1. Editorial Note
By 1977, U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa had been in flux for several years. Ethiopia’s increasing radicalization and anti-U.S. sentiment resulted in decreased U.S. access to bases and airfields, as well as the erosion of a longstanding relationship with an important regional ally. The Ford administration debated the merits of military and economic engagement. The decreased importance of Kagnew Station, a multi-purpose U.S. military installation in Asmara, Eritrea, as a communications base and the development of Kenya and Sudan as more consistent regional allies made the argument for continued engagement less compelling.
However, members of the administration who were concerned about Soviet inroads in Somalia argued that a diminished U.S. presence in Ethiopia would be perceived as a Cold War “loss,” and believed that regional instability would result. Contributing to those concerns was the impending independence of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (Djibouti). Djibouti’s port, essential to Ethiopian foreign trade, was coveted by Somali irredentists. The Ford administration feared that war between Ethiopia and Somalia over Djibouti was a distinct possibility.
During the Presidential transition, an interdepartmental group weighed the relative merits of halting or continuing the arms pipeline to Ethiopia, whether to be proactive with economic aid, and whether Ethiopian moderates would benefit from U.S. support. (See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 170.) The Carter administration entered office with these issues unresolved.