Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

483. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, October 9, 1979

SUBJECT

• Intelligence and Related Activities in Central America (S)

On October 4, I asked [name not declassified] from DDO at the CIA for an update on the CIA’s activities in Nicaragua. I found his report profoundly disappointing. We are doing too little too slowly. He said that operatives were passing modest amounts of money to [3 lines not declassified]. I told him that I thought the [less than 1 line not declassified] was a non-starter, and he more or less agreed with that. I agree that we must support [1 line not declassified]. He said that CIA had a budget of about $750,000 (a year) for these activities in Nicaragua. He also said that they were looking for ways to help the independent labor movement. (S)

This effort has to be negligible compared to what the Cubans are doing. Cuba has already given scholarships to 850 Nicaraguans to train in Cuba, and has sent 1,000 Cuban teachers and hundreds of doctors and military advisers to Nicaragua. It is inconceivable to me that the US cannot match and compete against a nation with less than 5 percent of our population and 1 percent of our GNP, but that apparently is the case. I suggested to [name not declassified] that he think about ways that we could assist third countries with good democratic credentials [1 line not declassified] to provide teachers to Nicaragua so that there would be less reason to invite the Cubans. I also suggested, and Vaky did as well, that CIA put together a more comprehensive proposal to compete with the Cubans in Nicaragua and throughout Central America. He said he would look into it. (S)

The CIA’s inadequate effort in Nicaragua is a symptom of a much larger problem: no agency in the USG has adjusted its resources to give Central America or the Caribbean the kind of priority it demands. We need to take steps to correct that now. (S)

On Friday,² at the interagency meeting which I chaired to discuss the reports of a coup in El Salvador, it was obvious that we were trying to develop policies based on a dearth of information.³ [3 lines not declassified] The State Department is just as guilty; our best Ambassadors and the largest number of officers are in countries in South America, where there are no crises and few problems. With the exception of Larry Pezzullo, we have our least talented Ambassadors in Central America and the fewest officers. I learned a couple of days ago that if AID is asked by OMB to cut its overseas personnel by 10 percent, it plans to eliminate its Central America Regional Aid Mission (ROCAP) and reduce by half the number of AID personnel in its Caribbean regional program in Barbados. It is quite obvious that the decisions made by AID and by the administrative people in State, CIA, and DOD are based on criteria and priorities which are very different from those which we are using. (S)

I am not privy to the decisions which are being made on the intelligence supplemental regarding Cuba, but I think it would be a great mistake if we did not use a large portion of any intelligence supplemental on Cuban activities in Central America and the Caribbean; my opinion is that we will obtain much less of a return on money spent directly on Cuba than if we spend it on what the Cubans are doing elsewhere. [2 lines not declassified]

RECOMMENDATION

1. As we try to deal with the problems of Central America and the Caribbean during the next year, we will need a lot more and a lot better information than we have been receiving for the last two years. We will also need a lot better political operators in the field. Because the bureaucracies are responding to a very different set of criteria, I recommend that you send the memorandum at Tab I.⁴ (S)

2. We also need to get CIA to reassess its effort in Nicaragua and begin developing proposals for the rest of Central America. I have prepared a tasker at Tab II for this purpose.⁵ (S)

Donald Gregg and Henry Owen concur.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 7, Central America: CACAR: 11/1/78–11/6/79. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. On another copy of the memorandum Aaron added the following notation: “ZB—Use the tasker for Talking Points at the SCC on covert action and follow up with a memo as necessary. DA.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, Presidential Advisory (PA) Very Sensitive, 1–12/79)
2. October 5.
3. For more information about the reports of a coup in El Salvador, see Document 388.
4. Tab I, attached but not printed, is an unsigned and undated memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, Brown, Miller, Bergland, Kreps, McIntyre, Jones, Turner, Celeste, Reinhardt, and Ehrlich noting the “need to increase the U.S. presence” in Central America and the Caribbean and requesting a report by November 15 “with recommendations on specific steps that need to be taken to increase the quantity and quality of our manpower and administrative resources in our posts.” Brzezinski did not approve or disapprove of this recommendation, but he signed a copy of the memorandum on October 11. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 7, Central America: CACAR: 11/1/78–11/6/79)
5. Tab II, attached but not printed, is an unsigned and undated memorandum from Brzezinski to Turner requesting a covert action proposal for El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, as well as a comprehensive proposal for Nicaragua, by October 15. Brzezinski neither approved nor disapproved of this recommendation.
6. Gregg and Owen both indicated their concurrence, (Gregg concurred in the second memorandum and Owen in the first), and an unknown hand wrote: “OMB concurs with memo#1.” In a November 8 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor described the response by the agencies to Brzezinski’s October 11 memorandum (see footnote 2 above) as “clearly unsatisfactory,” noting that “all use the exercise as an opportunity to carp at budget stringencies” and to submit “wish lists” for new positions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 11/1979) Gregg, Henze, and Rosenberg responded to Pastor’s November 8 memorandum in a November 9 memorandum to Brzezinski: “All three of us have reacted to Bob Pastor’s memo in the same way: He may not like what he is being told by CIA and other agencies about the difficulties involved in augmenting resources in the Caribbean, but what he is being told is true.” (Ibid.)