Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

395. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 22, 1979

SUBJECT

• SCC on Covert Action Proposals—23 October 1979

You called this meeting to consider three CIA covert action proposals relating to:

El Salvador	—	TAB 1.A.2
Jamaica	—	TAB 1.B.
Afghanistan	—	TAB 2

Of these three proposals, the one on Afghanistan is best worked out, since it reflects work already done as a result of the 3 July 1979 Presidential Finding. The Salvadorean and Jamaican proposals reflect commendable willingness on the part of CIA to attempt to do something in these important countries, but are not based on a great deal of preparatory work. Both essentially involve spending money for purposes which are defined only in a very general way. It is not clear how much guidance and influence we might be able to exercise in these situations. The best argument for action in both is that by getting involved we are at least doing something that will provide a base of experience on which better programs can be worked out.

El Salvador and Jamaica (TABs A and B)³

Bob Pastor has given you a memorandum endorsing Action Option #1 of the Salvadorean proposal but opposing both options of the Jamaican one—TAB 1. Recommend you read it before reading the proposals. I find Pastor’s recommendations persuasive in both cases.

We know from informal word from CIA that State is unenthusiastic about the Salvadorean proposal—Vaky feels that it is too early and our own policy is too unclear to justify our getting into the situation to the extent the proposal envisages.⁴

[Omitted here is material unrelated to El Salvador.]

Tab 1

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)⁵

Washington, October 19, 1979

SUBJECT

• Covert Action Options for El Salvador and Jamaica (S)

With regard to the CIA’s options paper, I recommend that we support action Option #1 for El Salvador described by the CIA, and strongly oppose any of the options on Jamaica.⁶ (S)

El Salvador. The new Junta in El Salvador gives us an opportunity to help a moderate democracy emerge, but we should not be lulled into thinking that the threat from the extreme left has diminished in any way. All that has changed is that the new Junta has positioned itself so as to be more capable to deal with the leftist threat, and we, in turn, are now able to help them. My guess is that the Cubans will not let up; the guerrillas have built a powerful internal structure and realize that the new Junta represents their greatest threat. (S)

In El Salvador, there will be a lot of violence, and we should be prepared to compete with the Cubans, adopting their principal tactic of picking a group and supporting it. We ought to do Option #1 now; it calls for using agents-of-influence within the new government and providing moral and financial support to moderate elements. I believe we ought to be more cautious about getting involved in a joint counter-insurgency operation, as envisaged by Option B until we have a better fix on how the Junta plans to deal with its internal problems. For one thing, they may not need counterinsurgency assistance. Secondly, if the Junta proves rotten, or if counterinsurgency operations get entangled with charges of torture, we would regret the decision. Therefore, I recommend that we not consider Option B at this time.⁷ (S)

As you examine the question of covert support for centrist groups in El Salvador, I hope you will ask the CIA to keep us informed as to which moderate groups they intend to assist. When I asked that question of them with regard to Nicaragua, the answer was disappointing for two reasons. First, they were only supporting three groups while there are undoubtedly more who merit support. Second, one of the groups is finished as a viable political force. In addition, I hope you will press the CIA to consider ways to help moderate groups by working through democratic third countries [1 line not declassified] (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to El Salvador.]

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I047, SCC–I on Covert Action, 23 October 1979. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for information. In an October 18 memorandum to Brzezinski, Gregg noted that “the covert action plan from CIA for El Salvador is a good one” and that “Pastor feels it should be approved soonest and that to wait until the 25th will be too late.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I025, El Salvador, 15 October 1979–11 February 1980) In an October 19 memorandum to Brzezinski, Gregg wrote: “Pursuant to my conversation with you yesterday, I called CIA and urged them, if at all possible, to move quickly in implementing a survey in El Salvador which would be a preliminary step to offering specific counterinterinsurgency aid to the new government (the assassination of the Inspector General in San Salvador indicates such aid may be necessary). CIA reports that their lawyers believe that no Presidential finding is needed for the survey to be undertaken.” Brzezinski replied by writing in the margin on October 20: “OK Proceed.” (Ibid.)
2. Tab 1.A., attached but not printed, is an undated memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency to the members of the Special Coordination Committee outlining two covert action options for El Salvador. Option 1 involved a unilateral action using “agents-of-influence within the new government and in other political and private sectors to oppose Soviet/Cuban-backed subversion, to forestall further polarization and to work toward a more open political system. Provide moral and financial support to moderate elements.” Option 2 involved a joint operation to “provide counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training to El Salvador security forces under a new moderate regime.” Tabs 1.B and 2 are attached but not printed.
3. Tab B is attached but not printed.
4. In an undated action memorandum to Christopher, sent through Newsom, Bowdler provided brief summaries of agenda items for the October 23 SCC–I meeting. With reference to El Salvador, Bowdler noted: “Action on the two proposed options should be held in abeyance pending further clarification of the needs and desires of the new government and the alternative ways of handling the proposed options. At this stage it does not appear necessary to resort to covert agents of influence to generate support for the new government. We can deal directly with groups in Salvador and with other governments through diplomatic channels. With respect to the second option—counterterrorist and counterinsurgency training—it is not clear at this stage whether we should be the ones to provide this service or whether is would be politically advantageous to consider assistance from third countries.” (Department of State, INR/IL Files, vol. 12, Intelligence Committee Report, Transfer Identification Number: 980643000013) For the summary of conclusions of the October 23 SCC–I meeting on Covert Action, see Document 396.
5. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. According to another copy of the memorandum, Brzezinski saw it. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I025, El Salvador, 15 October 1979–11 February 1980)
6. See footnote 2 above.
7. In an October 22 memorandum to Brzezinski, Gregg commented on Pastor’s October 19 memorandum to Brzezinski. Gregg recommended that Option 2 (counterinsurgency training) should be considered and a feasibility study begun. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I025, El Salvador, 15 October 1979–11 February 1980)