297. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts1

198014. Lagos for Amb Young, White House for Dr. Brzezinski. Fol rpt State 198014 sent Action Pretoria Info Paris, London, Bonn dtd 19 Aug 77.

Quote: Secret State 198014. For Amb, Charge and Asst Secretary Moose. Subject: Possible South African Weapons Program. Ref: State 197389,2 Pretoria 4228.3

1. While we believe it useful for SAG to allow our technical team to inspect Kalahari site by August 21, we do not wish press SAG into intransigent position on this point given difficulty of time factor. We are therefore prepared accept certain assurances from them if made in proper terms. Accordingly, you are instructed to see Fourie urgently and make following points to be conveyed immediately to Botha and Vorster in Cape Town.

A. In view of both the urgency and importance of this matter and the limited time available to us, we will at this time take South Africa’s word concerning its nuclear program. In that connection, we would appreciate receiving their affirmation, to be made public if necessary, as follows:

B. First, that South Africa does not have or intend to develop nuclear explosives for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise.

C. Second, that the Kalahari facility we have described to them is not a testing facility for nuclear explosives.

D. Third, that there will be no nuclear explosive testing of any kind in South Africa.

E. The SAG will appreciate that our ability to forestall or moderate expected demands for international action on this matter will depend on the degree to which the SAG can provide such affirmations. Given the problems that are likely to arise, the most effective way of defusing the matter would be for South Africa to declare publicly its intention to adhere to the NPT and place all of its nuclear facilities under full [Page 918] international safeguards. We envision problems both at Lagos and in the UN.

2. Should Fourie volunteer SAG willingness to invite on-site inspection, you should note that we have a team ready for a special flight to SA, but add that in view of the urgent international concern we would ask them to provide the affirmations outlined in subparas B, C, and D above.

3. If Fourie says inspection may proceed, notify us by Flash and we will provide necessary data for overflight and landing clearances including names and background of inspection team.

Vance

Unquote.

Christopher
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 107, 8/16–20/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Bonn, Paris, London, Lagos, and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Edmondson and Habib; approved by Habib. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
  2. See Document 295.
  3. See Document 296.