283. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter 1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Agency Ties With South Africa
We have now compiled USG agency responses on their ties with South Africa.2 Forty-three agencies report no ties to that government; 16 agencies described “light” ties; 10 agencies have “medium” ties; 5 have ties which are “heavy”; and 5 have “very heavy” ties. See Tab A.
Agencies with “light” ties have no contracts or agreements with the Government of South Africa, but do have generally indirect, informal, random and limited contacts. These may involve the exchange of apparently unclassified data.
Those with “medium” ties either have on-going contacts more frequent or formalized than are “light” contacts, or they have formal agreements which generally involve the exchange of unclassified information by apparently low and middle level South African officials.
Those with “heavy” ties have numerous and on-going agreements and/or contacts with South Africa, which appear generally to involve higher level officials. Those with “very heavy” ties have the most frequent, formal, and apparently high level direct agreements and contacts with the Government of South Africa.
Thus, nearly half of the agencies questioned have ties with South Africa. Of those (36) which do have ties, 22 have no formal agreements. The ties of 14 agencies which do have formal agreements involve economic and commercial issues, transportation, the exchange of information, the administration of justice, the struggle against nuclear proliferation, conduct of diplomatic relations, or military defense.
Implications
There is currently no evidence of a general policy governing USG-South African ties. Any South African influence in the USG would, therefore, appear concentrated among a comparatively few agencies which, however, administer the most significant value-interests of the US. This in turn implies that the regulation of formal contacts would [Page 863] require coordination among only some 14 agencies. Concurrently, these particular ties are also those whose rupture would generally be perceived as sending a strong signal of USG displeasure to South Africa.
But a strong signal might also be sent by a determined effort to eliminate informal ties among 22 agencies, precisely because social contacts are not only the most difficult to regulate but generally perceived as being the most harmless and, therefore, usually the last to be regulated in situations of this kind.
This study does not represent the full scope of relations between the two countries; it reflects only ties between USG agencies and the South African Government and omits USG-personnel communication with non-governmental black and white South African citizens. If substantial, this might comprise a web of communication, in support of or to the detriment of established policy, between elements of the respective peoples.
A common policy trade-off exists with respect to all categories of ties: the desirability of cutting ties versus the benefits from shared or exchanged information. Hence, a further distinction could be drawn between those ties conveying, and those not, such benefits. Finally, another refinement among “medium” to “very heavy” ties would be those whose rupture would involve violating a legal obligation, versus those which could be terminated consistent with existing obligations.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 71, South Africa: US Agency Ties with South Africa [I], 8/77. Confidential. Sent for information.↩
- See Document 277.↩
- No classification marking.↩