Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia and the White House¹

Washington, October 2, 1978, 0242Z

249885. For Ambassadors/Charges. Subject: Rhodesia: Letter to President Kaunda.

1. Following is the text of letter from President Carter and PM Callaghan to President Kaunda, which is to be delivered jointly by you and your British counterpart at earliest possible moment October 2. Detailed instructions follow septel.²

Begin text: Dear Mr. President:

There have been a number of new and troubling developments in the last week or so. The recent leadership crisis in South Africa³ has introduced new uncertainties for our promising efforts to resolve the Namibia question. We are nonetheless determined to persist in our efforts to bring about an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia in accordance with the proposals worked out by the Western Five members of the Contact Group.

We are also deeply concerned about the course that events are taking in Rhodesia. Notwithstanding the clear evidence that the internal settlement is not working, the Salisbury parties have continued to cling to their present course and to resist attempts to bring them into negotiations. If nothing is done to break the current impasse, it soon may be impossible to find common ground for a just and fair settlement. Cy Vance and David Owen had extensive discussions about these disturbing developments in New York last week.⁴ Following their talks we have agreed on the need to take immediate steps to break the deadlock. We know from the Kano meeting⁵ that you share this sense of urgency. David and Cy have given considerable thought to the question of how we might persuade the internal parties to abandon their present course and rejoin the negotiations. This will not be easy. They have invested so much in their present enterprise that they now find it difficult to admit the failure that is so clear to everyone else.

We have all along thought that the only way to get agreement on a settlement was to bring the parties together at a meeting at which they could, without help, resolve their outstanding differences. It had already been agreed that the invitations to such a conference must be without preconditions if there was to be any chance of getting all parties to agree to attend, but that our two governments would remain firmly committed to our joint proposals for a settlement. That remains our view.

One of the obstacles to convening a conference has been the failure of the parties to agree on a venue. One side or the other has objected to all the places previously proposed. For this reason, and because of the urgency we attach to the need for early progress towards a settlement, we propose to offer New York as the venue for an all-parties meeting that we are prepared to convene in the very near future. We believe that none of the parties should find this location unacceptable. It has the advantage of being close to the United Nations, where it will be easy for us to keep you and the other Front Line Presidents informed of developments.⁶ Moreover, the location has the added advantage of permitting both Cy and David to remain for as long as may be necessary to bring the parties to agreement.

None of us can guarantee success. We write now to convey our deep concern and to seek your urgent counsel on this proposal. Like you, we wanted to achieve a greater measure of agreement between the parties before calling a conference. But if we delay any longer, we believe that the divergences between the parties will only grow, as will the loss of life, the bitterness and the racial tension which can destroy Zimbabwe. We hope that we can count on your support.⁷

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Jim Callaghan

Christopher

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 103, 10/1–19/78. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Dar es Salaam, London, Maputo, Lagos, Pretoria, and Gaborone. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by George Moose (AF/S); cleared by Petterson; approved by Moose. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2059)
2. In telegram 249886 to multiple posts, October 2, Christopher transmitted the U.S.–U.K. talking points and detailed instructions to be used with the Front Line Presidents. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78.
3. Vorster announced his resignation as Prime Minister on September 20. Pieter Willem Botha was elected Prime Minister on September 28. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 29333)
4. See Document 214.
5. See footnote 2, Document 214.
6. In telegram 249884 to Dar es Salaam, October 2, the Department transmitted a similar letter to Nyerere. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78)
7. In telegram 3510 from Lusaka, October 9, the Embassy transmitted Kaunda’s response to Carter’s letter, in which Kaunda declined to support an all-parties meeting in New York. (National Archives RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780413–0614) In telegram 4304 from Dar es Salaam, October 4, the Embassy transmitted Nyerere’s refusal to endorse an all-parties conference. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 103, 10/1–19/78)