99. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

5379. Khartoum please pass to Amb Young. Subject: Namibia: Mtgs With Fourie Nov 24.

Summary. SYG Waldheim’s Special Rep for Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari, briefed MisOff Blacken late Nov 24 on status of talks with South African State Secty for FonAff Brand Fourie. Talks with Fourie have resulted in some clarification, but have not resolved basic issues. Key hang-ups remain South Africa’s (1) insistence upon establishing a fixed date for UN-supervised elections to be adhered to irrespective of whether a cessation of violence and a reduction of South African troops occurs; (2) size and composition of UNTAG; and (3) SAG refusal to agree to a date for UNTAG deployment until these issues are settled. Also Fourie has reaffirmed earlier SAG position that FonMin Botha [Page 264] would not be able to make decision on date for UNTAG deployment without returning to South Africa for discussion with his Cabinet.

Concerning the December elections, SAG position remains ambiguous. While stating that the UN will not have to deal with the elected reps, the SAG hopes that UN will do so. Fourie has stated that the December “elections would give an indication whether the elected reps would represent the people of Southwest Africa.” Under direct questioning, Fourie responded that the UN-supervised elections would be for a Constituent Assembly. Ahtisaari said that Waldheim and he believe that no real progress will be achieved during the visit unless Botha will discuss and hopefully agree upon a phased implementation of the SYG’s report and drop his insistence upon setting a fixed date for the UN-supervised elections. Ahtisaari said that he and the SYG, in preparing the SYG’s report for Nov 25, had done their best to put a positive tone on a situation that remains negative. He inquired whether Secty Vance might be willing to talk with Botha to emphasize the importance of dropping SAG insistence on a fixed election date and instead agree to a date for UNTAG deployment and phased implementation of the SYG’s plan. End summary.

1. During two sessions Nov 24, SYG Waldheim and SR Ahtisaari concentrated on obtaining answers from Fourie to questions on outstanding issues. Essence of answers is provided below.

2. Cooperation by South African Govt:

Fourie referred to South African cooperation in the past but said that differences between the Western proposal and the SYG’s report had become apparent. The gap in understanding had been narrowed through subsequent talks, but had not been eliminated. The purpose of the present talks between Fourie and subsequently FonMin Botha with SYG Waldheim is to create understanding on the basis of which Res 435 could be implemented. Fourie said SAG’s sincerity is illustrated by the fact that although the SYG did not agree to send Ahtisaari to Windhoek as envisaged by the joint statement of Oct 19, the SAG was sending the FonMin to New York for discussions with SYG.

3. Deployment of UNTAG:

The kickoff date depends entirely upon reaching agreement on “outstanding points”. Main outstanding points were the establishment of a fixed date for the UN-supervised elections and reaching agreement on the size and composition of the UN force.

4. Provisional target date for the election under supervision and control of United Nations:

Fourie referred to the joint statement, para 3, in which it referred to Ahtisaari’s visit to conduct “discussions to work out the modalities of the proposed elections under United Nations supervision and to fix [Page 265] a date for these elections.” Fourie then referred to para 4 of the joint statement outlining the SAG’s position which stipulated that the SR would consult with Administrator-General Steyn on all aspects of the SYG’s report. The South African Govt’s position is that the election date, once determined, would be a firm date, not a provisional one, and that no party could delay the election. The date should be adhered to irrespective of whether there is a cessation of hostility and a subsequent reduction of South African troops.

5. UN police monitors:

The SYG’s explanatory statement of Sept 29 had removed the SAG’s concern about the character and role of UN police. The exact number can be determined by Ahtisaari and Steyn on the ground.

6. Agreement on status of UNTAG:

Fourie stated progress had been made on the proposed agreement but a limited number of issues remain to be resolved. Given understanding on both sides, the obstacles do not appear insurmountable. He referred to it as a technical document.

7. Question of ceasefire:

SAG position remains as set out in a communication addressed to the Western Five on Sept 12. Fourie commented that “the reduction of South African troops in Southwest Africa will only commence if and when a comprehensive cessation of violence has been brought about.”

8. The December elections:

Fourie reviewed previous South African statement concerning elections, including para 4 of the joint statement. He said he could see no direct link between the December election and the subsequent UN-supervised election. Concerning the functions of those elected in December, he repeated ex-Prime Minister Vorster’s statement of Sept 202 which indicated all options remain open to them (those elected). The SAG will not prescribe to them. The body to be elected may:

Decide to draw up a constitution or postpone the drafting thereof;

Decide to proceed with the implementation of the proposal of the Five;

Decide to accept the SYG’s report.

Fourie added that Prime Minister Botha had stated on Oct 19 that SAG would have the final say on these matters. The elections would give an indication whether the elected reps would represent the people of Southwest Africa. Fourie concluded with the following statement: Begin quote

[Page 266]

Throughout the discussions with the Five and subsequently the South African Govt has made it clear that it is for the Five and the SYG to decide whether, after the elections in December, they wish to continue to negotiate with the SAG. We have never suggested that they should not do so. On the other hand, they would be free, if they so wish, to consult and hold discussions with the elected reps. We for our part would welcome such discussions. We have always in the past advocated contact between the Five and the various political groups in the territory. End quote

9. During subsequent give and take, Fourie indicated that the size of the voter turnout would be one factor in determining status of those elected in December. However, he also agreed that the body elected in UN-supervised elections would be a Constituent Assembly.

10. Ahtisaari told MisOff that from the UN’s point of view the principal objective during the Botha visit would be to persuade the South Africans to agree to the phased implementation of the SYG’s plan. Although the SYG could agree to setting a provisional date for the UN-supervised elections once a date for deployment of UNTAG is established, he could not agree to the South African demand for a fixed date for the UN-supervised election.

11. Fourie has made clear that FonMin Botha will not be able to agree to a date for deployment of UNTAG while he is in New York. Such a decision would have to be referred to the Cabinet. Ahtisaari inquired whether Secty Vance would agree to talk with Botha in an attempt to persuade him to drop his insistence on fixing a date for UN-supervised elections before agreeing to a date for UNTAG deployment and to cooperate in the phased implementation of the UN plan.

Leonard
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780486–1080. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Kinshasa, Lagos, Khartoum, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 92.