130. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter 1

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

4. Namibia Pre-Implementation Conference: The Namibia Pre-Implementation Conference will end in Geneva tomorrow with little to show for its week’s work. South Africa has stalled, apparently because it believes the leading internal party, the DTA, needs more time before it can beat SWAPO in a fair election. Although South Africa has made a major issue of UN support for SWAPO, it refused to negotiate on a package of actions to ensure UN impartiality once a date was set for implementation of the UN plan. Pik Botha told the Cape Town Five today that South Africa could not agree now to implement the UN plan since it would result in a SWAPO victory. He said South Africa was prepared to face the international reaction to its position. Representatives of the Western Five Contact Group in Geneva proposed a Heads of Government message to South African Prime Minister Botha, but London rejected the Contact Group draft and Don McHenry, the Canadians, and the Germans rejected the British redraft, which would have been much softer on the South Africans. The message, in either case, would not have changed the South African position, and the Western Five can still send a post-conference message trying to get South Africa to show some movement.

The UN will probably wind up the conference tomorrow with a summary of what happened, implicitly critical of South Africa, but noting the contact which took place between the parties and expressing the hope that South Africa will reconsider its position. The UN statement may also include some mention of the impartiality package offered to South Africa, which will serve to get that proposal on the public record.

African reaction to the failure of the conference may result in either a debate on Namibia at the UN General Assembly when it resumes January 15 and/or pressure in the Security Council for sanctions. We will be consulting with our Contact Group colleagues and Waldheim on how to hold the African reaction in check while we pursue the problem further with South Africa. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 41, State Department Evening Reports, 1/81. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.