement. We have to take a look at the country in detail and JCS should have a firm grasp on difficulties to be encountered. We need tighter intelligence about what we might run into. Before taking any of this to the President, we need a much clearer idea of what we face. (S)

Harrop. The Secretary of State would prefer that nothing go to the President at this point. (S)

Odom. Of course. (U)

Harrop. Before we close, can we consider the problem of a cover story? Could one be successfully implemented or maintained? (S)

Funk. We have got to go with the real story. (S)

Borg. Liberians would not believe that a military ship could be just for evacuation. (S)

Odom adjourned the meeting after saying that we would meet again shortly. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 122, SCM 127 Mini SCC 4/24/80 Liberia. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A Summary of Conclusions, on which Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner, is attached but not printed.
2. See Document 59.
3. In telegram 3581 from Monrovia, April 24, the Embassy responded to the Department’s questions about the safety of Americans in Liberia and elaborated on the previous night’s teleconference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800203–0172)
4. April 26.
5. In telegram 8677 from London, April 23, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office “would wish to coordinate any action with regard to welfare of its citizens with us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800201–0769)
6. No record of a meeting has been found.