121. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable1
COUNTRY
- South West Africa (Namibia)/South Africa/Angola/Zambia
SUBJECT
- Possibility that the Namibian Internal Parties Will Reject the Waldheim Report and Form an Interim Government (DOI: Early April 1979)
SOURCE
- [2 lines not declassified]
Summary: The Namibian internal parties met South African Ministers in Windhoek on 2 April 1979 to discuss their reaction to the 19–23 March proximity talks in New York. With tacit SAG encouragement, [Page 348] the internal parties seem disposed to reject the UN proposals and to introduce an interim government after 9 April. End of summary.
1. A prominent Namibian politician commented in early April 1979 on the mood of the internal Namibian political parties in the aftermath of the visit to Windhoek on 2 April 1979 by South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha and South African Foreign Minister R.F. Botha and in the light of current moves by the internal parties toward agreeing on a stand on the issues hindering the implementation of the Western proposals. He said that unless UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and the Western Five came out with a formula that could satisfy the internal parties’ objections to the issues of South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) bases inside Namibia and of monitoring SWAPO bases outside Namibia, the Constituent Assembly would probably pass a resolution on 9 April 1979 calling for the formation of an interim government to take over the responsibility of governing Namibia and of negotiating Namibia’s independence directly with the UN and Western Five. This resolution would probably be accepted by the South African Government (SAG) and might win the support of the Namibian National Front (NNF) and SWAPO (Democrat-D) who now saw little alternative to abandoning the Western proposals.
2. At a military briefing given by South African General Jannie Geldenhuys on 2 April 1979, the internal parties were told in balanced and unemotional terms that the UN and Western Five’s proposals for the monitoring of SWAPO bases were inadequate from a military point of view. Geldenhuys said that the technical surveillance devices suggested by Waldheim were of doubtful value and that Angolan President Augustinho Neto, had no control over southern Angola. He also said that both Neto and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda were being unreliably briefed by their officials.
3. At their meetings with P.W. and R.F. Botha on 2 April 1979, the internal parties were assured that the SAG would not act except in accordance with the internal parties’ wishes. P.W. Botha made a plea to the internal parties to put aside their ideological differences for the time being and to produce a united decision on accepting the proposed clarifications to Waldheim’s report S/13120 of 26 February 1979. He said the SAG would abide by that united decision, whatever it was. P.W. Botha pointed out the inherent dangers in accepting the proposed clarification and stressed once again the UN and Western Five’s constant breaches of faith and the continuous concessions made by the SAG. The politician said that he gained the clear impression that the SAG, which had previously wanted to see the implementation of the Western proposals, now hoped that the internal parties would reject them.
4. At a caucus meeting on 2 April 1979, immediately after the meeting with P.W. and R.F. Botha, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance [Page 349] (DTA) came within an inch of agreeing to put a resolution to the Constituent Assembly to adjourn indefinitely and summon a national convention of all the internal parties under the terms of the original Turnhalle Agreement to decide Namibia’s future. Remembering that this would restore to Aktur its right of veto, the DTA decided that the Constituent Assembly should negotiate with the NNF and SWAPO (D) the latter’s participation in an interim government. The DTA also decided that it would go ahead even if the NNF and SWAPO (D) refused to participate.
5. The DTA was determined to take over the governing of Namibia by way of an interim government. Efforts by the Constituent Assembly to remove racial discrimination in the territory had been constantly blocked by Aktur and the SAG was not prepared to fight Aktur. The DTA found itself in an intolerable situation whereby it was losing support daily to SWAPO because of its failure to fulfill its election promises. The DTA had no intention of declaring independence unilaterally but it wanted to be in a position where the UN and Western Five had to negotiate directly with the DTA as an interim government on its own terms. The DTA foresaw a situation in which UN Special Representative Marti Ahtisaari would make continuous concessions to SWAPO against which the Western Five would be unwilling to intervene, and it was determined that this should not happen.
6. The politician said that the DTA would hold bilateral meetings with the NNF and SWAPO (D) before 9 April 1979 with a view to securing their acceptance of the DTA’s proposal that the Constituent Assembly should pass a resolution on the formation of an interim government. These bilateral meetings could lead to an all parties meeting depending upon the response of the NNF and SWAPO (D). Whether or not the DTA secured their acceptance, the politician expected the Constituent Assembly to proceed with its resolution on 9 April 1979. [less than 1 line not declassified] comment: The SAG has given Waldheim’s clarifications to the internal parties. The Constituent Assembly will probably proceed with its resolution on 9 April. However, the Western Five might clinch NNF and SWAPO (D) acceptance of the UN position if they made public the clarifications agreed upon in New York. In this case, the united front of the internal parties would be broken and the SAG might refrain from closing the door.)
7. ACQ: [1 line not declassified].
8. Field dissem: [2 lines not declassified].
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 101, 4/12/79, Rhodesia and Angola [I]. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent to the Departments of State and the Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSA, NMCC, NSC, and the White House.↩