Attached are some thoughts that I have put together in the process of trying
to think constructively about the Horn. I hope you find them of some
use.
I have discussed this general approach with my North-South colleagues and
some others. I have profited from the discussion but would not suggest that
they fully support what I have written.
Attachment
Paper Prepared by Thomas
P. Thornton of the National Security Council
Staff2
POLICY TOWARD THE HORN
1. Personally, I am quite willing to let events take their course as
regards the Soviet role in the region. I think they will gain little
from their efforts in the short run and probably be heavy losers in the
not distant future (i.e., less than five years). As long as Mengistu is not desperate, he is not
going to be a Soviet toady. Also, I dispute the idea that the Horn is of
notable strategic value unless you are going to fight World War II over
again. I do not believe that any likely US policy course will result in
the Finlandization of Saudi Arabia, and think that we have quite a bit
to gain internationally by standing above the battle.
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2. These views may not be universally held (although they find
substantial support among those of us involved in North-South matters).
Whether or not they are accepted may not matter all that much; the
constraints imposed by our capabilities to act decisively may lead us to
much the same courses of action as would a relaxed attitude.
3. We do not have domestic support for a dramatic involvement in the
Horn. Most of those who would berate us for our weakness vis-a-vis the
Soviets will quickly get under the table if the question of personnel or
large-scale military assistance arises. The worst
thing that can happen to this administration, abroad and at home, is to
be seen as ineffective—i.e., talking big and not being able to follow
up.
4. We seem to have two principal goals:
—Increase the cost the Soviets and Cubans will have to pay to enhance
their position, and keep them from enhancing it to the extent
possible.
—Prevent a Somali collapse, either through invasion or subversion. Note
that a Somali victory is not among our interests.
5. We need to define a rhetorical and political position that will help
us achieve these ends with minimum involvement on our part. We should
stake out the high ground clearly by saying:
—We do not and have never supported Somali territorial aspirations.
—We stand by the principle of inviolability of African borders—and this
includes the Somalis’ own border.
—We urge great power restraint; preferably this means non-involvement.
When there is involvement it must be proportionate. We reluctantly
accept the fact of the Soviets helping the Ethiopians. We do not accept,
however, the massive scale of the involvement which raises questions as
to ultimate Soviet intentions.
—We should emphasize the role of regional responsibility; in the first
instance the OAU mediation
responsibility; in the second instance, the role of neighboring states
to assist Somalia if it is attacked.
6. A prerequisite to any effective action along the above lines is the
withdrawal of Somali forces from Ethiopia, or at least a general
perception that withdrawal is about to be effected by one means or the
other.
Tactics
7. A major difficulty in pursuing our propaganda line will be to convey
an adequate picture of Soviet involvement without creating unnecessary
pressures here at home or among allies. The matter should be approached
with calm and dignity—more sorrow than anger. The danger is not to us or
to our interests but to Africa, to the states of the
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general region and to world stability. For
domestic consumption we point out that the President is determined not
to get us bogged down.
8. While we have an interest in raising the cost of involvement to the
Soviets, this should not entail attempts to prolong the fighting in the
hope of getting the Soviets enmired in a mini-Vietnam. The main cost of
such a policy would be in terms of the lives of Ethiopians and Somalis,
and there is no US interest at stake that would permit us to do that in
good conscience.
9. In addressing the international audience, the cost to the Soviets can
be raised by a vigorous propaganda campaign. For example, we should be
getting pictures of Soviet ships ferrying troops to Ethiopia and
flooding the European and Third World media with them. We would
emphasize not the threat to the US but the disproportionate and
dangerous nature of the Soviet response. There will be unhelpful
playback at home, but this can be attenuated by the same themes. (We
need not respond as forcefully to Soviet bad behavior if it is not a
direct threat to us.)
10. Overall, our tactics should be aimed for maximum effect when our
political position will be strongest—i.e., when the Somalis are out of
Ethiopia, which is likely to be sooner rather than later.
11. We should be very receptive to the idea of going to the UN Security
Council. Our hands are clean and the Soviets’ are not. Even the Somalis
will look good once they have pulled back. (There is a certain
similarity to the role of North Korea before and after it was driven
back behind the 38th Parallel.) There is a threat to the peace and this
is just the kind of thing that the Security Council should be
discussing. Obviously it should look to the OAU as its instrument if the OAU could be effective. “Meddling” by the
UNSC plus a Somali withdrawal
might provide the context to galvanize the OAU.
12. If we are going to help the Somalis, it should be through third
country transfers. Indeed, the current situation raises questions as to
whether our self-imposed limitations on third country transfers make
sense. There are certain things that we should help other people to do
that we would not be willing to do ourselves. We should not unduly tie
their (and our own) hands. Quite aside from the immediate situation,
this is a policy that we should review.
13. Finally, we should design policies that will give Ethiopia a maximum
amount of incentive and flexibility in the short and mid-term to shift
away from the Soviets. Pressure is one aspect of this, but it must be
accompanied by clear indications that we are not unalterably opposed to
vital Ethiopian interests. In other words, we must not become totally
identified with the Somali cause. (The Arabs were able to diversify only
after it became clear to them that we were not committed to Israel 150
percent.)
