Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

60. Minutes of a Special Coordinating Committee (Intelligence) Meeting¹

Washington, May 23, 1980, 2:15–2:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Covert Action Proposal for Liberia (S)

PARTICIPANTS

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

• State Department

  • Mr. David Newsom (Under Secretary for Political Affairs)
  • Mr. Ronald Spiers (Dep. Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research)

• OSD

  • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
  • Admiral Daniel Murphy (Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Review)

• JCS

  • Lt. General John Pustay

• DCI

  • Mr. Frank Carlucci
  • Mr. Clair George (Chief of Africa Division)

• NSC

  • Jerry Funk

• OMB

  • John White (Deputy Director)
  • Randy Jayne (Associate Director, National Security & International Affairs)

• JUSTICE

  • Ken Bass

MINUTES OF THE MEETING

The Chairman, Dr. Brzezinski, opened the meeting by noting that there was a three-part covert action proposal on Liberia to be considered, and it was his understanding that there would be little discussion on parts two and three, with somewhat more discussion on item one. He therefore suggested we work backwards, taking the first item last. He then summarized the three-part proposal:

—To provide advisors to the GOL in managing its economic, political and public administration affairs.

—To provide [less than 1 line not declassified] assistance to the Liberian intelligence/security services, to train, equip and advise.

—To engage in propaganda activities to encourage the GOL to pursue an acceptable human rights policy. (S)

Mr. Newsom said that State had no objections to items two and three,—security liaison and propaganda. (S)

Admiral Murphy asked what safeguards there were to the security liaison proposal, noting that the creation of a very efficient security service can be politically dangerous. (S)

Mr. Carlucci said that the proposal was to train, to provide some measure of personal protection for the executive, [less than 1 line not declassified]—not to set up a police operation. He said that we all knew there could be no absolute guarantees, but that the best guarantee was our presence. [classification marking not declassified]

Admiral Murphy said that he agreed and had no further question. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski said that there being no further comment or question, the meeting approved items two and three;—security liaison and propaganda,—and asked for discussion on item one, providing advisors. (S)

Mr. Newsom asked for some elaboration on the proposal, and said that it was not clear if it was offered in response to GOL requests, or on our initiative. (S)

Mr. Carlucci said that CIA had been inundated with requests,—[2 lines not declassified]. He said that GOL was in deep trouble, and often had little or no idea of what to do next. He said that what was being proposed was not a unilateral CIA effort to respond but a unified USG effort to find an advisor or advisors qualified with experience in less developed nations who could give intelligent and timely advice to the GOL at the highest levels. [classification marking not declassified]

Dr. Brzezinski then asked what was to prevent the Embassy from rendering such a service. (C)

Mr. Carlucci said he felt the GOL leadership would prefer to have such high-level advice come from a private source not openly identified directly with the U.S. government. [portion marking not declassified]

Dr. Brzezinski then asked for clarification on how the action would be covert, in what respect. (S)

Mr. Carlucci responded that we could work [less than 1 line not declassified] to engage a consultant qualified to give economic and political policy advice, as a consultant to and employee of the GOL. He said that CIA had no particular candidate and would leave the selection to State if that were desired.

Mr. Claytor noted that State and CIA could coordinate closely in such a project. (S)

Mr. Carlucci said that the idea was to have the consultant report regularly to the Ambassador.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that he was left with the impression from last week’s foreign policy breakfast² that the President was generally favorably disposed to the idea of providing close advice to the GOL. He then asked for State’s specific concerns about the proposal. (S)

Mr. Newsom said that

—State can provide the required advice overtly.

—Much advice can be provided effectively by international organizations such as IMF and World Bank.

—Covert advice would tend to tie us too closely to a Doe regime which may fall.

—AID can provide much useful advice overtly.

—GOL can hire consultants on their own.

Mr. White, in response to the Chairman’s request for other views, said that in general advice of the kind contemplated should be overt insofar as possible, but there should be no objection to covert advice per se.

Dr. Brzezinski then suggested that covert advice should be seen as supplemental to overt advice, and should not necessarily exclude it. (S)

Admiral Murphy noted that covert action had the advantage of providing for quick action, as was called for in this case. (S)

Mr. Newsom said that there was an impression that the GOL had not really asked us for covert assistance of this kind.

Mr. Carlucci responded that this was not the case, but rather that such requests had been made repeatedly. He said the requests had not been made in detail, because it was impossible to get into a detailed discussion until a Finding was put forward to allow such discussions. [classification marking not declassified]

Mr. Newsom asked what advantage was to be had by providing advice covertly as opposed to overtly in this case. (S)

Mr. Carlucci [less than 1 line not declassified]

—would keep U.S. Government officials from direct identification with the GOL leadership.

—[2 lines not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

Dr. Brzezinski asked if it was stating State’s position clearly to say that there was no objection to covert action per se, but that it was not necessary in this case. (S)

Mr. Spiers responded that

—on the question of economic advice, there was objection, since such advice was bound to be hard and we would prefer to see non-USG people deliver the bad news.

—on the question of political advice, it is more appropriate that U.S. citizens render such advice.

—therefore, GOL should be encouraged to follow the lead of the IMF in looking for economic advice. (S)

Mr. Carlucci noted that the record of less developed countries in searching out sound advice on their own is not good, and that we must realize that the GOL needs help in knowing how to approach and cope with the IMF in eliciting and acting on its advice. [portion marking not declassified]

Mr. Newsom noted that there were some sophisticated people in the field of economics presently in the GOL. But that in any case, any advice should be given government to government, and not to Sargent Doe. (S)

Mr. Carlucci said that the proposal was to advise at the highest levels of the GOL, and not individual persons.

Dr. Brzezinski [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Newsom [2 lines not declassified] He went on to note that the Ambassador was on record as opposing the proposal. [classification marking not declassified]

Dr. Brzezinski then suggested that since we appeared to have two views,—first, that covert action is dangerous and unnecessary, and second, that we should have the option to act covertly in specific instances in a supplementary way,—we might wish to draw up a brief description of each view to put before the President. (S)

In response to an inquiry from Admiral Murphy, Mr. Newsom read a message from the Ambassador stating his position on the need for economic and political advice, and on the question of how to provide it.³ (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he found the Ambassador’s position to be sensible, and that perhaps there was no real difference in perceived objectives and little difference in approach. (S)

Mr. Newsom suggested that he still felt that overt advice such as could be provided by AID, was the best approach, [1 line not declassified].

Dr. Brzezinski said that there seemed to be three options: disapprove, approve, or find some middle ground. (S)

Mr. Newsom said there was a fourth option: to await the result of discussions to be held by Assistant Secretary Moose and Congressman Gray in Liberia the first week of June.⁴ (S)

Mr. Claytor commented that it was dangerous to wait; Dr. Brzezinski concurred, and then suggested that the Committee could agree that advice should be overt wherever possible, to be supplemented by covert advice where necessary, and in the case of economic advice, should be provided by non-U.S. sources. (S)

Mr. Claytor suggested that if we relied too heavily on overt advice we might tend to lose some control. Both Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Newsom said this was not necessarily the case. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said he felt that [2 lines not declassified].

Mr. Newsom agreed, [2 lines not declassified].

Mr. Jayne noted that the proposal called for only two man-years, and that much more would be required. (S)

Mr. Bass noted that a Finding was not necessary unless it was decided to take up the option for rendering advice on a covert basis. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked Mr. Funk to read the operative language that the meeting had agreed to amend the proposal, as it would be described in the Finding. Mr. Carlucci offered alternative wording which was agreed upon unanimously, as follows:

“Wherever possible provide advice and assistance overtly, either by U.S. advisers or through international organizations, such advice to be supplemented, particularly in the public administration and political areas, by covert advice [1 line not declassified]. In economic areas, advisers should be non-American insofar as possible.” [classification marking not declassified]

Dr. Brzezinski asked Mr. Carlucci and Mr. Funk to agree on precise wording for final clearance with State.⁵ (S)

The meeting adjourned at 2:50 p.m. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes 4/16/80–8/6/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Presumably the President’s foreign policy breakfast on May 16 with Brzezinski, Christopher, Harold Brown, White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, and Presidential Adviser Hedley Donovan. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.
3. In telegram 4471 from Monrovia, May 15, the Ambassador outlined the economic and political difficulties that Liberia faced in the near term, along with several suggestions for actions that the United States could take to alleviate the problems. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800240–0790)
4. See Document 62.
5. In a May 23 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski forwarded a Summary of Conclusions and recommended: “That you approve the Summary of Conclusions (Tab A), and sign the Finding (Tab B). Carter checked the “yes” box and initialed “J.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes 4/16/80–8/6/80)