221. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State1
335. Dept pass NSC for Brzezinski and Aaron. Subject: Rhodesia: Moose/Duff Final Discussions With Fourie. Ref: Cape Town 0310.2
1. C–Entire text.
2. Summary: Moose and Duff accompanied by Edmondson, George Moose, Funk and Reid (UK) saw Fourie for final one hour session this morning (February 21) and used occasion to reinforce arguments presented February 19 and to make precise what we expect in the way of cooperation from SAG. Fourie acknowledged that Smith’s recent public statements raised doubts about his intentions to step down and indicated that the SAG did not discount possibility of increased Soviet/Cuban involvement. Fourie said he had tried to discuss our presentation with Pik Botha, but had been unable to do so because of Pik’s preoccupation with other matters. He reiterated his promise to give our ideas prompt and serious attention. End summary.
3. Following the February 29 [19] meetings, Duff had sent over to Fourie text of Smith’s statement in Parliament indicating his intention to stay on until the new internal government elected in April achieves international recognition. Duff noted that this cast serious doubt about SAG’s scenario for post-election negotiations, which assumed that Smith would no longer be on the scene. Fourie acknowledged that Smith’s statement contradicted SAG’s expectation that Smith would not stand for election and said that Smith’s continued presence would greatly affect the whole situation. He indicated that SAG would seek clarification of Smith’s intentions.
4. Moose underscored our concern, which Fourie seemed to dismiss too lightly, over recent indications of Soviet-Cuban willingness to become more involved in the Rhodesian situation. He noted standing Soviet offer of massive assistance to Zambia and possibility that Kaunda, in his increasingly desperate situation, might accept, especially in the face of continued Rhodesian attacks.3 He further stressed related [Page 660] factor of how PF and Front Line might interpret activities by SAG, such as joint operations with the Rhodesians and other direct military support. There was a real danger that such actions might become an excuse or trigger for greater Soviet-Cuban involvement, which should be of concern to South Africa. Fourie asked for clarification of our reference to joint SAG-Rhodesian operations, to which Duff and Moose responded that there were rumors of SAG support in the form of air crews and transport and SAG patrols in Mozambique and Rhodesia. Fourie denied that SAG sought any military involvement in Rhodesia, indicating that a conscious decision not to become involved was made at the time SAG decided to withdraw its police units from Rhodesia. (It is possible that he was not aware of the reported presence of SAG helicopters and crews in Rhodesia.)
5. Fourie said his government did not dismiss the possibility of greater Soviet/Cuban involvement, although he argued that the PF did not want direct assistance from outsiders in the fighting since this would undermine their political appeal inside Rhodesia. Duff noted that our immediate concern was that the Soviets and Cubans would become involved to the extent of aiding in the defense of the Front Line States. This, however, could begin to create an attitude of greater receptivity to outside assistance which could affect the PF as well. There was also the danger of a black civil war, as in Angola, in which the Soviets could become involved on behalf of one side. The ultimate outcome could well be a regime in Rhodesia that was indebted and beholden to the USSR and Cuba. Fourie acknowledged the logic of the argument and reiterated that his government did not discount or ignore this possibility. Duff again underscored the point that any indication of SAG’s direct involvement on behalf of Salisbury could have disastrous consequences in terms of the attitudes of the Front Line and PF toward a greater Soviet/Cuban role.
6. Moose again questioned Fourie’s assumption that negotiations would be easier following the April elections. The whole history of Muzorewa’s and Sithole’s involvement in the internal settlement argued against their being more flexible once they were installed in office. Having compromised so much to achieve their goal, it was hard to see how they would be more flexible. If anything, they were likely to be even more rigid. There was a real danger that the elections would only freeze the situation and make progress impossible for several months, by which time a solution might no longer be possible.
7. Duff and Moose concluded the session by seeking to clarify what we were expecting in terms of cooperation from SAG. Fourie understood that our objective was to bring about impartial elections under UN supervision. Duff noted that specifically what we wanted was SAG’s acceptance of this objective and its agreement to join with [Page 661] us in bringing it about, each of us bringing to bear what influence he can with the parties. Moose stressed that in accepting the objective of UN-supervised elections, it must be understood that other problems would have to be resolved in order to make this possible. This included the problem of dealing with the various armed forces, the establishment of a neutral transition administration, and issues relating to the constitution. What we were seeking was a clear indication of SAG’s willingness to work with us in solving these problems. It is not our intention to present a full blown plan, but rather to simplify the process beginning with the acceptance by both sides of UN-supervised elections. Once this was accepted, we could begin from there to establish the necessary conditions to make this possible.
8. Fourie said he had tried to present our ideas to Pik Botha, but implied that this had not been possible owing to Botha’s (and perhaps his own) preoccupation with other matters, especially Namibia. He undertook to do so as soon as possible and promised that our views would be given serious consideration.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 1–2/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See Document 220.↩
- In telegram 4515 from Lusaka, December 29, 1978, the Embassy reported on Zambia’s security concerns and the distinct possibility that the Zambian military might force Kaunda to accept Soviet and Cuban assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790005–0802)↩