479. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Central American Supplemental—A Dissenting View (U)

In this memo, I request that you consider recommending different options than those Owen recommends in his memo to the President on the Central American Supplemental (Tab A).2 The options I suggest you recommend are described below and can be easily incorporated into Henry’s memo. These recommendations seek a balance between Vance’s national security concerns and Owen’s budgetary concerns. (S)

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On Nicaragua

Option (No. 3). Seek immediately FY 1980 Supplemental ESF authorization and appropriation of $75M to help cover Nicaragua’s balance of payments gap in 1979 and 1980, with the expectation that the remaining amount requested by Secretary Vance ($45M) be included in the FY 1981 budget if our current balance of payments projections for the Nicaraguan economy prove reasonably accurate. (S)

Discussion: Henry accepts Vance’s argument about the need to help Nicaragua fill its balance of payments gap, but he doesn’t see any reason why we need to appropriate funds at this time which will not be used by Nicaragua until 1981. I accept his point, but if we are going to commit ourselves to help the Nicaraguans over a two-year period as Vance and Owen recommend, we should be clear that we intend to put the remainder of the funding in the FY 81 budget, provided of course that the balance of payments gap that we presently project proves reasonably accurate. (There is no need to go ahead with it in FY 81 if the gap has been closed.) Henry’s option leaves the entire issue about FY 81 open, and that detracts from the two-year commitment which we need to make at this time. (S)

On Honduras and El Salvador

Option (No. 3). Seek Supplementals for these countries with the clear understanding that it would be used to give impetus to a broader multilateral development effort in Central America, which would be initiated by the Central Americans, coordinated by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and involve the Europeans, Japanese, and us. (S)

Discussion: Henry’s option to announce plans to participate in a multilateral development effort in Central America is a non-starter; if we get that far out in front, we will kill it. (We need to let the Central Americans put it together first; the Belgrade meeting of the World Bank/IMF will give them the opportunity; the Bank is pursuing the idea.) Moreover, his recommendation that we reprogram $25M in the AID budget is based on the fragile assumption that this kind of money can be easily found. I know that the Latin American aid budget is very tight, and I don’t expect that we will have any more success finding it in other regions. But there are more important reasons for our requesting this additional money for Salvador and Honduras: (S)

• First, it is politically imperative that we seek to try to balance our requests for money for left-wing Nicaraguans with money for right-wing governments in the region. Charlie Wilson has told me that he expects our requests to balance, and while these small amounts for Salvador and Honduras don’t do that; if we omit them, we will be inviting a retaliatory strike. (S)

• Secondly, it is important that our strategy is not only directed at Nicaragua—the product of past policy, but at the next round of problems in Central America. (S)

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In addition to these two options, I would like to recommend that the memo include three more points, which are pertinent:

(1) The problem we face in Central America is partly how to respond to Cuban activism on our border. This, of course, is the same problem we face in the Caribbean, and it is not surprising that the American public relates the instability in both areas. To exclude the Caribbean is to imply that we are still approaching the Caribbean on a piecemeal basis. I recommend that the memo refer to our intention of seeking an increase in the FY 81 aid and security assistance budget to the Caribbean. (S)

(2) Another problem we repeatedly face is lack of continuity or follow-through. I believe that the second most important thing we can do for Central America and the Caribbean after the supplemental is to make a solid multi-year commitment that we will try to maintain our aid to the regions at a reasonably high level. (S)

(3) We should seek to maximize our impact on Central America by engaging like-minded donor countries in a multilateral effort to help develop the region and assist moderate democratic forces. (S)

Finally, I think it is important to put Henry’s memo, which is written from a budgetary perspective, in a broader context. The American people are prepared to buy a $30B M–X; they are prepared to pay 5 percent more than the Administration requested for defense; they are prepared to sink the SALT Treaty and risk confrontation with the Russians at least in part because of what the Soviets/Cubans are doing in Central America and the Caribbean. I think we are correct in our judgment that Americans have focused on the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba, not because of Soviet troops per se, but because of the Cubans.3 If the American people are prepared to do all of that, then why are we cutting corners on a few million dollars for Central America—money which is likely to have a helluva lot more impact in the medium-term, when it matters, than anything we do in Guantanamo, Key West, or for that matter in the defense budget. Furthermore, it is consistent with our perspective—that the problems are indigenous, the Cubans are only aggravating them. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you recommend to the President the two options sketched above plus the three additional points—continued increased aid to Central America, budgetary increases in FY 81 for the Caribbean, and the need to maximize our impact by engaging other like-minded nations.4 (S)

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Alternatively, that you meet with Rud Poats and me to discuss the memoranda.5

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 10/1–14/79. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Aaron, Owen, and Poats. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page to Owen and Pastor: “HO/RB I agree with much of Bob’s case—and does the P. Let’s beef up our position.” A notation next to this comment in an unknown hand reads “9/26/79.”
  2. Tab A, attached but not printed, is an undated draft memorandum from McIntyre, Brzezinski, and Owen to Carter; for the final version see Document 480.
  3. An unknown hand wrote in the margin: “A tad overdrawn.”
  4. Brzezinski neither approved nor disapproved of this recommendation.
  5. Brzezinski neither approved nor disapproved of this recommendation.