1. Action Required. That you release the attached
Memorandum of Notification (MON) to the Members of the Special Coordination
Committee.
The attached MON is revised to reflect discussions which took place involving
CIA, NSC, Department of Justice and Department of [Page 297] State representatives.3 The MON’s revision stemmed from the
Department of State’s concern that an earlier version of the MON appeared to
describe the aim of the program to be the destabilization of Mengistu’s regime, which was not our
intent.
3. Authority. Our position is that this operation is
covered by the language and consistent with the basic spirit and thrust of
the 16 April 1980 Presidential Finding on Ethiopia, which in part authorizes
“contacting and supporting appropriate elements in the Ethiopian Government,
political opposition and other pertinent sectors in Ethiopia and
abroad.”
4. Staff Position. This MON has been coordinated with
OGC, OLC and Director, NFAC.
All portions Secret.
Attachment
Memorandum of Notification to the Members of the
Special Coordination Committee
5
SUBJECT
- Expanded Support to Ethiopian Oppositionists
REFERENCE
- Presidential Finding on Ethiopia Dated 16 April 1980
1. Background: This Memorandum is a revision of
the 24 October 1980 Memorandum of Notification to the SCC. The 16 April 1980 Presidential
Finding authorizes CIA to use liaison
and unilateral assets to “foster opposition to the pro-Soviet character
of the present Ethiopian regime and encourage pro-Western attitudes in
Ethiopia.” This ongoing [Page 298] covert
program has had some tactical successes in recent months, and there is
growing evidence that key Ethiopian officials are disenchanted with
their dependence on the Soviet Union for aid and advice. The aim of
CIA’s program is to heighten this
disenchantment and to try to move Mengistu toward closer relations with the United States
Government and other Western countries. The goals of this program do not
include Mengistu’s overthrow,
nor does the Agency seek to confront the current regime in any military
sense.
Within this context, CIA proposes to
expand its support to Ethiopian oppositionists to provide for dissident
activities and sentiment. Several anti-regime and secessionist groups
exist, but they are oriented toward maintaining military pressure on the
regime to achieve their own narrow goals, e.g., independence for Tigre
Province, for the Oromo tribe, for Eritrea Province. Opposition to the
regime is severely fragmented. Some opposition leaders are too Marxist,
others too ethnic, regional or royalist to attract a significant
following. Moreover, since most of the regime’s active opponents are
secessionists, the nationalist high ground has been yielded to the
regime, which acquires some measure of legitimacy as the sole force
working to prevent the fragmentation of the country. Ethiopians inside
and outside the country who oppose the regime and
secessionism have nowhere to turn and, as a result, the regime faces no
unified, credible opposition.
2. Operational Plan: We plan to establish a loose
grouping of exiled Ethiopians who are articulating selected moderate
programs which they will encourage the present government to adopt. This
is not intended as a mechanism to overthrow Mengistu, but instead is designed to encourage
moderation of the regime’s policies and the inclusion of more moderate
voices within the existing government. The collegium would be small (a
dozen principals and about 15 staff assistants) and handpicked to
include some prominent Ethiopians with proven competence and experience
in their fields (former cabinet ministers, diplomats, jurists,
professors, economists). The associates will meet infrequently in
Europe, and most of their work will be done as individuals where they
now reside in the U.K., U.S., Sweden and West Germany. All have been
contacted and have agreed to work on this project full time or part time
over the next two years. They are prepared to begin working immediately.
Only a select few of them will be witting of CIA’s sponsorship of their activities which will be
coordinated by an Ethiopian with whom CIA has been working closely for the past seven months.
Each member of the group will be responsible for:
—developing a plan to revamp Ethiopian Government policy in his field of
specialization;
—spotting potential sympathizers in key positions working in his field
inside Ethiopia.
[Page 299]
—finding ways to insinuate more moderate, pragmatic solutions to
Ethiopians’ problems into the regime’s programs (using personal
contacts, focused publicity and propaganda, etc.)
Members of the group will develop programs to redirect Ethiopia’s
economic ties to communist countries, revamp its revolutionary justice
system; mitigate the effects of six years of Marxist propaganda in its
schools; redraft the constitution and social legislation; wean the armed
forces and security services away from dependence on Soviet and Cuban
advisors and equipment; reorganize the labor union along more democratic
lines; relax restrictions on journalists and the clergy; and co-opt
certain secessionist leaders into supporting the concept of limited
regional autonomy within a unified Ethiopian state.
3. Goals:
—Stimulate opposition to Marxist policies and programs within
Ethiopia;
—Encourage moderation of the regime’s policies and more moderate voices
within the existing government;
—Work to disaffect key nationalists in positions of power within the
regime by publicizing alternative programs developed by former
colleagues with established professional credentials.
4. [8½ lines not declassified]
5. Policy Authority:
CIA believes that this operation is
covered by the language and consistent with the basic spirit and thrust
of the 16 April 1980 Presidential Finding on Ethiopia, which in part
authorizes “contacting and supporting appropriate elements in the
Ethiopian Government, political opposition and other pertinent sectors
in Ethiopia and abroad.” At the same time, it should be noted that the
specific recommendation to create an association of exiled Ethiopian
oppositionists was not included in any of the political action options
CIA submitted for SCC review last March as part of our
proposed CA program for Ethiopia at that
time.6 Furthermore, the estimated costs of the
particular operation over the next two years are more than double the
combined cost of the rest of our Ethiopian CA program. Given these considerations, CIA is hereby notifying the SCC of this proposed activity prior to
implementation.
6. Subsequent Reporting: Reporting on this
operation will be submitted to SCC as
results become available.
7. Implementation: Members were notified by
memorandum on 24 October 1980 of CIA’s
intention to move forward with the implementation of this proposal if no
objections were perceived by close of business [Page 300] 31 October 1980. The Department of State requested
that this memorandum be revised to include the clarification of
objectives appearing in the first paragraph of the Background section
above. On 7 November 1980, representatives of the Department of State,
Department of Justice, NSC and CIA agreed in a meeting at the Department
of State that the proposal for a grouping of Ethiopian oppositionists
could be implemented on the understanding that the objective of the
program would be later clarified in this revised Memorandum of
Notification. The representatives agreed that the proposal was
consistent with the existing finding and represented an expansion of the
present program within the scope of the existing finding. This
memorandum is provided for record purposes only and represents the
agreement concerning the objectives of the program as described herein
which the Agency has been authorized by the SCC to implement.
