Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

195. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 8, 1978, 3:15–3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Meeting Between President Carter and British Foreign Secretary David A.L. Owen

PARTICIPANTS

• President Carter
• Secretary Vance
• Zbigniew Brzezinski
• David Aaron
• Assistant Secretary Moose
• Thomas Thornton
• British Foreign Secretary Owen
• British Ambassador Peter Jay
• John Graham, British Foreign Ministry
• Ewen Fergusson, British Foreign Ministry
• Stephen Wall, British Foreign Ministry

Owen began with an overview of the Rhodesian situation. He pointed out that the Cuban danger had various aspects. We should keep in mind that a collapse of the internal settlement, for whatever reason, could leave us with an obligation to the patriotic front to oust Smith. We obviously lack the capability to do this and the PF could well turn to the Cubans and Soviets for support. In this circumstance, we will be perceived by many to be cooperating with the Cubans de facto.

Owen stated on the one hand that we cannot stretch the Anglo-American plan much further through concession to the PF. At the same time the internal settlement as now constituted is not viable. We need to find a settlement ground between the AAP and internal settlement and particularly seek to include Nkomo. We should also enlist South Africa’s support to put pressure on Smith.

The Africans are trying to push and split the US and UK. The United States has achieved a position of great prestige in Africa but now must show strength. We have pressure to bring to bear on the PF; specifically, Zambia is in very shaky shape and needs help from us.

The President said that we should stick to the AAP, adding to it elements from the internal settlement in so far as they are compatible. It would be desirable to have a conference in which all parties participate. We should consider however whether all invitees would come; whether South Africa would support it; and how we might best propose it.

Owen agreed with the need for a conference but emphasized that we would have to do a lot of ground work first. We might have to fall back to the “Proximity Talks” model as some of the parties were unwilling to meet with others. He believed that South Africa would lend support, hoping that Smith and Nkomo would get together and make a deal.

Owen had recently spoken with the French and Germans. They will go along with us at the UN and abstain if a resolution comes to vote.² Owen would prefer to cast a veto but since the United States does not want to he will go along with us. He urged that we issue a strong explanatory statement in view of the Chapter 7 implications of the resolution. The American and British explanatory statements should be closely parallel. The UK will not at this time let it be known that it will not cast a veto. It may be able to gain some leverage over the resolution if it still has this threat in hand.

Both the UK and the US agreed that no resolution at all would be preferable and there are several ways of attempting this. Owen raised the possibility of the British President of the Council simply announcing from the chair that the US and UK would call a meeting of concerned parties. This would have to be coordinated first with the Africans. In general the New York situation would have to be played by ear.

The President concluded the meeting by noting a general agreement on the matters discussed. We should move ahead with deliberate speed, and knowledge of the willingness of the British to join us in abstention should be kept to the very narrowest circle.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 15, Great Britain: 8/77–3/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.
2. See footnote 4, Document 193.