Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

321. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 11, 1977, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Discussion Between Dr. Brzezinski and Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, South Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• FOR NSC
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Henry Richardson (NSC Notetaker)
• FOR SOUTH AFRICA
• Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, South Africa
• Ambassador Donald Sole, Ambassador to the United States

Dr. Brzezinski: I am interested in your views on the current situation. I have had somewhat of a long interest in your country going back to my childhood interest in the Boer War. And I am conscious of the historical dilemmas now facing South Africa.

Sole: Allen Dulles wrote a brochure on the Boer War at the age of 8 years old; I will send you a copy.

Dr. Brzezinski: The Boer War and the Abyssinian War have stood as two examples of remote wars which captured a wide degree of interest. As I said, I am aware of the totality of the historical legacy and the dilemmas of South Africa. However, some of these legacies are in conflict with world trends. There is the danger that local conflict, such as South Africa illustrates, will quickly attain international significance and involve other parties. They do create a web of concerns that affect the international community.

Fourie: We are concerned with where the US/South African relationship goes from here. It goes without saying that we wish good relations; we want to know whether this is still possible. In South Africa there is a feeling that society is at the crossroads, and that the government must make some firm decisions. Some say that we need to tighten our belts and concentrate on surviving. That is a long road. Can we get out of the current situation that we’re in with our self-respect intact?

One South African dilemma rests on Foreign Minister Botha’s understanding that, in terms of time, Rhodesia and Namibia were seen as priority items to the United States. The understanding was that if there was reasonable progress on those two, then South Africa would have time to evolve with respect to the apartheid situation. This situation now seems to have changed, and domestic considerations in South Africa are now in the forefront, with the other two issues having slipped backward. Though we are not saying that there is an inter-relationship of substance, the atmosphere created by events in one area does affect the others. This has been complicated by the recent UN action.² Prime Minister Vorster has no intention of going back on his assurances concerning Zimbabwe and Namibia, but undoubtedly a shadow has been cast over those two issues. We will still try to carry out our promises on them. The nuclear issue is interlinked, though we do believe it is soluble. One problem does bother us: What is the use of making progress on the nuclear issue or on some other issue, if it is to be overturned in three or six months by UN action or by some unilateral action?

We need a period of some months, not (sic) years, to allow things to settle down. Our elections will be over at the end of November, and admittedly during the elections some exasperating things have been said. This is also true for the United States, for example, Ambassador Young’s recent statement with respect to the Prime Minister.³ We need time to put things on ice and allow them to settle.

Dr. Brzezinski: You have correctly identified the four issues which face us. There was indeed a pre-disposition by the United States to give each of them different degrees of urgency. Our hope was that by cooperation with the Front Line states, the Nationalists, the British, and yourselves, that we could move ahead quickly on Zimbabwe and Namibia. But we also held that certain issues in South Africa itself must be the subject of a progressive transformation towards participation by all people in the society, because of the national and international consequences that this would have if it did not happen. The nuclear issue surfaced rather suddenly. We thought that it had been contained by the three assurances which you gave, but then doubt arose on those. It is important to us that there be certainty on all three of these assurances, and that there be no factual uncertainty as there may be on one of them, as well as no uncertainty of commitment. It is in no one’s interest for this uncertainty to linger.

The death of Steve Biko and the events of October 19 pose an international issue. It provoked a considerable amount of US moral and political opposition to South Africa. This has produced a situation where there is more linkage among all four of these issues, and a compression of the time lag which we had formerly been prepared to entertain. This has occured in a process that is both national and international over which we have little control. It is simply that the world has changed in such a way that the repressive character of the acts plus some of the statements made in conjunction with them, for example, by the Minister of Justice, has led to their linkage and the compression of the time span with which we have to work.

In this respect, it is difficult to see how the situation can be put on ice, without acts by South Africa not only to undo the events of October 19, but also other positive acts in the context of black-white relations in South Africa. A simple release of people banned and detained at that time is not enough. Some broader response is needed. In this connection, you must realize that the events of yesterday⁴ only create a more difficult situation relative to your request to put the matter on ice. Until the events of October 19, although it was difficult, the timing was manageable.

Fourie: I do not have available sufficient facts to know exactly what happened in those arrests yesterday. I think, however, that the involvement of children was not to arrest them but to take care of them in a humane way; this leads me to believe that it was a different situation than what might have been implied in the press, but I do not have sufficient facts to comment fully.

Dr. Brzezinski: I understand, but you should realize that such events have a political effect which only accelerates the various issues which you propose to put on ice. Progress on the issue of domestic apartheid would tend to enhance progress on all outstanding issues.

Fourie: On the nuclear question our assurances will stand. There was never any intention to go back on those assurances (sic). These are not only assurances that we gave; this is our policy. The problem about the Prime Minister’s public statement arose because the questions were framed by the reporter in terms of whether the United States had “exacted a promise”, and the Prime Minister naturally answered “no”, because all we were doing was stating what our normal policy is. We think that this was only a storm in a teacup. As I mentioned in talks at the State Department,⁵ I would hope for Gerard Smith to be able at some time in the future to go to South Africa for a discussion on nuclear issues. I know that it presents political problems in the United States to talk on these matters, but I hope that we can proceed.

On the domestic situation, the accurate picture is that there is a process of South African evolutionary progress and there are certain patterns which can be pointed out. However, there has been somewhat of a set-back in the process because of international pressures. There has now arisen in South Africa an “appeaser syndrome” which has had a retarding effect on proposals for change. But, you should be aware of major indicators of this process, all of which together constitute a trend:

1. We are formulating plans to terminate our job reservation policy, so that job reservation would disappear in 80 percent of the cases.

2. A one-man commission has been established to explore the prospects for equal opportunity for all groups in the country.

3. You have doubtless heard of the revisions in the constitution which the government has proposed, which would give Indians and ‘coloreds’ their own parliaments and make it possible for them to elect the Executive President.

4. A Cabinet commission has been appointed to act “with speed” to give the government recommendations on the position of South African blacks in urban life, and we will soon appoint a new Minister of Bantu Affairs.

Such progress cannot be instantaneous. Our elections are over at the end of November; December is our vacation month; Parliament will reconvene next January.

Dr. Brzezinski: What you say is very sensible, but now there are questions of both timing and scope that have been presented. I can appreciate your dilemmas. But there is now a change in the consciousness of the international community and the consciousness of the people in South Africa in terms of how fast these changes must take place. The kind of channeling of protest and the pace to which you refer may not be possible because of these changed international circumstances. Any attempt to do so may well lead to an even sharper conflict which will lead to consequences for everyone concerned. The only way to prevent this conflict may well be to accelerate the pace of change; although I can see your reasons for maintaining a more leisurely pace, this may be impossible under the circumstances. This means that needed corrective measures must go beyond the points that you’ve raised and anticipate future problems.

Fourie: There is unfortunately here, a case of action and reaction between what we do and the response to it. The independence of the homelands are viewed by some as a deteriorating element, but actually they are an ameliorating element in the situation. We have given Transkei its independence, and will shortly do so for Bophuthatswana and probably two or three more.

Dr. Brzezinski: That is a complicated issue, and I don’t know enough about it to discuss it in detail. But there would seem to be certain glaring inequities, in terms of their resources, compared with those in the rest of the country.

Fourie: The independence of Bophuthatswana is entirely voluntary, and until recently we did not even know if they would accept independence. They will be comparatively well off economically, especially in terms of land. Let me mention Southwest Africa, especially the question of the size of our forces that will remain in that territory. We have tried our best in negotiations with the Five Power Contact Group, but we simply cannot go below 1400 troops remaining in the territory. Unless there is some accommodation on this point relatively soon, we must proceed independently and move towards an election.

In Rhodesia, a failure on the mechanics of the proposal threatens. The majority of the black Rhodesian population favors Sithole and Muzorewa, and are opposed to the outside forces of the liberation army. We cannot influence the black nationalists to accept the proposal. But if they do not accept it, the proposal will fail. Smith will not oppose the proposal. In principle, South Africa believes that the Anglo-American proposal has the ingredients for success, but it is the little things that are preventing it at the moment.

Dr. Brzezinski: Do you mean that the black nationalists are the primary opposition to the proposal, and that Smith will not oppose the Anglo-American plan?

Fourie: Yes. If the election were held now, Muzorewa would win 60–65 percent of the vote. Nkomo cannot win an open election. We have been dealing with this problem since 1974, and originally Kaunda sold us on Nkomo. We thought then that Nkomo was the desirable leader for Rhodesia. Now we have no favorite; we favor free elections.

Dr. Brzezinski: But we have pointed out before the dangers of an internal solution, and we still believe this is the case.

Fourie: We have told Smith to forget about an internal solution. If the Anglo-American proposal fails, it will not be Smith who makes it fail, but the nationalist leaders.

Dr. Brzezinski: Will Kaunda play any role here?

Fourie: Kaunda will deal with anyone. We would expect that the nationalists would make some move to insert the Patriotic Front.

Dr. Brzezinski: It seems to us that Smith’s aims in the situation are to divide the nationalists to stall and to buy time.

Fourie: Smith is no longer trying to stall. He can no longer wreck the Anglo-American proposal. The key to the situation is the support of Muzorewa and Sithole. We know this because we have talked with all of these groups. The Anglo-American proposal is 95 percent agreed; it is only the 5 percent, and this 5 percent concerns who is going to get the lever to rule during the transition period which would lead to power after independence.

The meeting ended at 10:20 AM.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 115, South Africa: 11–12/77. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office at the White House. The meeting ended at 10:20 a.m.
2. UN Security Council Resolution 417 (1977), adopted unanimously on October 31, condemned the South African Government “for its resort to massive violence and repression against the black people, who constitute the great majority of the country, as well as all other opponents of apartheid.” UN Security Council Resolution 418 (1977), adopted unanimously on November 4, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. For text of these resolutions, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, pp. 161–162.
3. Not further identified. Possibly a reference to remarks made at a meeting of the governing board of the National Council of Churches when Young said: “Lord have mercy for the hell which falls on John Vorster not after death, but in the day-to-day living with fear that has to go with the kind of sinful life that he has adopted as national policy in that government.” (“Young Sees Life ‘Hell’ for Vorster,” Washington Post, November 11, 1977, p. A23)
4. On November 10, the South African police arrested 626 blacks (including 198 children) in the Atteridgeville-Faulsville black township near Pretoria. (“626 Blacks Seized in South Africa Raid,” New York Times, November 11, 1977, p. A1)
5. See Document 320.