Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

15. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, October 23, 1977

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Toward Angola

Your query² on U.S. policy with respect to Angola, UNITA and Neto came as we were developing a strategy of working with African mediators to reconcile the factions and to begin the process of Cuban troop withdrawal. I believe the strategy, outlined in the memorandum, will most effectively further the goals you have indicated: to end Angola’s dependence on Cuban troops by encouraging it to come to terms with UNITA as a legitimate political force and by reducing the threat from neighboring states, such as South Africa. It also addresses the question of U.S. recognition. Andy Young agrees.

Background

The war in Angola is developing into a long stalemate. UNITA’s successes in the southern rural areas seriously disrupt the economy not only of Angola but of the entire region—cutting off all the cities from food supplies, enabling the Benguela Railroad to operate only sporadically at best. Yet UNITA is unable to take any southern cities, many of which are traditional MPLA strongholds. This prevents UNITA from consolidating its own position even in its own tribal area.

UNITA’s military successes have increased Angolan dependence on the Cubans; and racist appeals by MPLA internal opposition have increased Neto’s personal dependence on their protection. The ever-present threat of more meddling and even intervention by neighboring states—South Africa and Zaire—adds to the MPLA’s fears that it cannot afford to have the Cubans leave. Reports indicate that South Africa may be providing UNITA some assistance, for example communications equipment, but not on a large scale. Probably more important in Angolan eyes is South Africa’s large and modern force, and significant military presence on Angola’s border in Namibia. It has easily swept through southern Angola in the past and, in Angola’s view, could do so again.

UNITA is concentrating its efforts not on South African support but on securing resumption of assistance through Zaire, from third countries. UNITA claims to have commitments from Zaire, France and francophone African states that assistance will be provided. There has been no evidence yet that it is being delivered. Should substantial Zairian assistance to UNITA be resumed, it would provide Neto with every incentive to support another major Katangan military effort in Zaire’s Shaba province.

MPLA’s approach to Ivory Coast for mediation of its dispute with UNITA has provided some hope that the conflict in Angola might be resolved and the Cuban military presence rendered less important to the MPLA government. Ivory Coast has quietly begun this effort. While UNITA has initially refused to talk with MPLA until the Cuban troops leave, it has also reiterated its position that the war in Angola cannot be won militarily, and political reconciliation is the only solution.

U.S. Objectives

We believe that a mediation strategy thus best serves our objectives:

—To secure removal of the Cuban troops.

—To encourage reconciliation among the factions and an end to hostilities.

—To avoid a broadening conflict involving neighboring states—such as Zairian intervention in Angola and a Katangan invasion of Zaire.

—To encourage Angolan independence of outside powers, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union.

—To promote economic prosperity in Angola and develop mutually beneficial economic relations.

—To work productively with Angola on southern African issues. For example, it has more influence with SWAPO than any other African state and could be helpful in the Namibia negotiations.

Proposed Strategy

Assistant Secretary Moose has discussed with the Ivory Coast Foreign Minister a possible scenario for reconciliation containing the following elements: Cuban troops would withdraw from UNITA territory in the south, with control of the southern cities to be negotiated. Savimbi would stop fighting. Neto could invite him to serve as Vice President in a government of national reconciliation, although Savimbi might wish to remain in the south for the time being. The Western powers could weigh in with Mobutu to assure Angola against cross-border interference, and they could bring additional pressure on the South Africans to stay out. The U.S. could recognize the new government of reconciliation as the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola progressed, and could institute an assistance program, including projects in southern Angola. Given Congressional constraints, we begin with Titles I and II of the PL–480 program.

This scenario must not be presented as an American blueprint for the future of Angola, which would certainly harden the positions of Neto, Savimbi and the Cubans. But the Ivory Coast has expressed interest in pursuing it and would want at some point to be able to say it has United States support.

A memorandum elaborating this strategy is being sent to the NSC staff.

U.S. Policy Toward UNITA

U.S. recognition of a government of reconciliation which included UNITA would amount to our recognizing UNITA as a legitimate political force. I believe it is important, however, that such recognition take place within the context of the reconciliation strategy, and that we take no position of support for UNITA per se. It would be particularly damaging to our objectives were we to make any public statement of support in any sense for UNITA.

A public call for recognition of UNITA as a political force would have the following effects: It would bring back to the surface Neto’s underlying suspicions—based on past U.S. support for UNITA—and could well make him feel compelled to harden his position on dealing with UNITA. It could make our important dealings with Angola on Namibia that much more difficult. Coming on top of UNITA’s successes on the battlefield this year, it could conceivably encourage Savimbi to fight more and think less about reconciliation. Reactions in Africa would be strong, as many would suspect that the U.S. was again intervening in Angola on the side of UNITA.

Cuba

The United States should oppose all intervention in Angola by outside states—including Zaire, South Africa and others, as well as Cuba. We should continue to make clear our opposition to the presence of Cuban troops anywhere in Africa. But a more active public campaign focusing on Cuban withdrawal would likely be counter-productive, as Cuba would not want to withdraw, or be seen to be withdrawing, under U.S. pressure.

An important factor in a reduction of Cubans in Angola will be the lessening of Neto’s dependence on them. This is one result anticipated from the reconciliation strategy. Continuation of the war means continued reliance by Neto on the Cubans. Such reliance would also be reinforced by any act on our part to strengthen UNITA.

U.S. Recognition and Congressional Attitudes

One of the ways in which we can support eventual moves toward reconciliation in Angola is to hold out the ultimate prospect of U.S. recognition assistance. Thus, if the Neto regime or an intermediary like Obasanjo asks us about our intentions, we should avoid an absolute refusal. We should, however, point out that domestic political constraints prevent us from moving ahead now, and we can indicate that Cuban troop presence and the continuing civil war are factors which complicate our ability to recognize. We should use any contact we might have with Angola to encourage SWAPO cooperation in the Namibia negotiations.

In addition, Andy Young believes that we should at some point early in the strategy consult with the Soviets to assure them that we are not aiming at a simple reduction of their influence in Angola—and let the Cubans know that, while we will abstain from a public call for their withdrawal, we nonetheless intend to work quietly to this end. I agree.

In sum, we would like to launch the initiative through Houphouet and, in the meantime, to consult closely with key members of Congress to begin to build the support we would need if the strategy works. We should not move toward closer relations with Angola until we see some progress.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 105, 10/14–26/77. Secret; Exdis.
2. See Document 14.