Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

430. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, April 4, 1980

SUBJECT

• El Salvador and the Military (U)

At the very moment when you were suggesting to Bob White that he meet with the top military officers when he returns, Jim Cheek was doing it.² (We asked Jim to spend this week in Honduras and give us an analysis of what we should be doing there. Before returning, we suggested he spend a couple of days in El Salvador while Bob White was up here.) I suggest you read the summary of the attached cable.³ Jim met with all the top military leadership except Majano. Their meeting was extremely successful, and the military said all the right things about trying to reduce the repression. In addition, they informed us that the Junta intends to implement the “land to the tiller program” and several other actions to reduce the violence. (C)

If the military are really as interested in reducing the repression as they claim, we have made unbelievable progress; however, I am skeptical. Nonetheless, Cheek’s forceful presentation will undoubtedly serve to further sensitize them to our concerns over the repression. (C)

Follow-Up of Yesterday’s Meeting

1. ABC film on Archbishop’s funeral. I spoke to Len Lefkow, and he said he would get the ABC news footage and make sure ICA distributes it throughout Latin America. (C)

2. Letter from Harold Brown to Colonel Garcia. Bob White will be drafting this letter and I will clear it with you before sending it to Defense. (C)

3. FBI in El Salvador. After further discussions with Bob, we agreed that there is no sense bringing the Legatt up from Panama to El Salvador, if Vance and Webster are not going to permit any follow-up, i.e., letting the FBI help the Salvadorans. So we recommend dropping this idea.⁴ (C)

4. Invitations to the Pentagon. Bob agreed to prepare a list of military people, whom he will recommend for DOD to invite up here for briefings. (C)

5. Border problem. I will speak to Bowdler about the possibility of using Vaky to help solve the border dispute, but I think we probably should wait until the next round of negotiations (scheduled for next week) between the Foreign Ministers of Honduras and El Salvador. (C)

6. Scheme for a general transfer. As you will see from the attached cable, the military have already thought of this idea, although not exactly along the lines Bob had in mind. They intend to rotate local military commanders in order to break traditional ties with ORDEN (right-wing paramilitary group). This will be very effective. The next step will be for Bob to propose his higher level version of that idea. (C)

7. Pre-empting an Alternative Junta. The establishment of the “Democratic Front” on April 2 with Christian Democratic-defectors in the public positions, but the leftists in control is exactly what we feared.⁵ I spoke to Bowdler, and he agreed to have a cable sent to all appropriate posts to instruct our Ambassadors to use every method they can to preclude the kind of international support which would throw the JRG irrevocably on the defensive.⁶ I also worked on a cable to go to all leading Social Democratic leaders calling them to task for their behavior at Santa Domingo.⁷ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 4/80–7/80. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Brzezinski. A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw it. Brzezinski wrote at the bottom of the page: “good. ZB.” Aaron wrote at the top of the page: “ZB—Good status report! DA.”
2. Pastor sent an April 3 memorandum to Aaron in preparation for Aaron’s meeting with White that day. Pastor wrote: “Bob has a very strong antipathy toward the military, which I can well understand, but in the present situation in El Salvador, unless he is willing to work very closely with the military, we will find our ability to influence events significantly reduced.” (Ibid.) No other record of Aaron’s April 3 meeting with White has been found. For Cheek’s meeting with the military command, see footnote 4 below.
3. Attached but not printed is Cheek’s report in telegram 2418 from San Salvador, April 3. The Embassy reported that Cheek and other Embassy officials had met that day with the Salvadoran military High Command (except Majano). The command confirmed that the “land to the tiller program, granting 150,000 peasant families land they currently work, will be announced as soon as groundwork is completed.” For the announcement of the agrarian reform program, see footnote 4, Document 424.
4. Telegram 2280 from San Salvador, March 29, reported that the JRG had requested a team of FBI agents to help investigate Romero’s assassination. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, PRC 120, Central America, 8/2/1979) According to an April 2 memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor, Brzezinski, and Aaron all supported the proposal, while Vance and the FBI opposed it. (Ibid.)
5. The New York Times reported that on April 2, “leftist political parties, unions and professional groups announced” the formation of the “new Democratic Front” which they considered to be “a broad-based coalition to oppose the ruling military-civilian junta in El Salvador.” (“Leftists in El Salvador Form a United Front to Oppose the Regime,” New York Times, April 3, 1980, p. 10)
6. See footnote 2, Document 431.
7. Telegram 89466 to multiple Latin American and European diplomatic posts, April 5, noted that the Socialist International (SI) conference in Santo Domingo, March 26–29, “from the first day to the last was an outpouring of hostility to the United States’ role and policies in Latin America.” The Department reported that SI had accused the governing Junta of implementing “a political scheme of slaughter by reform,” accused it of complicity in the Romero assassination, and rejected “the North American intervention that includes the intent of involving other governments.” The Department stipulated a series of démarches to conferees in response. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800170–0141) Aaron wrote at the bottom of the page: “good follow up.”