213. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts1
190872. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary’s Meeting With Muzorewa, July 28.
Summary: In hour long meeting Muzorewa rejected Secretary’s argument that there would be much to gain and nothing to lose by participation in all-parties meeting. Bishop characterized such a meeting as a waste of precious time and argued that Nkomo and Mugabe were welcome to join the Executive Council. Positions Bishop took in [Page 629] conversation were predictable repeats of his previous statements. He intends to spend five days in London where he will repeat his Washington argumentation in favor of immediate lifting of sanctions. End summary.
2. Muzorewa was accompanied by personal aid Muzenhamo, US Representatives Nyamuswa and Zhuwarara, and Cleveland attorney Glen Billington. (Prior suggestion by Muzorewa’s staff that Ken Towsey of Rhodesian Information Office also accompany him was discouraged by Department). Harrop (AF), Hansell (L) and Davidow (AF/S note-taker), joined Secretary.
3. Bishop began with justification of his presence in Washington where he has been lobbying for passage of Helms Amendment.2 In 1972 he had travelled to US to mobilize international community to apply mandatory sanctions, but situation had changed, Smith had agreed to hand over power to majority and sanctions now punishing people they were meant to help. Smith has assured him that he “is not going to pull a fast one, another UDI.” Sanctions should be removed so that transitional government can start to resuscitate economy and to help displaced people. He was “puzzled, almost shocked” by USG attitudes. Two empty chairs wait on Executive Council for Nkomo and Mugabe. They have excluded themselves from the transitional government. Those who want to help should tell them to join the majority.
4. Secretary responded that until a new, legal government is established in Rhodesia we will not lift sanctions. Lifting at this time would not gain international support, would lead to greater polarization, and would undermine our ability to bring the parties together. We will direct our efforts to getting parties to negotiate an agreement, leading to a ceasefire which, in turn, would allow elections to be held in conditions of peace. There is nothing to be lost and much to be gained at an all-parties meeting. Each party would come without prejudice to its own position. We and the British would stand by principles of Anglo-American Proposals, but would accept any settlement reached by the parties themselves.
5. In a rambling response Bishop asserted that his party had initially welcomed the AAP while Patriotic Front had shouted it down. He had been surprised when US–UK met with PF on Malta without inviting him. Past conferences had sought to get Smith to step down and to develop a new constitution. Smith has agreed to hand over power to the majority by Dec. 31. A new constitution will be ready within two [Page 630] weeks. Everyone will be able to participate in elections. What then was the need for another conference?
6. Secretary asked if elections can be held without a ceasefire. Bishop responded that a tremendous deescalation of the war is taking place. Secretary noted that, in fact, fighting appears to be escalating and that the Bishop’s comments on the success of the ceasefire seemed inconsistent with what Mr. Smith had said (at his July 18 press conference).3
7. Muzorewa said the guerrillas are becoming desperate and as a result are exclusively attacking soft targets such as mission stations. Since March 3 he has had over 16 meetings with guerrilla leaders. In some places guerrillas and security forces are working together as “forces of the transitional government”. Even without a ceasefire, elections would be possible. He and Chikerema had visited several operational areas and thousands of people had come to hear them speak. Muzorewa argued that Smith’s statement on the ceasefire had been distorted by the press, and said he would make available the full text of Smith’s remarks to the Secretary.
8. Secretary returned to initial question of what is to be lost by sitting around a conference table. Muzorewa responded that time would be wasted. He referred to the unsatisfactory Geneva experience and said that it would be foolish to sit for 2–3 months talking to the PF while they consult with their bosses in Moscow, Peking and the Front Line.
9. Secretary responded that it was not beyond the realm of human capabilities to avoid the time problem, for instance by discussing the agenda beforehand. Muzorewa asked whether we had an agenda in mind. The Secretary gave him a copy of the following, repeating on several occasions that it was a nonpaper containing only suggestions of some topics which might be discussed. (The Secretary did not mention that same paper had been previously passed to Smith via Gaylard).4 Begin text: Principal subjects for discussion at a meeting of all the parties at principal level.
1. A transitional constitution, which would supersede the 1959 [1969] constitution and would provide for an administration, neutral as between the parties, through a Council, the composition, method of operation and chairmanship of which would be matters for discussion.
[Page 631]2. The provisions for holding of free and impartial elections at the end of the agreed transitional period.
3. The independence constitution, including the composition and powers of Parliament (e.g. special white representation and entrenchment).
4. Military and associated arrangements. This would cover the formation of armed forces for the independent country from the existing fighting forces and the integration of the rest of those now under arms into peacetime society. It would also cover arrangements for a ceasefire backed by a UN force. End text.
10. Harrop asked whether it was realistic to expect the PF to participate in elections run by Smith’s administration; the AAP speaks of UK supervision and UN observation. Muzorewa stated that the UANC had never rejected outside observers; a UN presence would be welcome. Secretary asked whether UN could supervise a ceasefire and the operations of the police. Muzorewa said he “wouldn’t quarrel with this as long as composition was right.” The Executive Council has already said that it would welcome a neutral body to supervise or observe. (Bishop repeated the phrase “supervise or observe” at several points, conveying the impression that he saw no difference between the two).
11. Harrop noted that this is precisely the type of issue which could be discussed at an all parties meeting. But the Bishop responded that there was nothing further to discuss, the West had been misinformed, a settlement had already occurred. Nyamuswa, turning his attention to the nonpaper, asked what the status of the Salisbury Agreement in such talks would be. The Secretary responded that the Salisbury Agreement exists: it would be one of the things discussed at a meeting. Referring to the first point on the nonpaper, the Bishop said the issue had already been covered, the new constitution would be almost a duplicate of that proposed in the AAP, but better, because it was freely agreed to by blacks and whites.
12. Secretary noted that the fourth point presented toughest set of questions. Bishop responded that Salisbury Agreement provided for integration of forces. He then digressed to assert that Lord Carver wanted to dismantle totally current security forces and turn country over to Patriotic Front. The Secretary denied this. Bishop said U.S. regards the Patriotic Front as “saints”. (Secretary interjected that he could assure the Bishop that we do not). With some emotion Muzorewa rejected Ambassador Young’s comments on responsibility for the missionary massacre and alleged that Young had claimed that he (Muzorewa) is responsible for ordering the murder of children.5
[Page 632]13. Muzorewa stated that real danger is possible civil war between Mugabe and Nkomo. If there is conflict between Executive Council and PF, however, it will be a “responsible civil war” between democracy and Marxism. Muzorewa argued that U.S. is acting on assumption that Nkomo and Mugabe control all the guerrillas, but that this is false, Nkomo’s army is split down the middle and he has admitted it.
14. As meeting drew to close Muzorewa urged Secretary to visit Rhodesia to see situation for himself and restated argument that sanctions now operating against people they were originally meant to help. Secretary responded that he had no plans to visit Rhodesia, but would be willing to travel to the area again to attend an all-parties conference. He repeated U.S. position on sanctions, and noted that the Bishop’s position is different because he believes in his heart that Smith has turned over power. Bishop noted that turnover has also been placed on paper; power lies in the Executive Council. But, the Secretary noted, decisions are only by consensus, and Smith, therefore, can still control events. The Bishop denied this, saying that “decisions are made by consensus without unanimity. If the three blacks don’t want something, Smith can’t do it. If Smith and two blacks want something, then the third black is unlucky”.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 112, 7/15–31/78. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to London, Lusaka, Pretoria, Maputo, Gaborone, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, and USUN. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Davidow; cleared by Arthur Houghton (S); approved by William Harrop (AF). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])↩
- See footnote 2, Document 210.↩
- Smith said that the constitutional agreement promising black majority rule by December 1978 “would not be carried out unless there is a cease-fire.” (Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1978, p. A2)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 211.↩
- In a July 13 interview published in Le Matin, Young said that if the massacre of 13 British missionaries on June 23 had been a carefully planned operation then “it could only have come from the Smith camp.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 29176)↩