244. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Rhodesian Sanctions
Section 408 of the State Department Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 (P.L. 96–60), requires you to terminate sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia by November 15 unless you determine that it would not be in our national interest to do so and so report to the Congress. In order to avoid legal controversy as to timeliness, the determination and report contemplated by the statute should be made, if at all, no later than Wednesday, November 14.
While the negotiations at Lancaster House are still in progress, I believe you should not decide to remove sanctions. Lifting sanctions could jeopardize the negotiations, and undermine our ability to urge flexibility on the external parties and the Front Line states. We can best preserve our impartiality and avoid getting out in front of the British by maintaining sanctions. We could not credibly defend under international law a lifting of sanctions by the United States when there had been neither a British action “returning Rhodesia to legality” nor Security Council action terminating sanctions.
[Page 714]Background
The British government has stated in Parliament that it will not seek to renew the Order in Council specifically applicable to sanctions against Rhodesia.2 The order will lapse on November 15. However, as the British have pointed out publicly, the great bulk of UK sanctions relating to direct trade and the transfer of funds will continue under general legislative authority. These will not be revoked until the British Governor arrives in Salisbury, at which time the UK will regard Rhodesia as having “returned to legality.”
The British decision not to renew the Order in Council will weaken our position on the Hill. The basis on which you justify a determination not to remove our sanctions will influence the support which our opponents will be able to muster to overturn such a decision.
There are three options: 1) to announce your decision to maintain sanctions in view of the ongoing negotiations at Lancaster House, but state you would keep the situation under continuous review; 2) to announce your decision to maintain sanctions, but state you will move to remove them as soon as the British return Southern Rhodesia to legality and a British Governor arrives in Salisbury; or 3) to announce your decision to maintain sanctions, but state you will lift sanctions when a British Governor arrives in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections begins. We rule out lifting sanctions at the present time, since such a step would clearly be premature.
In choosing among the three options, we face two competing considerations. The more specifically we tie ourselves to following the British lead (as in Option 2), the better the chance of heading off a Congressional reversal—but the less we can maintain flexibility until we see what the final UK proposals look like, retain some influence over UK decisions, and maintain credibility with the Africans and in the UN.
Under Option 1, you would have maximum flexibility to decide sanctions policy at the conclusion of Lancaster House on the basis of the positions of the various parties, as well as the fairness of final British proposals and any relevant action by the Security Council or by third countries. But because no commitment would be made to lift sanctions under specific conditions, this would be most difficult to sustain with Congress.
Under Option 2, you would make a commitment to lift our sanctions when the British lifted their remaining sanctions, regardless of [Page 715] whether a settlement among all parties had been reached or whether the final proposals could be defended as offering all parties a fair chance in impartial elections. This would remove such influence as we might have with the British during the final days of the conference and would damage our credibility with the Front Line and Patriotic Front. However, it would enhance our chances of success in both Houses of Congress and could win the support of such key Congressional leaders as Byrd, Church, Wright and Zablocki in blocking a hasty move to lift sanctions.
Under Option 3, you would convey to Congress and those involved in Lancaster House a general intent to lift sanctions when the UK began implementing its proposals, but would still leave open your final decision on sanctions depending on whether those proposals could be defended in good faith as impartial. If the UK reached agreement with Muzorewa alone on arrangements that clearly would bias elections, you could conceivably withhold immediate endorsement and maintain sanctions in order to seek alterations that would improve the proposals and enable us to press for Patriotic Front acceptance. On the other hand, if ZAPU and/or ZANU rejected impartial arrangements, and the British proceeded with Muzorewa (and perhaps one or the other of ZAPU and ZANU), you could support this and lift sanctions. With Congress, we would point out that the UK proposals thus far have been impartial and great progress has been made on that basis, but we should not make our final decision until the process is concluded. This may gain some Congressional support, although some will still argue that Muzorewa already has made great concessions and that the Administration should not be left with discretion which our opponents believe would be used to press for arrangements more favorable to ZAPU and ZANU.
Option 3 would commit us to lift sanctions if you determined an impartial elections process was underway, whether or not the Security Council acted to remove sanctions or other countries joined in a consensus that the basis for sanctions had ended.
Whatever your decision now, circumstances affecting sanctions policy will evolve rapidly. The UK intends to wrap up Lancaster House one way or another as soon as possible. If there is an early breakthrough with the Patriotic Front on elections arrangements, complete discussions of ceasefire arrangements would follow quickly. If there is not, the UK may move quite quickly to install a Governor in Salisbury on the basis of arrangements agreed to by Muzorewa alone, perhaps without ever spelling out UK ceasefire proposals. Congress has thirty days to act on a resolution of disapproval on your determination. Expedited procedures in the Senate mean that even a sympathetic Foreign Relations Committee leadership could hold back the resolution [Page 716] for no more than ten days. Precipitous action in the House is less likely, however, due to a number of factors: a more sympathetic attitude among Foreign Affairs Committee members; an upcoming one week recess; and the more cumbersome procedures for expediting consideration of a resolution.
A final consideration is the attitude of other Western countries to the British approach to sanctions. The UK has pressed the EC as well as the US for a commitment now to lift sanctions when a British Governor arrives in Salisbury and, in the British view, legality thereby is restored. London argues that even if the Patriotic Front is excluded and the Security Council therefore does not lift sanctions, the restoration of legality by the UK removes all basis for enforcement of sanctions. The EC members, except possibly France, have been reluctant to agree to lift sanctions without reference to the Security Council or to give the UK a blank check when they do not know its plans for the final stage of negotiations.
Before your decision has been transmitted to the Congress, I would propose that the State Department brief key members of the Congress (Church, Byrd, Javits, McGovern, Zablocki, Wright, Brademas, Solarz) with the objective of building support for our position and deterring any early moves for a Congressional override. Depending on whether these leaders see an early, serious effort to overturn your decision as likely, we would decide whether to seek high-level hearings and mount a major effort with Congress.
Attached is a recommended Presidential Determination3 and three alternative justifications depending on which option you choose.4
Recommendations:
I recommend—
1) That you approve the Option 3 justification (Tab 4), so that we will not lose all influence now over the negotiations; but in the end I believe we will support whatever decision the UK reaches because of the great strides they have made already toward majority rule and an impartial process.
| Approve: | Option 1_____ |
| Option 2_____ | |
| Option 3_____5 |
2) That you approve Congressional consultation on the basis of the justification option that you approve.6
3) That you sign the determination at Tab 5.7
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 120, Zimbabwe: 12/79. Secret.↩
- The Southern Rhodesia Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on November 7, stipulated that Section 2 of the 1965 Southern Rhodesia Act pertaining to sanctions would not be retained. The bill was enacted on November 14. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1980, p. 30175)↩
- Not attached. Printed as Document 245.↩
- Justifications for Options 1 and 2 are attached but not printed.↩
- Carter approved Option 3 and initialed the right-hand margin.↩
- Carter approved the recommendation.↩
- See footnote 3 above.↩
- Secret.↩