327. Intelligence Assessment1

RP 78–10003

Human Rights: South Africa And the United States

An Intelligence Assessment

[Omitted here is a table of contents]

NOTE

The heart of this paper is a relatively short essay that assesses the human rights situation in South Africa, the prospects for change, and the implications of this situation for the US. The essay attempts to transcend and put into perspective the wealth of detailed information available about South African racial and security legislation and specific instances of human rights abuses. Selections from this detailed information are appended as annexes.2

The paper uses Secretary Vance’s definition of human rights, which divides the concept into three broad categories:

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Individual Rights

—The right to be free from government violation of the integrity of the person.

—Freedom from torture.

—Freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

—Freedom from arbitrary arrest or punishment.

—The right to a fair public trial.

—Freedom from the invasion of one’s home.

Social and Economic Rights

—The right to the fulfillment of such basic human needs as food, shelter, health care, and education.

—Freedom from the diversion of resources to a self-serving elite at the expense of the needy.

—Freedom from government indifference to the plight of the poor.

Political and Civil Rights

—The right to enjoy civil and political liberties.

—Freedom of thought.

—Freedom of religion.

—Freedom of assembly.

—Freedom of speech.

—Freedom of the press.

—Freedom of movement both within and outside one’s country.

—Freedom to take part in government.

I. HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Ideology is not the issue in South Africa. It is justice.

Reverend Makhulu, a South African refugee in Botswana at a memorial service for Steve Biko.

Introduction: Jim Crow, South African Style. If one looks at the South African situation from the standpoint of human rights, one is tempted to conclude that human rights is the South African problem. This appears to be a logical assumption if one considers the events that have dramatized the human rights situation in South Africa in recent months:3

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—The death of black consciousness leader Steve Biko while in police custody in September 1977, less than a month after he had been detained in apparently robust good health.

—Revelations about the humiliating conditions under which Biko was held, the likelihood that damage to his brain resulted from police brutality, and indications that South African officials condoned and covered up police excesses.

—The security crackdown on 19 October 1977:

—The detention of over 50 black leaders and other activists, including the editor of the country’s largest black newspaper (The World), Percy Qoboza.

—The banning of 18 black consciousness or other anti-apartheid organizations, including two with which Biko had been prominently associated (the South African Students Association and the Black People’s Convention) and the multiracial Christian Institute.

—The banning of three publications, including The World.

—The banning of seven leading white critics of apartheid, including the head of the Christian Institute, Beyers Naude, and Donald Woods, the editor of an English-language paper and a personal friend of Biko.

Such actions are not unusual in South Africa. They reflect basic white South African attitudes about race and security. The government’s policy of apartheid4 is essentially an Afrikaner version of white supremacy, a concept which the Afrikaners clearly did not invent and which most English-speaking South African whites have generally shared. What distinguishes apartheid from the more relaxed and pragmatic white supremacy policies of the predominantly English-speaking white South African governments up to 1948 is an attempt to implement a systematic separation of the races. In South Africa, anything that threatens apartheid is considered a threat to national security, and anyone who criticizes apartheid is believed to be a Communist, a fellow traveler, or some other kind of subversive.

The Legal Basis for Repression. These attitudes are embodied in a complex of laws designed both to implement apartheid and to silence its critics.5 Many of the laws that buttress apartheid were on the books long before the National Party came to power in 1948, but their enforcement has been tightened and their scope enlarged over the past 30 years:

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Native Areas and Group Areas Laws prohibit blacks from owning land outside the 13 percent of the country that the government has designated as black homelands.

Influx Control Laws are designed to keep blacks in tribal homelands unless they have jobs.

Pass Laws require each black over 16 to carry a pocket-sized passbook containing basic personal data including tribal affiliation and permits showing where he or she can live or work. Blacks must be able to produce their passbooks on demand or risk fines and imprisonment. (About 300,000 to 400,000 blacks are convicted of Pass Law violations every year.)

Job Reservation Laws reserve jobs above a certain level of skill for whites.

Since 1948 the National Party governments have also added an intricate web of security laws that provide a variety of ways to intimidate critics and to silence those it regards as threats:

Petty harassment: police surveillance, searches without warrant, interrogations.

Preventing a person from leaving the country: refusing an application for a passport or withdrawing the passport of a person who already has one.

Banning: banning orders vary somewhat from person to person, but usually are for five-year periods and commonly include restricting the person’s movements to a given magisterial district, forbidding the person from meeting with more than one person (outside his or her immediate family) at a time, forbidding attendance at any social, public, or political gathering, forbidding visits to educational institutions or factories, forbidding publishing anything or being quoted, and forbidding the practice of certain professions. (About 160 persons are currently banned, about 40 of whom are white.) An organization can also be banned, in effect making it illegal and allowing the state to confiscate its assets.

Listing: former members of a banned organization can be “listed,” which subjects them to certain restrictions or prohibitions that in their totality are almost as inhibiting as a banning order.

House Arrest: confining a person to his or her residence, usually from sunset to sunrise, and requiring the person to report regularly to the local police headquarters. (Such persons would almost always be under banning orders as well.)

Banishment: blacks can be required to live in an area of the country remote from their homes.

Detention: persons can be arrested and incarcerated for up to a year at a time without coming to trial or being charged with the break[Page 992]ing of any law. They can be held in solitary confinement and incommunicado, even being denied a lawyer. After the period of their detention expires, they can be immediately re-arrested under the same terms so, conceivably, a person could be detained indefinitely without trial. (Over 700 persons are currently detained under the security laws.)

The fact that such security practices are entirely legal in South Africa is perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the country’s human rights situation. The Afrikaners are people of the Book, so they like to have a quotation from the Old Testament or the law to justify what they do. Their emphasis on legality, however, tends to blind them to criticism and to delude them about the international acceptability of their harsh practices.

The sweeping powers granted by the security laws also create an atmosphere conducive to abuse. Police do not hesitate to use force against unarmed demonstrators. Torture seems to have become a standard operating procedure in the interrogation of detainees. Forty-five security detainees are known to have died while in police custody since 1963 (23 since March 1976), several under highly suspicious circumstances that suggest police brutality as the cause of death. At least some of the reported suicides of detainees could in fact have been prompted by a realization that death would be preferable to further torture.

There are subtle differences in the ways whites and non-whites are treated under the security laws. White political dissenters are more likely to be banned than detained, unless the government believes it can make a criminal case against them. The government is less hesitant about making mass arrests of blacks and other non-whites even if it does not plan to press formal charges. This difference may be less a function of race than of the perception that while white dissenters can be irritants, they do not pose the threat to white supremacy that the black majority does.

The Principal Target. The principal target of the government’s recent security crackdown is the black consciousness movement that has developed in recent years, mainly among the younger generation of urban blacks. Almost all of the organizations banned last October—the principal exception being the Christian Institute—were associated with the black consciousness movement. The movement is not an organization but essentially an attitude characterized by pride in being black. The government evidently holds the movement primarily responsible for creating the unrest that turned to violence in Soweto in June 1976 and views it as the principal internal threat to the South African way of life.

By its recent actions, the government apparently hopes to duplicate the success it had in repressing the black nationalist movement in the [Page 993] early 1960s. At that time, it rendered politically impotent the leaders of what is now the older generation of black activists. Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress (ANC), has been imprisoned since 1962—the last 13 years at the South African penal colony on Robben Island. Robert Sobukwe, onetime leader of Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), has been either imprisoned or under house arrest and banishment for the past 17 years.6

Conclusion. The only persons in South Africa whose human rights are protected and respected are whites who do not question the fundamental policies of white supremacy and apartheid. Only whites can vote, hold office, or have any meaningful say in the political process. Non-whites are systematically relegated to inferior jobs, inferior education, and inferior housing. Though there are only about 4.3 million whites in South Africa’s population of over 26 million, whites earn roughly two-thirds of the national income and possess an even greater preponderance of wealth and power.

The South African government tries to justify this situation by arguing that South African blacks are better off than the vast majority of blacks in sub-Saharan Africa. This is probably true in terms of quantitive measures of standard of living, education, housing facilities, and medical services. But the price the vast majority of South Africans are paying for this situation is the denial of their basic human rights.

II. PROSPECTS

The white man is stronger than you think, and the black man must not push us around.

Jimmy Kruger, South African Minister of Justice.

Forces For Change. A number of important factors impinging on the South African human rights situation have changed in recent years. Internally, the younger generation of black South African activists bring a different background to their conflict with the white authorities from that of their elders. While the older generation had been educated largely in mission schools and had experienced firsthand the more relaxed white supremacy system before 1948, the younger generation is essentially a product of the apartheid system of “Bantu” education and systematic repression. Their elders have been intimidated by fear of losing their jobs and what little property and status they have managed to acquire, but many young urban blacks are imbued with the [Page 994] new black consciousness philosophy and are less inhibited by the risks involved in trying to change the system. They also have less to lose.

The collapse of Portuguese authority in southern Africa has introduced a sense of impending change into the thinking of South African whites as well as blacks. The victory of radical, revolutionary movements in Mozambique and Angola accelerated this process. And the continuing pressure for black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia has further heightened Pretoria’s sense of insecurity.

Internationally, the issue of human rights in South Africa is more in the spotlight than ever before. There are several reasons for this:

—The South African government’s recent repressive actions.

—Advances in international telecommunications.

—The new US emphasis on human rights and on Africa.

—The new vitality in United Nations efforts to get South Africa to change its racial policies.

The recent UN decision to impose a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa7 is likely to be only a first step in a mounting campaign of external pressure for change.

The Strength of Resistance to Change. These new factors in the situation have not and will not by themselves compel the South African government to alter its basic policies. Indeed, they may make the Afrikaners even more stubborn in their resistance to change. The Afrikaners have survived many difficult tests in the past because of their resilience and tenacity and perhaps especially because of their belief that God is on their side. These qualities will help to sustain them in their future efforts to withstand what they regard as attacks on themselves and their way of life.

The Afrikaners’ resistance to change is related to their sense of insecurity and their passion for survival as a distinct people. These in turn are rooted as deeply in the sufferings and humiliations inflicted on them by the British in the 19th and early 20th centuries as in any contemporary fears of engulfment by southern Africa’s black majority. This anti-British animus does much to explain the Afrikaners’ resistance to even such modest political reforms as extending the franchise to a relatively small proportion of nonwhites, which many English-speaking South Africans would favor. The Afrikaners fear that the non-whites would be likely to align politically with English-speaking whites and that, if enough non-whites had the vote, such a voting alignment would be able to wrest political power from the Afrikaners. Such fears, [Page 995] in addition to a basic conservatism, help to explain the Afrikaner conviction that reform would accelerate rather than avert a revolution.

Continuing Apartheid and Repression. The government will continue to try to implement the logic of apartheid. In theory, this would seem to require separate homelands for each of the different races, but in practice the homelands policy is limited to blacks. Other homelands are likely to follow the example of the Transkei and Bophutatswana in gaining their nominal “independence,” notwithstanding the facts that:

—The homelands have little or no meaning for urban blacks who have weak tribal loyalties at best.

—No other government in the world is likely to recognize them.

—They are not economically viable.

—The different races are actually more economically interdependent now than ever before.

The main significance of this policy in human rights terms is that it is designed to justify the government’s refusal to grant South Africa’s 18.6 million blacks any political rights outside the homelands.

The government will probably move ahead with the creation of separate parliaments for the country’s 750,000 “Asians” (mainly ethnic Indians) and 2.4 million “Coloreds” (people of mixed race, mainly white, black, and Malay). This change would allow these groups a measure of self-government, but the government has no intention of relinquishing the whites’ dominant voice in the nation’s affairs. A related proposal—to create a powerful new office of president with the authority to run the country virtually as a dictator—would reduce the power of even the present all-white parliament.

Another purportedly major change, which the government recently announced with much fanfare—replacing the passbooks now issued by the South African government with identity cards issued by black homelands—would actually result in a further implementation of apartheid. Movement of blacks into “white areas” would continue to be restricted, but the restrictions would be applied by the black homelands rather than by the white South African authorities.

Other changes will undoubtedly be announced, probably accompanied by public relations efforts to make them appear significant. Some petty aspects of racial discrimination may be reduced or even eliminated, but the effect almost certainly will be essentially cosmetic.

So long as the Afrikaners maintain their grip on power, there will be little prospect of any significant departures from the policy of apartheid. There is also little prospect for any significant relaxation of the security laws or their enforcement. The state security apparatus appears strong, vigilant, and pervasive enough to thwart major unrest and to maintain stability over the next few years at least.

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The Longer Term. It is doubtful, however, that repression can be effective indefinitely. Repression in the 1950s and 1960s had the effect of turning otherwise moderate dissidents into radicals, and this trend almost certainly will continue at least among a significant minority.

The only hope for meaningful peaceful change would appear to be a multiracial dialogue, which some moderate blacks and whites have already proposed. Given the determination of the Afrikaners to resist change and the power of the state security apparatus, however, the chances for peaceful change seem slight.

The longer change is delayed, the greater the likelihood it will be revolutionary and violent when it does come. In the interim, the struggle will probably be drawn out for several years, with growing bitterness and intermittent, probably increasing violence. This prospect will almost certainly keep the South African human rights situation in the international spotlight and increase the external pressures for change.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

The blacks are awakening too fast for the Afrikaners to come to terms with them. The white man is now so desperately afraid of the black giant that you can almost talk of a sick society. Fear is clouding the Afrikaner’s judgment.

F.J. van Wyk, Head of the Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg.

Overview. The basic elements of the South African human rights situation can be stated fairly simply. The abuse of human rights is essentially a function of apartheid. Unless there is a change away from apartheid, the abuse of human rights will continue indefinitely—regardless of any other changes the South Africans make.

Notwithstanding the simplicity of these generalizations, the South African situation is extremely complex. The complexity does not stem from the fact that the government deprives the vast majority of the people in the country of fundamental human rights. South Africa is not alone in this regard either in Africa or in much of the rest of the world. Nor does the difficulty stem from the fact that the Afrikaners are particularly resistant to change; in that also they are by no means unique. What makes the South African problem especially complex is that it is rooted in racial distinctions that flaunt the sensibilities of most of the world.

The problems which this situation poses for US policy are also complex. On the one hand, there is little room for compromise between apartheid and US human rights policy. On the other hand, Washing[Page 997]ton’s human rights policy must be considered in the broader context of the full range of US policy interests and objectives. US pressures for change within South Africa are unlikely to move the Afrikaners to abandon apartheid, but they are likely to make cooperation with Pretoria in other areas more difficult. At the same time, such pressures are likely to improve US standing in black Africa.

South African Reactions to US Policy. The Afrikaners view the new US emphasis on human rights, so far as it applies to them, as an attempt to get them to change their way of life. Prime Minister Vorster and the National Party made US interference in South Africa’s internal affairs the central theme in their recent campaign for re-election. The results clearly demonstrate that the government has the overwhelming support of the country’s white electorate in its resistance to such pressures.

Politically conscious South African blacks (and black Africa generally), on the other hand, have been impressed by recent US human rights policy, at least insofar as it has implied a tougher US stance toward South Africa. They are wary, however, that US rhetoric may not be matched by sustained practical efforts in support of change. Their apprehensions derive from:

—The large US economic stake in South Africa.

—The even larger economic stake of major US allies, particularly the British.

—Past US cooperation and continuing relationships with the Pretoria regime.

—US opposition to recent efforts in the UN to enact tougher sanctions against South Africa.

While Washington’s human rights policy has given encouragement to South African blacks, it has increased the sense of isolation and insecurity of white South Africa. Since white South Africans consider themselves part of the “free world,” they find it especially difficult to understand why “the leader of the free world” has taken a leading role in what they view as an international campaign against them. They undoubtedly hope that Washington will back off from its new emphasis on human rights, and they will do what they can to achieve that end.

Rhodesian and Namibian Contingencies. The evolving situation elsewhere in southern Africa may be viewed in Pretoria as an opportunity to ease its predicament. Pretoria knows that the West would like South Africa’s help in facilitating peaceful transitions to black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Pretoria would probably be willing to play the delicate game of bartering its influence over negotiated settlements in Namibia and Rhodesia in exchange for a more relaxed US stance toward the South African human rights situation, if the US were willing to play that game.

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Pretoria’s opportunities for maneuvering will depend in part on the course of events in Rhodesia and Namibia. “Internal” settlements in either territory which attempt to exclude the more radical “liberation” forces, e.g., the South-West Africa People’s Organization, the Patriotic Front, or their more militant elements, could raise the likelihood of more active Cuban or Soviet involvement in the Namibian and Zimbabwean liberation struggles. If such involvement escalated significantly, Pretoria might expect that US alarm at such a development would lead to greater US willingness to relax its pressures for change within South Africa itself.

Choices for the US. The dilemma for US policy in this situation, as in others, is to find a workable mix between principle and practicality, action and inaction. Because of the intractable nature of the South African situation, there is a risk that no matter what steps Washington takes in support of change, none will fully satisfy the demands of politically conscious South African blacks (and their principal allies in black Africa, such as the Nigerians) short of giving the black majority and the other races full and equal political rights. This, of course, would amount to a revolution in the South African context.

The Communist powers have a tactical advantage in this situation in that they advertise themselves as the champions of revolution and have few compunctions about the means by which revolution should be achieved. The advocates of basic change in South Africa, however, would be less likely to accept Communist aid if their cause had the option of viable alternative support. Most tend to be wary of Communist intentions, in no small part because of the poor Communist record with regard to human rights.

So long as the US is prepared to take practical steps in support of change, the new US emphasis on human rights should enable Washington to stake out a viable position between the racist and the Communist extremes. A graduated sequence of deliberate pressure, for example, would have a chance, over time, of convincing the Afrikaner leadership of the need for meaningful change. Failing that, the US would at least put itself in a position to compete with the Communist powers in the longer term contest for influence not only in southern Africa but in Africa generally.

On the other hand, if the US is not prepared to back its human rights principles with serious practical efforts (unilateral, multilateral, or both) for change within South Africa, the US could regain some favor with the Pretoria regime. This would have the near term advantage of facilitating Pretoria’s cooperation in other areas but the disadvantage of identifying the US with racism and the southern African status quo. Given the powerful forces for change already set in train, such a choice would almost irrevocably ensure a long-term diminution of US influence.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 79T01316A, Intelligence Publication Files (1977–1979), Box 4, Human Rights: South Africa and the U.S. Confidential; [handling restriction not declassified].
  2. Annexes A–C are attached but not printed.
  3. See Annex A for a chronology of some of the more significant South African human rights developments over the past year. [Footnote is in the original.]
  4. By apartheid we mean the fundamental South African policy of systematic separation of the races, not simply racial discrimination. Apartheid is sometimes called by other names, e.g., “separate development” or “plural democracy.” [Footnote is in the original.]
  5. See Annex B for a list of key South African racial and security laws enacted since 1947 and their major provisions. [Footnote is in the original.]
  6. See Annex C for brief sketches of Mandela, Sobukwe, and some of the other victims of apartheid. [Footnote is in the original.]
  7. UN Security Council Resolution 418, adopted November 4, 1977. See footnote 2, Document 321.