346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa1
183943. Subject: Follow-up to Smith Talks.
1. Technical experts have reviewed information on, Kalahari provided Smith and Locke June 29 by General Lemmer.2 They conclude (a) US technical evidence contains no clear indications that types of activities described by Lemmer have taken place at Kalahari site, (b) visible features at site do not appear to fit Lemmer’s story and remain most explainable in terms of nuclear explosives testing, (c) it is not even clear that site described by Lemmer is the same as that to which US side has referred.
2. Under the circumstances, and in light of Lemmer’s request for our evidence and his offer to “annotate” the imagery, we feel it is appropriate to go back for further clarifications of Kalahari. Although we will not be able to give photographs to the SAG, as Lemmer asked, [Page 1056] we can show photos to SAG officials, afford them the opportunity to study these photos in presence of US rep, and leave with them for their reference and annotation a sketch based on the photos. FYI. We hope this gesture of reviewing evidence with the SAG will demonstrate our good faith and seriousness of purpose in seeking resolution of the Kalahari question, and encourage the SAG to provide enough specific information about the site to permit adequate clarification. End FYI.
3. We believe further US–SAG contacts on this question are appropriate even before the SAG reaches decisions on the nuclear settlement proposed in the June talks. While resolution of the Kalahari question (one way or another) is important to us to establish whether future US–SAG nuclear cooperation is appropriate and in our interests, we believe the SAG should see it as in its own interests to dispel doubts concerning its nuclear intentions, independently of progress toward resuming US–SAG nuclear cooperation.
4. You are authorized to take up this matter with Fourie along the lines of the preceding paragraphs, and seek assistance in arranging further discussions with General Lemmer or other appropriate authorities. We envisage further discussions with military on Kalahari running as follows:
A. In a first meeting with military authorities, we would present maps which identify the location of the site in Kalahari, to ensure that we and the South Africans are referring to the same site. (FYI, coordinates of site were passed to SAG last year). We would then introduce photographic evidence, reviewing features we see which have led our experts to the nuclear test thesis. We would then hand over the map and one or more sketches based on the photographs, so that the South Africans can satisfy themselves that the pictures they have seen represent the location to which we have referred in the maps, and do in fact depict features which have been or are present at the Kalahari site. We would ask that the SAG perform its examination expeditiously, and then return a copy of the sketch or sketches with as much annotation or explanation as it can supply, taking into account the need to accommodate its desire for secrecy with our mutual interest in putting the Kalahari issue to rest. We could assure the SAG that any information it provided would be held in the strictest confidence and made available only to the absolute minimum number of individuals in the USG.
5. We would hope that the SAG could return with annotations a copy of the sketch at a second meeting within a week, and that the meeting could be used to review and clarify on the spot as need be the information provided on Kalahari by the SAG.
6. In view of the seriousness and the sensitivity of this proposed exchange and its underlying purpose, we believe your personal [Page 1057] involvement in such discussions might be appropriate; we would appreciate your views on this and any other aspects of the proposal. We can pouch the maps, photographs and sketches for your use, together with additional descriptive material on the features of the site and the analysis and intelligence conclusions drawn by Washington. In addition, or alternatively, we can make available on short notice appropriate expertise from Washington to participate in the meetings, with or without you as you deem appropriate. Such an expert could hand carry the necessary materials, and thus permit the contemplated exchange independent of the classified pouch schedule.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 112, 7/15–31/78. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Lock; cleared by MacFarlane, Bowdler, Despres (CIA), Van Doren, Guhin, and Richard Castrodale (S/S); approved by Ambassador Smith. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–1993)↩
- See Document 345.↩