Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

167. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, September 12, 1977

SUBJECT

• Rhodesia: A Status Report and Recommendations for Action

The State of Play

No one expected the Owen-Young talks with the Front Line,² Patriotic Front,³ other Nationalists,⁴ South Africans⁵ and Rhodesians⁶ to result in unqualified support for our settlement proposal. Our success to date lies not so much in acceptance of the proposal as it does in the fact that none of the parties has rejected it, and also in the degree to which it, rather than the armed struggle, is the present focus of attention. Our task now is to sustain this focus and gain momentum by getting talks started between the British Resident Commissioner, a UN Special Representative, and leaders of the nationalist and Rhodesian military forces.

It was clear in the talks in Lusaka that the Front Line states view a negotiated settlement as decidedly in their interests. No one is more realistic about this than Machel, but he and his colleagues will have to be convinced at each step of the way that Smith is definitely on his way out and that the path to majority rule will be irreversible. The Patriotic Front is unenthusiastic about the proposal. Nevertheless, there are features of it which they like and they have not gone so far as to reject our initiative. Ian Smith’s obvious preference is for an internal solution. However, there is little he can do in this regard without the acquiescence of Bishop Muzorewa and/or Reverend Sithole, and for the moment they favor the UK–US proposal. Smith can be expected to try to convince them that our plan is a non-starter insofar as their interests are concerned. Clearly, Vorster is not inclined to put any pressure on Smith.

Plan For Security Council Action

Our immediate goal at this time is a limited one. Together with the British we will seek Security Council approval for the Secretary General to designate a special representative to join with the UK Resident Commissioner-designate and enter into negotiations with the commanders of the Rhodesian and nationalist forces.⁷ The purpose of these talks will be to establish terms for a ceasefire and to discuss a wide range of military matters relating to the internal security arrangments during the transitional period and beyond. Andy Young and his UK counterpart have suggested that we go to the Security Council with the proposal for the UN representative around September 20. We agree with this timing.

In order to obtain Security Council approval we have to work to achieve the strongest possible African backing in the United Nations. We will have to rely primarily on the Front Line states and Nigeria to ensure that the three Africans on the Security Council (Benin, Libya, and Mauritius) support the resolution we are proposing. Ambassador Young is now sounding out the Africans at the UN and is relatively confident that their support will be forthcoming.

Planning The Next Steps

At this point it appears likely that U.S. pressure on South Africa will not be necessary to gain agreement from Smith to participate in the internal security negotiations. This, however, is not certain. Further, over the longer term it is likely that it will be necessary to apply considerable pressure on South Africa to gain Smith’s acquiescence in the entire settlement package.

We have made a clear commitment to the Front Line that, if we have African support for our proposals, we will do all we can to obtain Smith’s resignation and Rhodesia’s return to temporary British administration. We have stated our willingness to apply strong pressure on South Africa toward this end: in your conversation with Nyerere you specifically mentioned oil as a likely lever.

It is certain that pressures at the UN from African, non-aligned and communist countries for measures against Rhodesia and South Africa will build very quickly if we do not receive an early indication of Smith’s willingness to acquiesce in the settlement package as a whole.

To forestall this, it is imperative that we are perceived as being willing, and even preparing to bring the necessary pressure on Vorster and Smith at a later date, if necessary. We should move ahead on two tracks: (a) immediate actions, even if mainly symbolic, to demonstrate our serious intent; and (b) planning for the hard moves against South Africa that might be necessary.

One step that we have already begun which will help convey the message that we are serious about applying increased pressure on Rhodesia involves a “Core Group” of major trading nations (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and Iran) which will meet for the first time on September 13. From this meeting, we hope to gain agreement from these nations to more strictly enforce current sanctions against Rhodesia. At the very least, this would symbolize to South Africa and others the intent of the West’s commercial leaders to bring about a settlement of the Rhodesian question. We will also ask that each member of the Core Group underscore to South Africa their support for the US/UK proposals.

Decisions Ahead

If Rhodesia shows no willingness to participate in negotiations regarding a ceasefire and transitional arrangements, or if it enters these negotiations but stalls, we will have to make clear again (as we did in London with Botha)⁸ to South Africa that Rhodesian intransigence will lead to actions in the UN and elsewhere which will inevitably have negative effects on it.

We must, therefore, determine what steps might be taken, especially in the critical area of arms and whether there are appropriate actions in relation to the oil issue which we might undertake. We are urgently discussing these issues within the Department of State and will consult with other interested agencies to develop proposals which we hope to present to you for your endorsement within the coming weeks. We are critically aware that time is of the essence. I will suggest to Zbig that the Policy Review Committee meet next week to consider these essential questions.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Rhodesia: 7–12/77. Confidential.
2. In telegram 2583 from Lusaka, August 28, the Embassy reported on the August 27 meeting with Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel, Dos Santos, and Masire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770311–0138)
3. In telegram 2578 from Lusaka, August 28, the Embassy reported on the morning meeting with Nkomo and Mugabe. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770311–0058) In telegram 4405 from Pretoria, August 28, the Embassy reported on the second round of talks with Nkomo and Mugabe. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770311–0189)
4. Not further identified.
5. In telegram 4458 from Pretoria, August 29, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Vorster, Botha, Brand Fourie, and South African Ambassador to Rhodesia Olivier. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770312–0481)
6. In telegram 11372 from Nairobi, September 2, the Embassy reported on the September 1 meeting in Salisbury with Smith and his Cabinet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770382–0818)
7. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, pp. 189–192 and p. 202. UNSC Resolution 415 (1977) was adopted 13 to 0 with 1 abstention on September 29.
8. See Document 165.