189. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter 1

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

3. Rhodesia: Sithole Discusses Internal Settlement with Owen: In conversations with Sithole in London, David Owen reviewed the broad outlines of the Salisbury agreement on constitutional principles and made several suggestions which would make the arrangements more acceptable to international opinion.2 Sithole seemed to accept David’s points. David also asked Sithole for his ideas on how to bring Nkomo into the internal talks, but Sithole, while acknowledging that Nkomo was an important figure who would be welcome, had little to offer on this.3 The British are clearly anxious to explore the possibilities of splitting Nkomo from Mugabe. Dick Moose is off to London tonight to discuss with David our negotiating strategy.

Sithole’s version of the arrangements for an interim government coincides with what we know from press reports: a Council of State with one seat for each of the three black leaders, one for Smith, and a neutral chairman, and a Council of Ministers of the same proportions. The parties have already agreed to constitutional safeguards which reserve 28 seats for whites in an independence parliament, with power to block changes in the constitution; and a general formulation on the make-up of a new army which provides for no more than a promise of amnesty and integration into the Rhodesian Defense Forces of guerrillas wishing to join.4

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 2/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “Cy.”
  2. In telegram 2831 from London, February 20, the Embassy reported on Owen’s meeting with Sithole. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780077–0546)
  3. In telegram 2876 from London, February 21, the Embassy reported on the second meeting between Owen and Sithole. Sithole held that “a place in the transition should be provided for Nkomo . . . Nkomo, however, cannot expect a special place in the transition nor would he be welcome if he represents foreign interests. Nkomo and his army must submit themselves to a general political agreement which transfers power to the people of Zimbabwe, not to any particular individual or group.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780078–0432)
  4. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Give me a simple tabular comparison. Prospective internal settlement vs our minimum requirements.” See Document 192.