Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

313. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, October 24, 1977, 8:30–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• South Africa

PARTICIPANTS:

• The Vice President
• Denis Clift

• State:

  • Secretary Vance
  • Richard Moose
  • Anthony Lake
  • Ambassador William Bowdler

• Treasury:

  • Robert Carswell
  • Lyle Widman

• Defense:

  • Secretary Brown
  • Deputy Secretary Duncan
  • David McGiffert

• United States Representative to the United Nations:

  • Ambassador Andrew Young
  • Anne Holloway

• Commerce:

  • C. L. Haslam

• CIA:

  • Adm Stansfield Turner
  • William Parmenter

• JCS:

  • General George S. Brown
  • Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

• NSC:

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Thomas Thornton
  • Jessica Tuchman
  • Henry Richardson

Ambassador Bowdler reviewed the South Africa situation.² The recent political repression is part of the government’s overall strategy relative to plans (centering on recent revisions of the constitution) to bring the Indians and the “coloreds” into the laager. It also may relate to the November 30 election; the US has an interest in maintaining a viable South African political opposition. South Africa probably still wishes to be reasonable on Rhodesia and Namibia. It took such actions to gain time for the policy of separate development and for some yet-to-be-defined policy on urban black South Africans. The Vorster government also may believe that the major trends in the world are politically conservative and wish to buy time until they can gain advantage from them.

In further discussion, US intelligence cannot now positively say that the Kalahari facility is a test site, but on the other hand, there is no alternative use seen for the facility; South Africa could possibly be ready to explode a nuclear device in a number of weeks. The meeting was generally in favor of the proposed Congressional resolution condemning the South African action.³ It was agreed that the concept of prohibiting all grey-area sales should be subsumed under a mandatory UN arms embargo, both subject to a six-month moratorium, provided this can be negotiated in the Council. If needed at the end of six months, a Presidential Directive would be considered. On selective reductions in Embassy Pretoria personnel, the discussion focused on the symbolic impact of various specific reductions versus the need for providing information.

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

On economic measures, the discussion focused on denial of Exim Bank insurance and guarantees and the withdrawal of Commercial Credit Corporation facilities; withdrawal of Exim Bank facilities would not necessarily lead to a termination of US bank exposure in South Africa.

Secretary Vance summed up:

—that Ambassador Young and Assistant Secretary Moose would undertake to communicate with the Congressional Black Caucus, and as soon thereafter as possible, communicate their findings to the President;

—that the Committee recommends that the United States support or initiate a resolution on a mandatory arms embargo under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, plus a review of economic relations between member states and South Africa;

—that the United States would take other unilateral steps indicated previously;

—that Ambassador Bowdler would remain in the United States as long as necessary;

—that Ambassador Young would attempt to have the hearings on the concurrent Congressional resolution delayed for a few days;

—that there should be a meeting as soon as feasible between officials of the Department of Commerce and representatives of major American corporations doing business in South Africa to get their views and input on the situation;

—that public statements issued by the United States about the current situation vis-a-vis South Africa should be put in the context of Vice President Mondale’s previous statements in Vienna, should not imply the beginning of a series of pressures to turn around South Africa, should express hope for improvement, and should not involve the US Government in a public negotiating round on specific South African measures;

—that these recommendations should go to the President as soon as possible.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 115, South Africa: 11–12/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. A detailed account of Bowdler’s assessment was transmitted in telegram 5664 from Pretoria, October 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1821)
3. Reference is presumably to the Collins Resolution (House Concurrent Resolution 383) introduced on October 19, which condemned the South African Government’s “massive violations of the civil liberties of the people of South Africa,” and urged the President to “take the strongest possible diplomatic measures against South Africa.”