Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

401. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)¹

Washington, December 21, 1979

SUBJECT

• Withdrawal of Dependents from El Salvador (S)

State, over the objections of the Ambassador and the Peace Corps, is ordering a substantial reduction of the number of dependents at our Mission and all the Peace Corps contingent.² While the security situation has deteriorated, especially in the countryside, there is no indication that dependents’ safety is threatened, provided they take normal precautions. Nor am I convinced that the situation is worse today than before the October 15th coup. The only thing that would justify the withdrawal is events in Iran, not in El Salvador. (S)

At this moment, we need to find ways to provide immediate support to the Junta. The only alternative to their success is a bloody civil war. Withdrawal of our dependents is the worst thing we could do now; it would completely demoralize the already beleaguered government; it would be interpreted as a U.S. loss of confidence in the Junta and would be a significant morale boost for the terrorists.³ There are indications that the Junta has finally decided to bite the bullet and fight the terrorists. I have asked DOD to begin working on a range of alternative ways we can assist them to do this job. They promised me it after the holidays. (S)

By withdrawing our people, we will detract from the Junta’s efforts to control the left, and ultimately increase the danger for all Americans in El Salvador. We should not panic. (S)

I have suggested in the memo attached at Tab I a list of five steps State ought to take soon to shore up support for the Junta, and one step they shouldn’t take. (S)

I understand that the Secretary may be submitting a memorandum to you or the President on Monday on the Salvadorean situation, and that is why I am transmitting this memorandum to you sooner.⁴ I was told by State that this subject came up at the Friday breakfast, but it is not clear what was decided.⁵ Among the five steps I recommend is a meeting with the President, and you may want to check with him first on that. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.⁶

Tab I

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance⁷

Washington, December 26, 1979

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to El Salvador and the Drawdown of U.S. Personnel (S)

I am concerned that the consequences of the decision to require a substantial reduction of the number of dependents in El Salvador could have very serious repercussions on our broader interests, and indeed could contribute to less security for the remaining personnel in the country. (S)

A drawdown could be interpreted as a loss of confidence by the U.S. in the Junta (JRG), and could boost the morale of the leftists. We should not ask anyone to stay in El Salvador against his or her will, nor should we allow any U.S. personnel to remain if a clear threat exists. All I suggest is that we not implement an across-the-board drawdown unless our Ambassador and the people on the ground believe the threat demands it, and that no other response is satisfactory. (S)

We also need to take immediate steps to show our support for the Junta, politically, diplomatically, economically, and militarily. I am persuaded that the five members of the Junta are deeply committed to human rights and social and political reforms, but they face a war against committed leftist guerrillas, and unless they gain our support early on, their chances of implementing their reforms may not be too good. (S)

(1) Political Support. I understand that the Junta (JRG) has recently requested a meeting with the President in early February. We should issue an invitation and announce it in such a way as to show our support for the direction the JRG is taking in El Salvador. We also should try to protect the flanks of the JRG by briefing U.S. human rights groups on the situation in El Salvador, and the acceleration of the guerrilla war by the extreme left. Undoubtedly as the violence picks up, these groups will begin accusing the JRG of human rights violations. Unless there is evidence suggesting that the JRG is condoning such violations, we ought to try to dampen that criticism by keeping these groups fully informed. You may want to consider speaking to Father Healey from Georgetown; he knows and understands El Salvador and could be very helpful. (S)

(2) Diplomatic Support. We should continue to encourage other countries in the region to show their support for the JRG. Panama and Honduras could be particularly helpful, as could Venezuela and Colombia. You may want to consider sending Chris⁸ or Bill Bowdler on a quick trip to the country for an assessment. A trip by SOUTHCOM General Nutting also could be helpful.⁹ Archbishop Romero’s understanding and support for the decisions of the JRG are essential, and if you think it would be helpful, I would be happy to ask the Pope for his help on this. (S)

(3) Economic Aid. When the aid team returns from their inspection, we ought to reassess our program for FY 80 and FY 81 and seek increases, if necessary. The present FY 81 level of $7 million is unhelpful to our interests. We also ought to continue to encourage the government to work with the IMF. It is difficult to encourage foreign investment at this time, when we ourselves are considering pulling out, but we will want to think about how to do this when the situation improves. (S)

(4) Military Aid. If Congress approves the reprogramming of $300,000 for MTT’s, as I expect they will, we will be in a better position to help the Salvadoreans and also to identify their most serious problems. In the meantime, we ought to be examining a range of possible alternatives to help the government fight the war against the guerrillas, if they so request. I understand that there was some problem with licenses on various munitions items for El Salvador. I trust these have been resolved, and the licenses have been granted. (S)

I believe if we take all these steps, and we are careful with U.S. personnel, we will not only have ensured the safety of Americans there, but also we will give the new Junta a chance to succeed in implementing its democratic reforms. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 20, El Salvador: 11/79–12/79. Secret. Sent for action. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the page: “RP. copy. Original hand-carried to ZB’s office Saturday morning (22nd) by Flo.”
2. In telegram 287407 to San Salvador, November 3, the Department stated that leftist extremist groups were ready to escalate violence to weaken the JRG and intended to link the U.S. Government to the JRG and had “therefore turned their attacks on the United States.” Noting deep concern “at the very highest levels of the Department,” the Department suggested a security drawdown of U.S. personnel in El Salvador. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790505–0004) In telegram 315738 to San Salvador, December 8, the Department noted that Vance wanted personnel whose positions would be “phased out” for security reasons to depart quickly. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790566–0144) In telegram 321055 to San Salvador, December 13, the Department instructed the Embassy to “take immediate steps to reduce substantially the number of dependents at post.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790573–0486)
3. In telegram 7195 from San Salvador, December 14, Devine wrote that a substantial reduction of dependent personnel would “very quickly become matter of public knowledge and inevitably have strong political and psychological impact on already precarious political situation in El Salvador.” Also, noting the kidnapping of Peace Corps volunteer Deborah Loff, Devine endorsed the total withdrawal of the Peace Corps. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790576–0296) In a December 20 memorandum to Vance, Celeste opposed the withdrawal of the Peace Corps, terming such a proposal as “arbitrary and self-defeating.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 16, Peace Corps, 6/79–7/80)
4. December 24. See Tab A, Document 403.
5. December 21. On December 20, Tarnoff sent Vance a memorandum for his breakfast with Carter outlining steps taken and planned to help the Junta. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, President’s Breakfast, 9/1/79–12/31/79) According to a December 26 memorandum from Bowdler to Vance, Carter asked Vance during the December 21 breakfast meeting for a “detailed memorandum on the present situation in El Salvador and U.S. policy and initiatives.” Bowdler transmitted a copy of the requested memorandum under the memorandum requesting that Vance sign it. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador, Misc. Memoranda, Nov.–Dec., 1979) The final version of the memorandum is printed as Document 403. No other record of the December 21 meeting has been found.
6. Brzezinski did not indicate his preference regarding this recommendation; however, he did sign the memorandum.
7. Secret. A copy was sent to Brown.
8. Warren Christopher.
9. On his copy of the memorandum received on December 27, Brown wrote: “I agree with ZB’s approach. Let’s follow up on Nutting’s visit, & on Mil. Aid.” (Washington National Records Center, FRC 330–82–0205, El Salvador 1979) In telegram 450 from San Salvador, January 18, 1980, Devine recommended against a visit by Nutting due to the Salvadoran military’s split over the retention of Garcia as Minister of Defense. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800031–0505) In telegram 18042 to USCINSCO Quarry Heights, January 21, 1980, the Department agreed with Devine and deferred Nutting’s visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800036–1084)