Attached is State’s outgoing cable summarizing its much publicized 5-power
Horn Meeting this past weekend.2 It is a remarkable testimonial to the poverty of
real thinking in State on this key problem. You will notice that the U.S.
side never raised the key issue: how to get the Soviets
out of the Horn and keep Ethiopia from locking itself into a
relationship of dependence upon the USSR
(I did raise it, but I get no credit in this cable) and there is no discussion of the Cubans at all! Everything
centers on circular discussion of negotiations (how diplomats love to
negotiate!) and there is no realism about how one can establish any
preconditions for negotiation. There was also no discussion about Eritrea
(again I raised it but get no credit in this cable) and its important
relationship to the Ogaden conflict and the problem of Soviet and Cuban
presence. —I am extremely skeptical about the socalled “Dobrynin initiative”. State seems lusting
to draw the Soviets into discussion of the Horn, just as they earlier rushed
to invite the Soviets into the Egyptian-Israeli talks. —I have underlined
other noteworthy sections of the report and made a few marginal comments
which I believe are worth your noting because I suspect Vance will be setting forth this plan at
Thursday’s SCC meeting as a basis for
action of some sort.3
Attachment
Telegram From the Department of State to Selected
Diplomatic Posts4
Washington, January 24, 1978, 0233Z
18370. Subject: Five Power Meeting on the Horn of Africa.
1. Begin summary: Representatives of five Western states met in
Washington on January 21, 1978 to discuss the conflict in the Horn of
Africa. The senior participants were Assistant Secretary Richard Moose for the United States,
Assistant Under Secretary Philip Mansfield for the United Kingdom,
Director of African and Malagasy Affairs Guy Georgy for France, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Helmut Mueller for the Federal Republic of Germany,
and Counselor of Embassy Giancarlo Carrara-Cagni for Italy. Group
concluded that time had come to press for a negotiated solution based on
an autonomous Ogaden to reflect interests of inhabitants, combined with
Somali Government withdrawal from Ethiopian territory. Group noted
recent Soviet approach to French along these lines, and participants
agreed to explore this possibility with concerned states. British
expressed interest in pursuing UNSC
resolution. Consensus was that peaceful resolution of crisis depended on
departure of GSDR forces from Ogaden.
End summary.
2. Present military situation: It was agreed that during the present
relative battlefield lull the Somalis were preparing for at least one
more attack on Harar and perhaps Dire Dawa. The Somalis were credited
with high morale, but their air defense capability was weak. They had
probably less than a fifty percent chance of success. While it was
believed that Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR) had had some success in arranging
for light arms, no participant believed GSDR had been able to obtain quantities of heavy or
sophisticated weapons needed to counterbalance longer term Soviet
supplies to Ethiopian Provisional Military Government (EPMG).
3. EPMG has established general air
superiority and succeeded in carrying out air raids on Hargeisa and
Berbera, but troop morale remains low and discipline and command/control
structures are weak. According to US analysis, Ethiopian Air Force, with
Cuban and Soviet support and possibly some degree of participation, will
be able to
[Page 99]
launch an expanded
air offensive by early February, and launch counterattacks of less than
full scale between now and May. It is unlikely EPMG can launch a successful general counterattack before
June. (Mueller pointed out that air attacks against Somali population
centers might have a serious effect on President Siad’s position. Germans have been
told that a number of young Somali military officers had opposed
Siad’s anti-Soviet
moves.)
4. Probable objectives of an Ethiopian counter-offensive: US
representatives have been assured by Mengistu that EPMG
does not consider Somali territory to be a military objective and
Soviets have said that EPMG has
pledged not to use Soviet equipment outside of Ethiopia. Although these
assurances might be worth little in the heat of battle, EPMG might be deterred from crossing into
Somalia by knowledge that such a move would cost them the diplomatic
advantage gained as defenders of OAU
principle of territorial integrity, and might, in addition, bring other
countries (such as Iran) to reverse their present position of holding
back moral and material support from GSDR. However, it was also noted that difficulty of
retaking Ogaden might bring EPMG
nonetheless to strike into northern Somalia in order to bargain for
Somali withdrawal from Ogaden. Concern was also expressed over
possibility that EPMG might carry out
grave reprisals against Ogaden population during reconquest.
5. Status of current mediation efforts: Somalis are publicly pledged to
negotiate in any suitable place (i.e. anywhere but Addis Ababa or
Moscow), and without preconditions, but we have no indication that they
have begun seriously to think about the outlines of a negotiated
solution. It was agreed that the Ethiopian position remains that
negotiations must be preceded by withdrawal of all GSDR forces from Ethiopian territory.
However, EPMG representative has said
his government was studying ways to implement the policy of autonomy for
the various “nationalities”.
6. While Nigerian/OAU effort has made no
progress, Nigerians are now canvassing the eight nation OAU commission to see if there is
agreement on inviting Somalia and Ethiopia to meet in Lagos in February.
The Madagascar negotiation initiative seems to have foundered, although
Ethiopian and Somali delegations have both (separately) visited
Antananarivo. The French representative said that Ratsiraka had
reportedly succeeded in arranging a meeting between Siad and Mengistu, but that the meeting had failed because of
Soviet opposition to Mengistu’s
participation.
7. Elements of a possible negotiated solution: While admitting that the
prospects for a negotiated solution were not good, it was agreed that a
basis for compromise might be found between the Ethiopian stated policy
promising the various Ethiopian “nationalities” the right
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to self-determination and
self-government in autonomous regions, and the Somali Government’s
assertion that all it seeks is self-determination of the Ogadeni-Somali
people. The establishment of a largely autonomous government of the
region of the Ogaden which maintained a continuing link with the Addis
regime might satisfy the Ethiopian desire to preserve its sovereignty
over the area while providing the Ogadenis sufficient control over their
affairs to induce Somalia to abandon its goal of incorporating the
Ogaden. The arrangement would presumably require some form of guarantee,
whether by the UN, the OAU or a joint
OAU/Arab League undertaking. Before
any negotiation of the form of government could take place, the fighting
would have to be stopped, by ceasefire or perhaps by recognition of a
stalemate. Ethiopia would not agree to a simple ceasefire in place, but
insists that Somalia’s forces be withdrawn. Somalia would not agree to
withdrawal of its forces, at least until it was confident that the
members of the Western Somali Liberation Front and, indeed, the
non-combatant Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden would be protected from
Ethiopian reprisals. It would therefore appear necessary for a neutral
peacekeeping force supplemented by a neutral administrative body to
monitor the withdrawal of Somali Government forces and to administer the
Ogaden until a negotiated settlement had been reached.5
8. French rep reported on January 20 luncheon conversation between French
Ambassador and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin during which Dobrynin outlined his “personal ideas” on how a peaceful
settlement might be achieved. Dobrynin proposed 4-point approach:
(A) Somali Government to announce its willingness to withdraw troops from
Ogaden in two weeks;
(B) Ethiopia and Somalia undertake thereafter to sit down to work out a
settlement;
(C) Settlement would affirm respect for existing borders;
(D) Settlement would provide for an autonomous state for the population
of the Ogaden in “confederation” with Ethiopia. In response to question,
Dobrynin did not rule out
possibility that a neutral peacekeeping force such as UN could be
inserted between contending sides to ensure against Ethiopian reprisal
attacks on Ogadeni population. Meeting noted that Dobrynin intervention obviously
planned with quinquepartite meeting next day in mind and might be a ruse
to keep West off balance, but was nonetheless worth probing, since under
Dobrynin formulation Somali
troop withdrawal would take place only following an Ethiopian
undertaking to negotiate a settlement that
[Page 101]
would include an autonomous Ogaden, meeting agreed
that Dobrynin proposals, if
genuine, represented an advance of Soviet position.6
9. Soviet (and Cuban) presence: French representative Georgy noted that
the problem of the Horn was primarily a geopolitical one—Soviet
penetration of an area of importance to the West and to the Arab world
from which the Soviets have been almost entirely excluded. Soviet
military supplies are being furnished Ethiopia in amounts in excess of
what would be needed for the Ogaden war, and will serve Soviet strategic
advantage in consolidating a position first in an Ethiopia where the old
elites—the Westernized intellectuals, the clergy, and the
bourgeoisie—have been dispossessed, later in destabilizing Kenya
following the death of Kenyatta,
and even regaining a position in Somalia where many Soviet-formed cadre
in the military must be assumed to be ready to take power if the
opportunity arises.7
The solution to the Ogaden conflict, if one could indeed be found, would
not solve the problem of the Horn from the Western and moderate Arab
point of view. However, it was generally agreed that a solution to the
Ogaden conflict would at least remove the principal pretext for the
expanding Soviet military presence.
10. British representative Mansfield said Foreign Secretary Owen believed
that the time was ripe for further efforts to promote negotiation.8
Mansfield circulated a draft Security Council resolution which might be
submitted to express the support of the international community for a
negotiated solution. The suggested text was as follows:
The Security Council, expressing its concern over the present hostilities
in the Ogaden region of Africa, concerned at the loss of life and human
suffering, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations open square brackets concerning the peaceful settlement of
disputes, as well as close square brackets particularly the various
provisions of Chapter VI concerning procedures and methods for the
peaceful settlement of disputes, commending the efforts made by the Good
Offices Committee of the Organization of African Unity to seek a
settlement of the conflict,
1. Calls upon the parties concerned to cease hostilities and to end the
conflict in the Ogaden.
2. Calls on the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to enter into early
discussions aimed at securing a negotiated settlement.
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3. Requests the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a
special representative to visit the area and enter into contact with the
parties concerned in order to promote a negotiated settlement.
4. Calls on the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to cooperate with the
special representative in the execution of his task and requests the
Secretary General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.9
Mansfield believed this might be acceptable to both the GSDR and the EPMG.10 If the Nigerians
and President Bongo favored a
UNSC resolution, Western powers
could support the effort. Meeting stressed necessity to avoid actions
which gave appearance of upstaging OAU
efforts. (The US and other participants had doubts that British proposal
as drafted would attract sufficient support to be passed.)
11. All parties further agreed that it would be in Western interest to
maintain pressure for negotiations and explore possibility of a
settlement as discussed above. The Italian representatives felt their
government, when they had one, might agree to approach the Ethiopians to
test their reaction to the outlines of a negotiated solution. The UK representatives agreed to speak to
Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba
during his January 22 London stopover to discuss the outline of a
suggested negotiated solution and to raise the possibility of a Security
Council resolution as a means of support for the OAU mediation effort. The UK representative also agreed that they
might be a logical choice to approach the Cubans. The German
representative agreed to discuss negotiations with OAU President Bongo during his visit to Bonn January 23. French
representative Georgy agreed to encourage the Madagascar initiative in
conversations with Ratsiraka.
12. The US side agreed to raise the Horn question with the Soviet Union
in the context of the bilateral relationship,11 although the US
side was not in a position to say what weight would be given the Soviet
role in the Horn in the over-all US/Soviet context. The US would also
consider raising matter in context Indian Ocean talks as suggested by
Mr. Georgy. The US would also consider discussing the matter with the
Yugoslavs, a state with some hope of influence in Addis Ababa, and to
continue discussion with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran.
13. Reply to Siad’s request: The
British, Germans, Italians and the US representatives all said their
governments would not give military supplies to either side so long as
the conflict continued. The French
[Page 103]
were willing to consider providing some light
arms, but the GSDR had rejected a
previous offer and presumably remained uninterested in anything but
heavy or sophisticated military equipment. It was agreed by all that the
replies to Siad’s most recent
request for troops would be that the Western states could not provide
the military assistance desired because of the GSDR presence in Ethiopian territory. Siad should be encouraged to negotiate
a solution and reflect on conditions under which he would withdraw
Somali forces from the Ogaden, a move which would facilitate Western
aid. It was further agreed that the replies would be given individually
(the US and the UK having already
conveyed a public refusal to send troops). Some of the Western powers
would perhaps be more willing to consider military assistance after a
GSDR withdrawal. Georgy made it
clear that because of Djibouti, France would not give more than light
defensive arms, even in the event of a Somali withdrawal.
14. Italian representatives stated that they could not commit GOI to a
joint Western approach to Garba,
Bongo or others. It was
therefore agreed that all approaches discussed would be made in a
bilateral context.
15. A press statement was issued at the close of the meeting affirming
support for a negotiated solution and the efforts of the
Nigerian-chaired OAU mediation
committee (State 17279).12
