107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town and the Mission to the United Nations1
54634. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: Botha’s Response to the Secretary. Ref: A) Cape Town 433;2 B) State 49690.3
1. (C–entire text)
2. South African Ambassador Sole called on the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary March 5 to deliver text of Botha’s response to the Secretary’s message (ref B) requesting specifics on South African charges of UN and Contact Group duplicity in recent Namibia negotiations. Botha’s response (text in para 5 below) does not provide the degree of detail which the South Africans have already leaked to the press in support of their charges (such as in Fleurde Villiers March 4 Sunday Times article cited in Cape Town 441).4 Response from the Secretary being prepared and will be sent septel.5
3. In explaining the South African position, Ambassador Sole, who was accompanied by South African UN Charge Ecksteen, generally went over familiar ground. He noted that the letter gave particular attention to the issue of UNTAG composition, although he said that he personally believed that South Africa could accept any composition package proposed by the Secretary General as long as it did not include Nigeria or one of the Front Line States. Sole explained the emphasis on the composition issue as indicative of South Africa’s view that it had been tricked and deceived throughout the recent negotiations and that its views had been completely ignored. The key issue, Sole pointed out, was the lack of confidence in the UN’s objectivity which the recent negotiations have engendered among people in South Africa and in Namibia itself. Confidence in the UN’s objectivity was very much undermined, he said, and he doubted that it could be restored. South Africa was being presented with a fait accompli, he claimed, because it was clearly impossible for Waldheim now to back off and assume a [Page 284] position more favorable than that contained in his February 26 report to the Security Council.
4. In discussing the question of SWAPO bases in Namibia, Sole stressed that there were no such bases now and that the establishment of a base would attract additional armed SWAPO personnel leading to a progressive build up of SWAPO forces in the country. He suggested that unarmed SWAPO personnel could cross the frontier, obtain arms from secret arms caches in Namibia and then claim to be members of SWAPO’s armed forces. Ecksteen interjected that South Africa simply could not understand what was going on in New York. He cited as an example Ambassador McHenry’s statement that the section in the annex dealing with monitoring of SWAPO bases was a mistake, and he asked how it was possible for South Africa to proceed on this basis. Sole referred to “aggressive” SWAPO statements, noted that there were new sabotage incidents in the country including an attack on a railroad south of Windhoek, and said that somehow these remaining issues must be resolved. There must be monitoring in Angola and Zambia and there could be no SWAPO bases in Namibia. Sole said that the “South West Africans” will not accept SWAPO bases in Namibia and that “we won’t overrule them.”
5. The Secretary noted that he did not have the details on these matters at hand and asked the Deputy Secretary to get the information together for a response.
5 [sic]. Following is text of Botha letter:
I appreciate receiving your letter of 2 March 19796 and I am encouraged by your views that we must get to the heart of the matter.
We have for some time now been extremely concerned about information which has come to our attention concerning the developments surrounding Mr. Ahtisaari’s visit to the Frontline States and the preparatory work in New York leading to the Secretary-General’s final report. This information derives from sources which hold no brief for South Africa, neither do they stand to gain anything from it.
During Mr. Ahtisaari’s visit to South West Africa and South Africa from 14 to 22 January 19797 he categorically refused to discuss with the Administrator-General and with myself the question of the composition of the military component of UNTAG, on the grounds that he had not been authorized to do so by the Secretary-General, who had [Page 285] reserved for him personally the question for consultations with the parties in New York. This fact the Secretary-General, specifically emphasized in his letter to me on 1 January 1979 (S/13002).8 We eventually accepted the position and resorted to conveying our comments in this regard directly to the Secretary-General. However, we subsequently learnt that, while Mr. Ahtisaari had been requested to press Mr. Nujoma in Luanda to arrange for SWAPO’s response on the Secretary-General’s initial proposal on composition to be conveyed to the Secretary-General in New York without delay, Mr. Ahtisaari nevertheless had felt perfectly free to exchange views on this subject with Mr. Nujoma during their meeting in Luanda. Moreover, Mr. Ahtisaari and the Secretary-General thereafter changed their proposal in this regard without even consulting South Africa.
As you know, composition has all along been a very important aspect for South Africa—you will recall our conversation with President Carter and what he said about our right to insist on a well balanced force. We also emphasized that composition was more important than numbers.
You yourself will recall that also during the discussions with the Five South Africa was time and again assured that it could afford to be less concerned about the actual size of the component since its views on composition would be taken into account. Consultation on composition was in keeping with long-standing United Nations practice which recognizes the necessity of paying due regard to the views of the host country. It was emphasized that practicalities and the importance of the cooperation of the receiving country made it impossible for the United Nations to emplace forces in a country without its agreement. We need therefore have no fears on that score, we were told. To avoid any future misunderstanding South Africa, for its part, repeatedly pointed out that it would not be willing to accept countries who had in the past identified themselves with the aims of SWAPO. Their forces could not be expected to act with absolute impartiality.
In actual fact, the South African Government was presented with a “working model” by the Secretary-General and, in an effort to reach agreement, the South African Government indicated its acceptance of forces from certain countries hostile to South Africa and parties in South West Africa, other than SWAPO. Indeed as far as the infantry [Page 286] battalions were concerned, we accepted at the outset Ghana and Romania from the “working model.”
In the course of the “consultations” South Africa proposed several African countries, none of which was accepted. It also suggested several Asian, Latin American and Western European countries—all of these suggestions falling within the pattern of equitable geographic distribution—and yet again none was accepted.
The process of consultation therefore, simply amounted to a procedure whereby the same “working model” was repeatedly presented to us as the only feasible group of countries. This implied that either the “working model” had to be accepted or UNTAG could not be emplaced.
In regard to the “two further countries” to provide infantry mentioned by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 1 March 1979 to the Security Council it is significant that he omitted Canada, which was included in the original “working model” and which incidentally was accepted by South Africa. Is this because Canada is a member of NATO and SWAPO has in the meantime made clear its attitude so far as NATO countries are concerned?
A second major concern to us relates to the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.
When an early draft of the Waldheim report was discussed with the Five in New York, terminology was inserted to the effect that a form of monitoring of SWAPO would take place. Upon preparing the redraft this sentence was omitted by the Secretariat but it was reinserted when this became apparent. When presenting the redraft to the Frontline States, Mr. Ahtisaari in response to a question, stated that the particular phrase had nothing to do with South Africa’s request that SWAPO bases be monitored.
When Mr. Ahtisaari was in Cape Town and the question of monitoring on both sides was discussed, there was no suggestion that SWAPO would not be monitored outside South West Africa. Indeed Mr. Ahtisaari was appreciative when South Africa indicated that it was willing to allow monitoring south of the Orange River, since this would ease his task when he discussed this with the Frontline States.
I do not have to remind you of the utmost importance we and all the parties in South West Africa, with the exception of SWAPO, attach to the necessity of effectively monitoring both sides, as is clearly required by the annexure to the Western proposal.
We were appalled by the Secretary-General emphasizing in the annexure to his letter sent on 19 February 1979 to President Carter and eleven other Heads of State and Government, including those of the Frontline States, Nigeria and the Sudan, that the settlement proposal “makes no provision for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases [Page 287] outside Namibia.”9 We were shocked to learn of the endorsement of this interpretation by the Five.
Are the relevant provisions meaningless and, if so, I presume they are equally meaningless in so far as the South African forces are concerned?
Furthermore, if that is the attitude of the Secretary-General and of Mr. Ahtisaari, what was the purpose of the Special Representative’s discussions with us on this question during his Cape Town visit? The question therefore arises: When did the Secretary-General and Mr. Ahtisaari discover—or when were they informed—that the proposal and its annexure contained no such provision? Clearly this occurred after Mr. Ahtisaari’s visit to South Africa. And for one of the Five to tell us ten months after accepting the proposal in its final and definitive form, that the presence of a vital provision in its annexure is a mistake and should have been omitted is incomprehensible.
In addition a totally new and amazing concept was introduced in the Secretary-General’s report, namely the provision to restrict “to base at designated locations inside Namibia, to be specified by the Special Representative,” SWAPO personnel.
Throughout the discussions, over 23 months, it was abundantly clear that there were no SWAPO bases inside South West Africa and the possibility of creating such bases was never even considered.
The preparations of the letter and annexure in question came to our notice during discussions with the Secretary-General and his staff and with members of the Western Five. The letter with annexure was prepared and despatched (under the authorization of an Assistant Secretary-General for special political questions) without Dr. Waldheim approving the final version and in the “absence” of Mr. Ahtisaari on a visit to Washington, D.C. When the particular sentence was pointed out to the Secretary-General he intimated that the letter and annexure had been coordinated with, approved by and sent out with the full knowledge of the Western Five. The Five in turn, tried to disassociate them from some of the contents of the letter and the annexure.
Thus, South Africa was again confronted with a statement in an official United Nations document. We know from experience that once anything has gone into such a document, South Africa has no chance of having it deleted.
We are fully aware of certain preposterous claims by SWAPO and that these were in fact listed in one of the earlier drafts of the report. For the sake of expedience these were omitted in the final draft and [Page 288] replaced by the phrase “differing interpretations and perceptions regarding the implementation of certain provisions of the settlement proposal.”
These are some examples of incidents which have come to our knowledge. You will appreciate that they give rise to a strong feeling on our side that we have not been dealt with fairly. As you yourself have indicated, on several occasions, mutual trust underpins this entire undertaking. We can accept that a certain amount of intrigue is unavoidable in negotiations of this nature but the above goes much further and destroys the confidence that this exercise can be carried out impartially and in the best interests of all the people of Namibia.
I must reiterate that we have become doubtful of the ability of the Five Western powers to comply with their commitment in terms of their settlement proposal.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790102–0557. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Niles; cleared by Gerald B. Helman (IO), Robert V. Peeley (AF), Peter S. Bridges (IO/UNP), Jackson (P), George H. Mitchell (S); approved by Christopher.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 106.↩
- See Document 106.↩
- Telegram 441 from Cape Town, March 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790099–0676)↩
- See Document 108.↩
- Transmitted in telegram 49690; see Document 106.↩
- In telegram 258 from Pretoria, January 15, the Embassy reported on the January 13 meeting between Ahtisaari and Brand Fourie in Johannesburg and a meeting later that day with Edmondson and German Chargé Michael Schmidt. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790020–0988)↩
- In telegram 7 from USUN, January 2, the Mission transmitted the text of Waldheim’s letter to Pik Botha. Regarding UNTAG, Waldheim wrote: “I am therefore giving instructions for the necessary consultations regarding the composition of the military component of UNTAG with the parties concerned, with potential contributing governments and with the Security Council to take place at UN headquarters.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790002–0418)↩
- Transmitted in telegram 707 from USUN, February 20. See Document 103.↩