2. Memorandum From Henry J. Richardson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • ALERT ITEM: Cuban Reinforcements Arriving in Angola

Summary

Several trends in Angola are conjoining, creating a situation not now alarming but which warrants scrutiny. Increases are now being noted in Cuban men and materiel flowing into Angola, but on current information the purpose of this is unclear. Close intelligence monitoring is underway. The intensity of and success of insurgency activity in the south and in Cabinda has also increased, as has friction between the Soviet/Cuban military-civilian adviser-occupation forces and the Angolan civilian population. The Gulf Oil installation on Cabinda may be in some danger of destruction by the FLEC liberation movement which enjoys local acquiescence among the population. Around 200 American and British nationals may be involved, and evacuation may be required. The immediacy of this danger is unclear, however. The Cabinda situation is now public knowledge.2

The government is beseiged with serious problems, but cannot be said to now be in danger of falling, notwithstanding dissent (with possible racial overtones) in MPLA ranks, as long as Castro continues his current strong support of the Neto regime.

This situation may furnish an opportunity for the US, in the context of the present steady but not accelerated process toward normalizing [Page 3] relations with Angola, to arrive at exercising some influence in Luanda while the Cubans and Soviets pay the freight. It would seem to be in Neto’s interest to move toward us somewhat to give himself additional options, to open another channel to Mobutu, and to lay the basis for requesting badly needed US aid and ultimately technical assistance.

The Nigerians, by virtue of the time and effort spent in their Angola-Zaire mediating effort, and the Zambians would seem to have immediate interests in maintaining Neto’s stability, i.e., in urging him to take positive action on the Cabinda and UNITA situations, and in shoring up the Angolan economy.

Introduction

There appears to be some dissent within the upper level MPLA leadership as well as increased insurgency by anti-governmental groups in Angola. Within the past few weeks Cuban flights to Angola have been nzoticeably full and three Cuban convoys of ships have left for Angola in the month of May alone.

Angolan-Cuban Friction

Angolan dissatisfaction over Cuban and Soviet involvement there has grown in recent months. Although Angolan President Neto probably has good relations with top Cuban and Soviet leadership, their substantial and continued presence in Angola has led to increasing frictions at lower levels of the Angolan Government and society. There are an estimated 10,000 to 14,500 Cuban military and civilian advisors in Angola. Several hundred Soviet advisors and sizeable contingents from other East European states are also there. The Cubans and Soviets are criticized for being arrogant, monopolizing luxuries, being incompetent for the salaries paid them, not fostering economic progress, and not eliminating the insurgent threat in southern Angola and the exclave of Cabinda. Reportedly, Cuban troops have been reluctant to actively pursue insurgents, and this has created additional friction.

While Neto is undoubtedly aware of the problems caused by continued Cuban and Soviet presence, he simply cannot afford to reduce their role given Angola’s current economic difficulties and his increasing dependence on the Cubans to maintain internal security and keep the government functioning. Fidel Castro apparently, however, remains committed to the preservation of the Neto regime, and these reinforcements would seem to confirm that. However, they may also be evidence of Cuba’s sinking into a Viet-type quagmire.

Cuban Reinforcements

The third Cuban convoy on the way to Luanda is currently under very close intelligence surveillance. [4 lines not declassified]

[less than 1 line not declassified] coverage of the port of Luanda is being arranged and further reports will be made.

[Page 4]

The purpose for these three convoys is uncertain. There is a possibility that this could be part of a large though normal rotation of Cuban troops accompanied by shipments of new equipment.

More probable is that these men and equipment are related to reinforcing Cuban participation on the side of the Neto government against the insurgency by UNITA in the South, against the insurgency by FLEC on Cabinda, against any problems generated by the apparent trickling back across the Angolan-Zaire border of defeated Katangese, or Cuban participation in other internal security duties for the Angolan Government, or all of the above. There is tentative evidence, for example, that of the two-ship first convoy, one ship docked in Cabinda and the other in Luanda.

The ranking probability is that this activity is related to a felt Cuban need for reinforcements in the UNITA and the Cabinda situations. Neither of these have been going particularly well militarily for the Angolans and Cubans recently: UNITA has managed to at least temporarily interdict some food supply routes in the South; and FLEC appears the most disciplined and effective military force on Cabinda, against Cubans, Angolans and Zairians, and evidently controls over half of that territory with the acquiescence of the local population.

The latter raises a problem for the Gulf Oil installation on Cabinda, from which FLEC has demanded payment of royalties otherwise flowing to Luanda, on threat of destroying the installation. Unconfirmed reports are that some Gulf personnel have felt threatened enough to seek safety on offshore oil drilling platforms, which are now also threatened. It is unknown whether FLEC actually possesses the capability to carry out this threat, or the extent to which the installation is effectively being protected by the Angolan/Cubans. Evacuation may be needed here. Further, it seems important that Gulf have maximum flexibility relative to its royalty payments in this situation. Such flexibility has in the past been a key to the survival of that installation when Gulf was caught between the Portuguese and the growing MPLA liberation movement.

It must be emphasized that the information on the Cuban reinforcements and the Cabinda situation discussed above is still tentative, and that the situation remains under very close scrutiny.

An Opportunity for the US

While I believe it would be too much to say that the Neto government is in danger of falling, especially with continued Cuban/Soviet assistance, it is safe to say that he and his regime are beseiged with very serious problems. This is especially the case in Cabinda from which the Gulf installation furnishes a significant part of the country’s revenues, and in the south where the UNITA insurgency represents [Page 5] not only political and military antagonism toward Luanda, but also tribal differences. The Neto regime has never come to terms with the Ovimbundu peoples who are the mainstay of UNITA support; there are reports of Soviet pressure on Neto for him to open serious negotiations with UNITA to stabilize the situation and prevent further economic drain on the country. This apparently has not yet occurred.

Neto would not seem in a position to eject the Soviets and the Cubans, even if he wanted to. Other possibilities are, down the line after protracted negotiations, for some kind of shared governmental arrangement with UNITA. Neto still has OAU and African recognition which would seem unlikely to be withdrawn, especially since there is probably residual South African support for UNITA.

He probably seeks normalization of relations with the US to, among other reasons, give himself more options in the situation and to lay the basis for future requests for US aid. It would seem profitable for us to continue the process of normalizing relations, though not to accelerate it, and through that process search out small and then larger opportunities for US leverage and influence in Luanda. We would have to tread cautiously, acting positively in a guarded way, while seeing whether the Soviets and the Cubans hang themselves. All of the foregoing indicates that it is increasingly within Neto’s interest to begin to slowly counterbalance ‘occupational influence’, and this may be a situation where we can begin to be heard while the Cubans and the Soviets pay the freight.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 105, 4–5/77. Secret. Sent for information.
  2. The Chicago Tribune reported on the unrest in Cabinda in a May 17 article entitled “Anti-Reds threaten to blow up Gulf Oil rigs in Angola.” (Chicago Tribune, May 17, 1977, p. 2)