Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

252. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 17, 1979, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador Kingman Brewster
• Ambassador at Large Henry Owen
• George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State
• Robert D. Blackwill, NSC Staff Member
• Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher
• Lord Carrington, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
• Sir Nicholas Henderson, Ambassador to the U.S.
• Sir Robert Armstrong, Secretary to the Cabinet
• Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
• Sir Frank Cooper, Ministry of Defense
• Michael Alexander, Private Secretary to the PM
• George Walden, Principal Secretary to the Secretary of State

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Moving on to Rhodesia, the President congratulated Lord Carrington for his extraordinary success in the Lancaster House negotiation and said he was eager to hear how prospects looked now after a slight interruption over the weekend. We had lifted sanctions at midnight last night which was another indication that the U.S. would continue to be Britain’s full partner in this effort to bring peace to Southern Africa. The President added that there should be no hesitation on Mrs. Thatcher’s part to ask us for help in the period ahead, and we would do everything possible to be responsive. (S)

In reply, Mrs. Thatcher said she was delighted to be sitting in the White House; it was a great emotional experience to be in the United States as Prime Minister for the first time. She thanked the President for everything the U.S. had done on Rhodesia, and especially for its efforts during the last few days. Noting that Lord Carrington had done extremely well in the negotiations, the Prime Minister indicated that the UK had come up against Patriotic Front hesitation at the last moment over the weekend. But she was still hopeful and stressed that prompt U.S. action in the last few days had been important in trying to assure the success of the Lancaster House discussions. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

The President next asked for the UK’s latest reading on the Rhodesian situation. Lord Carrington replied that, as always, the last hurdle was the most difficult. They had brought the Patriotic Front to agreement on a constitution, on transitional arrangements and on the cease fire. The sticking point now was the Patriotic Front’s assembly areas. These areas were around the outside of the country and not in the middle. This seemed to be sensible since the Patriotic Front did not wish to be surrounded by Rhodesian security forces. Britain wanted to leave them where they were—on the outside areas of the country. With 17 or 18,000 Patriotic Front guerillas inside Rhodesia, Lord Carrington thought 15 assembly areas was about right. He said he was extremely surprised when the Patriotic Front did not agree. Carrington thought that the Front was trying to get a political advantage by putting more of its people in the center of the country. This problem was particularly difficult to deal with since the Patriotic Front argued that it had 35,000 troops inside Rhodesia, which the UK knew to be untrue. (S)

Nonetheless, and to try to find a compromise, Lord Carrington over the weekend had offered the following: (1) if Britain found that it was wrong about the size of the Patriotic Front force inside Rhodesia, it would reassess the situation with a view to adding more assembly areas; and (2) it would now give the Front an assembly area in the center of the country. Carrington thought these proposals might do the trick. President Machel had been particularly helpful by putting pressure on Mugabe. Carrington said that Nkomo wanted to sign, but that Mugabe really did not want to sign. The last word from London was that it appeared that there would be a majority within the Patriotic Front to initial the final documents. Reflecting on Britain’s negotiating style through the Lancaster House negotiations, Carrington said that they had been forced to issue ultimatum after ultimatum all the while indignantly denying that they were issuing ultimatums. But there was no other way to bring the Patriotic Front around. (S)

Carrington thought that with a bit of luck we should get a cease fire, but even then, the situation would be messy. Both sides were suspicious and it was doubtful the Patriotic Front would assemble all their forces. We were unquestionably in for a difficult period and it was important, Carrington said, to hold the election as soon as possible. (S)

The President asked if the Muzorewa group was opposed to giving more assembly areas to the Patriotic Front or whether that was a British position. Carrington replied that it was a bit of both. Salisbury thought that a larger number of assembly areas would endanger their political prospects. Nonetheless, Britain had agreed to give the Front one area in the center of the country and would consider creating more areas if it was wrong about the total number of Patriotic Front troops inside Rhodesia. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher added that, in general, Salisbury had been quite helpful and had accepted the idea that the Patriotic Front have an assembly area in the center of the country. The President asked if the UK would set a deadline for the Patriotic Front’s acceptance of the agreement. Carrington replied that he would not break up the conference although the Patriotic Front might seek to make him do so. Whatever happened, Britain would say that the Patriotic Front could join the process but the election period would begin if the Front did not soon initial the agreement. Secretary Vance asked if a problem would be created by continued infiltration of Patriotic Front troops into Rhodesia during the transition period. Lord Carrington replied that the Front would certainly try, but that he hoped that Machel and Kaunda would stop it. The President said that we were prepared to help Britain as this process continued. Carrington noted that the U.S. had been fair all the way along, and the President responded that we thought so too. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher opined that Nkomo was a natural politician but that Mugabe was a typical communist obstructionist. The President asked if the Communists had been helpful in this endeavor and Carrington responded that they had provided no help at all. Gromyko had been decidedly hostile in his conversations with Carrington on the subject and both the Soviets and Romanians had been supplying arms to the guerillas. Carrington said there was a good reason for this. Trouble in Southern Africa suited Soviet interests very well. Dr. Brzezinski observed that it was odd that the Romanians had been supplying arms to the Front. Mrs. Thatcher stressed that Britain would go ahead with the election because that was the right thing to do. It would not be an easy task for Christopher Soames, but the UK would press on. She then asked if the President would like next to discuss the Middle East. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 10–12/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.