389. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State1
5859. Subj: (S) Status of Coup d’Etat in El Salvador as of 1:30 pm. Ref: San Salvador 5840.2
(S-Entire text)
Request Dept Pass DIA WashDC
1. Two principal coup leaders, Ex-Air Force Major Alvaro Salazar Brenes and LtCol Rene Guerra y Guerra contacted Datt at 1230 hours Oct 15 to request urgent meeting at nearby office building. LtCol Gerald Walker and operations coordinator CW2 William Smart met for ten minutes with coup leaders, who, in essence, delivered following message:
[Page 972]A. Coup movement has taken control of all major military installations in the country except for two minor installations, presumably outside city.
B. To date coup movement has been confined to cuartels and there has been no resistance or bloodshed.
C. Coup leaders contacted President Romero early this morning and gave him until 1500 hours today to depart country with guarantees for his family. Similar guarantees were provided for following key members of the military High Command and their families: General Federico Castillo Yanes, Minister of Defense; Col. Jose Eduardo Iraheta, Sub-Secretary of Defense; and Col. Carlos Eduardo Melendez, Chief of Armed Forces General Staff. Col Iraheta has gone to Airborne Company at Airport where he reportedly may attempt to develop countermovement utilizing 300 man Airborne force.
2. President responded to offer of safe exit by requesting additional two hour delay. Coup leaders are concerned that such a delay would provide Col. Iraheta with opportunity to mobilize Airborne company in countercoup effort to rescue President and that this would engender violent confrontation within armed forces and provide far left with opportunity to exploit situation. As a result, coup leaders requested DATT to approach Ambassador Devine on urgent basis and request him to call President Romero at Casa Presidencial and urge him to depart country by 1500 hours as a humanitarian gesture to preclude bloodshed. Coup leaders requested that DATT check with Ambassador and call them back regarding approach to President Romero.
3. After discussion regarding this approach, Ambassador decided that DATT would not return call at this time but if called by coup leaders would inform them that Ambassador in the field does not have authority to take action requested but that their request has been relayed to Washington.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850081–2563. Secret; Flash; Nodis.↩
- Telegram 5840 from San Salvador, October 13, reported on possible coup planning. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790470–0627)↩
- Telegram 269480 to San Salvador, October 15, instructed Devine to inform the coup leaders: “While we urgently hope that bloodshed will be avoided, it is not possible on basis of limited information available for Ambassador to take action requested. At the same time, we would not want DATT to lose or alienate the channel, and he may say that we would be interested in further information as to developments and their plans.” Devine was also instructed to ascertain, as soon as possible, who was behind the coup and what the “power dynamics look like.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850081–2567) In telegram 5875 from San Salvador, October 16, Devine reported that Romero and his associates had departed for Guatemala and that Mayorga would be President of the new Junta government. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 10/79)↩