Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

246. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 21, 1979, 10:15–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Attacks on Zambian Road and Rail Links² (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• STATE

  • Assistant Secretary Richard Moose
  • Mr. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning
  • Mr. Paul Hare, African Bureau, Southern Africa

• CIA

  • Mr. Bruce Clark, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
  • Mr. William Parmenter, NIO for Africa

• DOD

  • Mr. Robert Komer, Advisor to the Secretary
  • Mr. James Woods, ISA, Africa

• White House

  • Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs

• NSC

  • Mr. Jerry Funk, Staff Member

It was agreed that:

—The Rhodesian raids, cutting virtually all Zambian international road and rail links, were directed primarily at Zambia rather than directly at guerrilla infiltration

—The raids will have a devastating effect on the Zambian economy, already faced with a very serious maize shortage and general dislocation

—The overall effect is two-fold: (1) to endanger the Lancaster House cease-fire talks by making it impossible for Kaunda to continue his cooperation, and (2) to create a situation which could possibly lead to intervention by Cuban technical and support personnel, and perhaps eventually military units,—though this later event is not believed imminent

—Specifically, we should:

—Condemn the raids³

—Urge the UK to persuade the Muzorewa government to exercise restraint⁴

—Be responsive to Kaunda by expressing our deep concern and our intention to be helpful,—preferably by a Presidential message

—Explore with the Zambians, (and as appropriate, with the UK) various proposals, including an engineering survey team, airlift of bridging materials and crews, PL–480 assistance, and other security support assistance, such as transport and commodity aid

—Encourage our European friends to be responsive to Kaunda with respect to the raids and their economic impact. (S)

Finally, in arriving at these conclusions, and in discussion on the necessity of OMB and AID reprogramming, it was noted that we have been generally neglecting the critical need for security support assistance in our overall defense posture, and that we should urgently address this imbalance. (S)

Detailed Memorandum of PRC Meeting

Aaron said he had asked Warren Christopher to convene this meeting because of our concern over Rhodesian attacks on Zambia road and rail links, and the possibility of this resulting in Soviet/Cuban involvement. He said we wanted to explore possible U.S. reactions, including assistance to Zambia. (S)

Moose (acting as chairman in lieu of Christopher) said there were three elements of concern: (1) that we get UK to urge General Walls to exercise restraint,⁵ (2) demonstrate our support for the cease-fire talks by being responsive to UK requests for airlift assistance,⁶ and (3) to be psychologically and materially supportive of Zambia. He noted that Ambassador Wisner suggested that we be responsive with SSA,—which could well be directed toward bridging and transport,—and to respond with PL 480 assistance. (S)

He then suggested we look at SAG and Z–RG motives,—are they really responding to ZIPRA infiltration, or are they acting with a wider political purpose? (S)

Parmenter said that raids would have some modest effect on infiltration, but it seemed clear that there was a wider purpose. There had been no recent surge of troop movements into Zimbabwe, and that the steady effort in this regard was meeting with mixed results. He noted that all parties were looking beyond the immediate situation to position themselves for the cease-fire and the elections. He felt it was likely that General Walls felt that attacks on the Tan-Zam railway link had been effective in bringing Kaunda to cooperate at the Lancaster House meeting, and more of the same would be effective in gaining further concessions. But it is also quite likely that Walls is proceeding with a grander plan to cripple Mozambique and Zambia before the cease-fire can be effected, and is ignoring day-to-day political changes. (S)

Lake asked if there were reports from London that Walls did in fact state that he wanted to attack Zambia before any cease-fire interfered with those plans. (S)

Parmenter said there were such reports. (S)

Moose noted that the UK was key to the whole problem, and that while they seemed to be reluctant to put pressure on Walls, we could not be certain, as they were not sharing this with us. He said we were in position of trying to look over their shoulders at their cards, and trying to give advice while they were on a winning streak. Thus, while they may not listen very carefully to us, we had expressed our concern, but that perhaps we should move up to a Vance-Carrington message. (S)

Aaron said that the only way to get the UK to move on this issue is for us to move ourselves, and bring them along,—and that we should tell them directly that we feel their response thus far has been inadequate. We should note that Kaunda has a case in his grievance with the UK, especially after his role at Lancaster House. (S)

Lake and Komer agreed with that assessment. (U)

Parmenter noted that Kaunda’s press conference statement⁷ on the raids had been emotional, but quite moderate regarding mobilization, and that he said he “did not wish to internationalize the war.” Thus, it was not likely that Kaunda was on the verge of actually calling in Cuban troops. (S)

Aaron said that his immediate concern was not that Cuban military units would be called in, but that Cuban bridge construction parties and other support units would be involved, thus establishing their presence. Therefore, he felt we should make a responsive gesture to forestall that event. (S)

Lake suggested that we try to encourage the Germans and Scandinavians to offer assistance as well. (U)

Clark suggested that the best first step was to send in a US engineering survey team, to help Kaunda get a better feel for the true nature and dimension of his transport problem. (S)

Aaron and Komer agreed that this would be useful. (U)

Lake asked about Congressional reaction. (U)

Komer said that he felt this would depend on the status of the cease-fire. (U)

Aaron asked if we could reasonably propose to the UK that they supply Bailey bridges and crews, and that we fly them in. There was general agreement that this could be done. (S)

Moose noted that we could have a problem on the Hill if we move such men and materials prior to a cease-fire, but that in the meantime we could send in a survey team, ask OMB and AID to reprogram funds, and move on PL 480 assistance. (S)

Komer said that this brought up a broader issue,—our inability to be responsive to key and essential security support assistance, at a time when we are in a generally critical situation and forcing defense spending up. This, he said was terribly inconsistent, and prompted his general argument that DOD might consider asking that considerable funding be moved from the regular DOD budget to SSA, where it would be effective and complimentary in building up our overall strength. (S)

Aaron concurred with this argument, and noted that we seemed in danger of starting to move toward a “fortress America” concept. (S)

Moose stated that it was certainly time to move toward an expanded SSA program for African nations. (S)

Aaron noted that we should ask Secretary Brown to make the argument for shifting funds to SSA. (S)

Parmenter said that, finally, with respect to Zambia, the food stocks were thought to be adequate to March only, and this estimate is probably based upon a continued normal inflow. Thus, the immediate food problem may well require assistance with internal transportation and distribution. (S)

Moose briefly summarized to say that there was agreement then, that we should move in the areas discussed,—and that we should relay the decision to be generally supportive of Zambia quickly,—to prevent a breakdown of cease-fire talks, and to preclude intervention. State would, he said, work on draft messages this afternoon, and devise tactics of response. (S)

Aaron, as a final note, said that decision to respond to UK airlift request for cease-fire support was with the President, and should not be held up to incorporate with any responses on the Zambian situation. (S)

The meeting adjourned at 10:45 a.m. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 118, Zambia: 1/79–2/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found.
2. In telegram 4175 from Lusaka, November 19, the Embassy reported on an attack by Rhodesian security forces on Zambia’s major remaining overland routes to the outside. The report noted that the attack severed all road and rail access to Tanzania, Malawi, and southern Zambia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790532–1053)
3. In telegram 301679 to Lusaka, November 20, the Department transmitted Hodding Carter’s press guidance: “We are deeply concerned by the latest Rhodesian attacks on lines of communication and bridges in Zambia. We condemn the destruction of what are clearly economic targets in that country. We believe these attacks are particularly unfortunate in light of the on-going talks at Lancaster House which hold such promise for bringing a peaceful resolution to conflict in the region.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790535–0153)
4. In telegram 4236 from Lusaka, November 23, Wisner transmitted the text of Carrington’s conversation with Walls: “We have made it clear to Walls that any further action by the Rhodesian security forces at this stage in Zambia could have very serious consequences in relation to the conference and to the safety of British citizens in Zambia. Please tell Muzorewa that, while we are aware of the problems which confront the Rhodesian authorities over infiltration, the conference itself and any prospect of a successful conclusion of the negotiations will be at risk if Rhodesian raids into Zambia continue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790542–0771)
5. See footnote 4 above.
6. See Document 247.
7. In telegram 4196 from Lusaka, November 20, Wisner reported on the press conference. Kaunda held the British responsible for the attacks and called for an independent Commonwealth monitoring force. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790534–0900)