Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

393. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in El Salvador¹

Washington, October 18, 1979, 1623Z

272443. For Ambassador Devine. Subject: Current U.S. Policy and Objectives in El Salvador.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. This cable summarizes for your information and guidance our policy assessments and immediate objectives with regard to the current situation in El Salvador as defined at the highest levels, and the corresponding lines of action that would be indicated:

—The October 15 coup has provided an opportunity for the country to emerge from the downward spiral of polarization and threat of radicalization in which the country seemed to have been caught.

—The successful creation of a joint civilian/military junta, representing broad public support, which would undertake a dedicated, decisive program of respecting human rights, instituting social reform and establishing free democratic processes, could isolate the extremists, reduce tensions, avoid insurrection and stablize the national processes.

—On the other hand the failure of the Junta either to gain broad support or undertake such reforms could lead to renewed confrontation and eventual success of Marxist extremists.

—It is therefore very much in our interest to help the new government succeed and obtain broad support, and to influence and urge it to undertake the kind of policies and programs that will enable it to be viable and us to support it.

—We desire in this regard to be active in efforts to assure such an outcome, to assist the new government with both economic and security assistance, and to dialogue with it and other sectors to urge them to deal realistically with the opportunity and challenge before them. This may well be the last opportunity for Salvadorans to avoid civil war and the emergence of a Marxist regime, and for us to influence the situation productively. The sense of needing to seize this real but perhaps passing opportunity is very strong here.

—We are prepared to be seen publicly as supportive of this government in a positive and correct manner if it adopts the human rights/democratic policies that appear necessary. It is felt here that we should be imaginative and positive as may be opportune.

3. The situation in El Salvador must also be viewed from the perspective of U.S. global interests. The role of Cuba on the international scene and in Nicaragua, the Soviet/Cuba troop issue and the President’s policy statement on U.S. intentions in this hemisphere² are all very relevant to the situation that is evolving in El Salvador. The factor of potential external support for extremists and terrorists is complicating. We believe this must be prevented. We are prepared to assist the new government in confronting that kind of challenge.

4. Given the above, we believe the following broad lines of action are called for:

—Continuous contact and dialogue with the Junta members to ascertain their views, to recommend action and to encourage them to move along the lines sketched above. (Your contacts and discussions as exemplified in Salvador 4966 are precisely the kind of interaction we have in mind.)³ Please continue your excellent contact and advice to the Junta as in your discretion appears necessary and important to insure the success of a viable, reformist government.

—Continuous contact and dialogue with other sectors of society to urge them to cooperate, support and join a broad based reform effort. Please continue your close contact and continuous dialogue with the Church (the Secretary is particularly desirous that you maintain contact with Archbishop Romero), the Democratic parties, private sector, labor, et al. Our effort here would be aimed at ensuring that these sectors understand that the success of this government may be the last hope of avoiding an extremist outcome, that their cooperation and support is necessary for success, and that their support, cooperation and interaction with the Junta can insure its moderate, democratic course. The necessity of isolating the extreme left should be stressed. (The potential uncertainties between the Christian Democrats and the military foreshadowed in Salvador’s 5948 and 5968, suggest the desirability of a specific effort to urge both sides to maintain friendly and constructive relations.)⁴ We are concerned that a wait and see attitude or a critical posture by the Christian Democrats or other significant sectors would greatly diminish the possibilities of a successful outcome to the present situation. These sectors should also know that we are prepared to provide prompt and significant support and assistance to the new government in the circumstances described above.

—We want to be ready to respond quickly to requests for aid or to meet obvious needs. This refers to immediate opportunities as well as short and longer term programs.⁵ You should let us know as soon as you can what you suggest as to assistance in both the economic and security fields (State 271342 already raises the question of your recommendations in the latter case),⁶ and what you recommend. Are these immediate things we should do? Your recommendations should perhaps reflect the Junta’s views as to what it thinks they may need immediately and in the longer terms, and you should therefore determine how best to ascertain that. We are of course prepared to consider any specific requests by the Junta very promptly.

5. The above will provide you with the general concept and assessment which we believe should now govern our actions. The bottom line is that we should do all we can to ensure the satisfactory outcome that now appears possible.⁷

6. For San Jose and Caracas: You should point out to appropriate representatives of the Christian Democratic Party and to government authorities and host country nationals who may have influence with them, our views of the situation. You should particularly urge Copei and appropriate authorities of the GOV and GOCR to use their influence with the Salvadoran PDC to encourage the latter to adopt a positive and cooperative posture vis a vis the new Junta. Should the PDC hold itself aloof at this critical moment, it could end the hopes of that party and other democratic parties to be relevant to the future in El Salvador.

Vance

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador, Telegrams, 10/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City, Managua, Panama City, Tegucigalpa, Caracas, and San José. Drafted by Wilson and Vaky; cleared in ARA/CEN and S/S–O; approved by Vaky.
2. See footnote 5, Document 319.
3. In telegram 4966 from San Salvador, October 17, Devine reported to Vaky about his efforts to engage Gutierrez and Majano on the importance of human rights. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 10/79)
4. In telegram 5948 from San Salvador, October 17, the Embassy relayed the Christian Democratic Party’s analysis of the current situation in El Salvador. (Ibid.) In telegram 5968 from San Salvador, October 17, the Embassy reported that the Popular Forum had selected nominees for the new civilian/military junta. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790476–0964)
5. In telegram 272951 to San Salvador, October 18, Vaky noted his assumption that Devine understood “that you may specifically inform the Junta in your discussions with them that we will give full support to the new government if they honor human rights and democracy.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 10/79)
6. In telegram 271342 to San Salvador, October 17, Vaky referenced the “initial difficulties that new government is experiencing with public security and the reaction of leftist organizations,” and instructed Devine to request that Walker send an assessment of what kinds of military assistance would be appropriate. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Kimmitt, Arms Transfers/Country File, Box 18, El Salvador, 7–12/79)
7. Devine replied in telegram 5985 from San Salvador, October 18, with a preliminary estimate of the Salvadorans’ short term military assistance needs and remarked: “As Department is aware, question of military assistance to new civilian/military junta is politically sensitive and fraught with important policy implications.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2520)