Office of the Historian

361. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, September 22, 1979, 4:40–5:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • [less than 1 line not declassified]

PARTICIPANTS

    • Department of State
    • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
    • William G. Bowdler, Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research
    • Allen W. Locke, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations (PM)

  • Department of Defense

    • James Siena, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Affairs, ISA

  • Central Intelligence Agency

    • Bruce Clarke, Director of National Foreign Assessment Center
    • [name not declassified], Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

  • Department of Energy

    • Harry Bergold, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs

  • National Security Council

    • Henry Owen, Chairman
    • William E. Odom
    • Jerry Schecter
    • Gerald Funk

Henry Owen convened the meeting and asked for an intelligence briefing followed by a discussion of the implications.

[4 paragraphs (21 lines) not declassified]

Henry Owen summed up the evidence as follows:

—Strong positive evidence.

—No negative evidence.

—A period of uncertainty during the next week until we corroborate [less than 1 line not declassified].

In the discussion of policy implications, the emerging key action question became whether or not the United States should make public the information we now have. All agreed that the U.S. must be the first to announce it, if it is valid. [2 lines not declassified] it was the judgment that:

[Page 1087]

—Our posture in the UN will be important, and the Soviet and African radicals will try to exploit the situation.

—Our bilateral options, beyond a demarche, may have to include commercial sanctions. The U.S. public posture will be terribly important for our African policy.

—African countries won’t blame the U.S., but rather South Africa.

—Of the Big Five countries, the most serious implications will be for Great Britain, somewhat less for Germany and France. State did not believe a public announcement of the evidence would hurt the conference underway in London on Rhodesia.

— U.S.-Soviet relations are not greatly affected, but we will have differences in how we deal with Southern Africa.

Henry Owen directed that another mini-SCC meeting be held at 11:00 a.m. Sunday in the Situation Room.2 He made the following taskings for that meeting:

a. CIA is to bring all new information and to provide a draft public announcement. [2 lines not declassified]

b. State is to contact our Embassy in South Africa, seeking any evidence which might corroborate [less than 1 line not declassified]. State will produce a U.S. policy options paper in draft by tomorrow.

c. Defense is to verify all U.S. strategic force locations so that we can be certain that no U.S. weapons accidentally exploded in the region. Defense will also check Soviet force locations for the same purpose.

d. All agency representatives should consult with their principles before the 11 o’clock meeting tomorrow for their views and clearances on a position on publicly announcing the evidence we now have.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 72, South Atlantic Nuclear Event: 9/79–6/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found.↩
  2. See Document 362.↩