77. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Namibia Negotiations

The five-nation Contact Group initiative on Namibia is moving into a critical period. After a generally unsuccessful round of negotiations in November–December of last year,2 the Contact Group decided that a round of “proximity talks” between South Africa and SWAPO in New York, based on a Contact Group settlement proposal, offered the best hope for achieving the necessary breakthroughs and averting a collapse of this effort.3 After considerable difficulty in arranging a time for these talks, the Contact Group agreed January 20 to propose to the parties that negotiations at the foreign minister level be held in New York February 10–11, 1978. The concept of holding the talks at the foreign minister level was approved by Secretary Vance, who has indicated that he would be available only on February 11 but that the talks should open on the 10th as proposed. The attached paper presents the major issues to be covered in the talks, the positions of SWAPO and South Africa, and the implications of the talks for the United States and the other members of the Contact Group.

Peter Tarnoff
[Page 198]

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State4

STATUS OF THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS

Introduction

The negotiations conducted by the Contact Group aimed at reaching an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibia problem have reached a decisive phase. In an effort to avert a breakdown of the talks and develop a compromise solution, the members of the Contact Group agreed January 20 to propose to South Africa and SWAPO a scenario for a round of proximity talks to be held in New York February 10–11 at the foreign minister level. Two days of preliminary talks at a lower level will be held on February 8 and 9. In the case of South Africa, this proposal will be made expressly contingent upon that country’s refraining from unilateral actions bearing directly upon issues under negotiation.

This latter point is of considerable importance in view of South Africa’s present determination to announce an election date for Namibia during a parliamentary “no-confidence” debate which opens January 30. The Contact Group has pointed out that this would be a unilateral move, prejudging negotiations, and has urged South Africa not to take such a step, thus far to no effect. It is likely that SWAPO would refuse to attend the proximity talks should South Africa proceed with this announcement.

In the days ahead, the Contact Group will have to make crucial decisions to enhance the possibilities for the success of the talks, and to deal with the contingencies that they may stall or break down entirely.

Remaining Issues

The latest series of talks between the Contact Group and the South Africans, SWAPO and the Front Line States failed to produce solutions for the two major remaining issues, the demand by South Africa that some of its troops be allowed to remain in Namibia through independence and the status of dissident SWAPO members currently held prisoner in Tanzania and Zambia. An increasingly important, though perhaps secondary issue, concerns the date of the Namibian elections. The South Africans have gone so far as to inform the Contact Group that [Page 199] the elections will be held during the first week of June 1978, and that they plan to announce the date around January 30. A South African cabinet meeting scheduled for January 24 may provide the occasion for key discussions on the Namibia problem. SWAPO could not accept June elections under any circumstances as this would not allow them sufficient time to return to Namibia and mount an effective campaign. If the South Africans go ahead and announce the election as planned, this will probably end any hope, at least for the time being, of a negotiated settlement.

South Africa’s Position

In discussing South Africa’s position on the Namibia question, we must start from the fact that South Africa is illegally occupying Namibia. This fact was recognized by the International Court of Justice in 1971 and by the United Nations Security Council in 1976 (Resolution 385 of January 1976). South Africa itself does not claim sovereignty over Namibia; it acknowledges a trust relationship to the Namibian people and an international responsibility to bring the region to independence. However, the South Africans are doing all they can to ensure that their influence over an independent Namibia is maximized. Consequently, while negotiating with the Contact Group the South Africans have been moving ahead with their preparations for an “internal solution” which they could rapidly bring into play if the Contact Group’s effort collapses.

SWAPO’s Position

As its maximum objective, SWAPO wants South Africa out of Namibia lock, stock and barrel prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign. This would include not only the South African armed forces but also the police and the civil administration. In view of its recognition by the UN General Assembly as the “sole authentic representative” of the people of Namibia, SWAPO would prefer to take power in Namibia without running the risk posed by free elections under UN supervision. However, during the negotiations SWAPO has agreed that the South African civilian administration can remain in place up to independence, they have accepted on a de facto basis the position of the South African Administrator General, and they have agreed that the post-independence government of Namibia should emerge from free elections supervised by the UN. SWAPO has steadfastly refused to accept any South African troop presence in Namibia after the beginning of the electoral campaign, a position which reflects the profound mistrust which SWAPO feels toward South Africa. SWAPO clearly believes that its chances in the elections would be severely compromised by the intimidating presence of the South African military. Just as South Africa has proceeded on the dual tracks of negotiating with the Contact Group [Page 200] and preparing the “internal solution”, so SWAPO has followed a dual policy of negotiating while preparing for a lengthy guerilla campaign if the negotiating track proves fruitless.

U.S. Interests

The United States is committed to an internationally acceptable solution in Namibia. The consequences of standing aside and acquiescing in a South African “internal settlement” would be a lengthy period of guerilla war in Namibia with an increasingly active Soviet role in support of SWAPO plus serious damage to the position of trust which we have built up over the last year among the Africans. The salient fact in the African and UN view of the problem is that South Africa has no legal right to be in Namibia. Consequently, no internal solution engineered by South Africa could gain international acceptance, and such a development would rapidly lead to demands in the United Nations for punitive action against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Western countries at the same time might well find the adoption of such sanctions both in conflict with their efforts to find solutions to other problems, such as Rhodesia, and unpopular domestically. Although the decision would be difficult for all the Western countries, we doubt that in the final analysis any one of us would be prepared to be seen internationally as South Africa’s protector on this issue.

Consequently, our basic interest continues to be an internationally acceptable solution along the lines proposed by the Contact Group. Should this prove impossible, we and our Allies will face a hard choice of either agreeing to sanctions against South Africa, resisting African pressures for such sanctions, or finding some new basis on which to continue the initiative of the Contact Group. Making such a renewed effort credible in the eyes of the Africans will be difficult.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 67, PRC 052, 2/17/78, Southern Africa—Rhodesia. Confidential.
  2. See Document 76.
  3. In telegram 5768 from USUN, December 22, 1977, the Mission reported on a December 21 meeting in which the Contact Group agreed to hold a round of “Proximity Talks” in New York. The meetings with the South African Government and SWAPO would be held at the same time, but in separate locations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770476–1049)
  4. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas N.T. Niles (IO/UNP) on January 20.