92. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Nicaragua: Your Questions About Political Futures
At your request, I tasked the CIA to do a study of political alternatives to Somoza,2 though I used another phrase.
The Agency’s analysts have not strayed from their hard-sell approach to encouraging us to play an active mediating role, along the lines Pete Vaky advocates. As the first paragraph indicates, they believe that the U.S. is “the key to a viable solution”, and that “an internally generated compromise” is not likely. With regard to the specific question of who is likely to be in a transitional or a future government, the Agency’s analysts were incredibly reluctant to answer that question. I brought them together with a couple of officials from State today to address the question again, but their reluctance did not diminish.
The paper, however, like my previous memorandum,3 lists many of the people and groups who are most likely to play important roles in future governments. It is, of course, impossible to do anything more than speculate, but we all agree that the opposition, which would want to participate in a mediation effort, a transitional government, and a future government would include Alfonso Robelo (MDN), Rene San [Page 251] dino (Conservative Party), Ramiro Sacasa (Liberal Party faction), Cordova Rivas (UDEL), Xavier Chamorro (newspaper editor), and Manuel Jose Torres (INDE). The paper lists other possibilities.
In our conversation, an idea emerged that perhaps the best transitional government, and also the most widely acceptable, would be one which preserved current institutions, but displaced Somoza and some of his closest lieutenants. Most of the moderate opposition to Somoza is critical of Somoza, and not of the institutions. Their programs are generally quite moderate and reformist, calling for honest government, better programs, more efficient civil service. There is almost no call for structural change. Almost all of their concern is focused on Somoza.
Therefore, the best transitional government would probably be one which was led by someone like Somoza’s current foreign minister, Quintanilla. It would include a Cabinet which brought people from a wide range of opposition and government leaders. And most importantly, the National Guard would be practically untouched, except for displacing the Somozas and a number of their closest allies. It would probably be best to have the Chief of Staff of the Army, Armando Fernandez, remain as the spokesman for the Guard. By keeping the Guard largely untouched, that would permit sufficient capability to continue the fight against the Sandinistas.
[1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 9/1–19/78. Secret.↩
- Attached but not printed is the September 7 CIA study entitled, “Nicaragua—Factors and Figures in the Process Leading to a Transition Government.”↩
- See footnote 6, Document 89.↩