The dispute is over the demarcation of the border, and the best way to
resolve that problem is to have the two parties agree to a mediator, and
to give full support to his efforts.
The bilaterals with the Presidents of El Salvador and Honduras are both
scheduled for Wednesday afternoon.2 Both governments will probably ask for some
additional economic assistance to develop the border area or to build a
resort in the disputed Gulf of Fonseca. They will argue that such
assistance could help bring the parties together. You may want to
respond that until the two countries renew their commercial relations,
it is academic to consider joint development projects.
We can probably consider the discussions a success if the Salvadorean
President agrees to publicly announce his intention to seek the
ratification of the mediation agreement, and if both Presidents agree to
open up the border in the interim to normal commercial flows.
Tab 1
Memorandum Prepared in the National Security
Council4
Washington, undated
PEACEKEEPING: EL
SALVADOR—HONDURAS
ISSUE FOR DECISION
How the USG can best assist efforts
to resolve the border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras.
ESSENTIAL FACTORS
The long-standing border dispute and periodic incidents between El
Salvador and Honduras have economic and demographic origins. El
Salvador is one of the most densely populated countries in Latin
America. Honduras is five times as large but with almost half the
number of people as its neighbor. Therefore, Salvadorans have tended
to spill over into the inviting spaces of Honduras. In the process,
tensions have developed over the treatment of Salvadorans in
Honduras and other disputed pockets of land along the border between
the two countries. The problem is complex and emotional for both
parties.
Since 1969, when the so-called “Soccer War” occurred no diplomatic or
economic relations have existed between El Salvador and Honduras.
This situation has impeded regional economic integration,
contributed to competing arms acquisition, and maintained a
destabilizing element in Central America.
The United States has pursued a policy of indirect support for
efforts to resolve the dispute. This has included providing
personnel and equipment, at OAS
expense, for a border observer team. Relatedly, the US has tried to
discourage an arms race between the two countries.
In late 1976, the two countries signed a mediation formula agreement.
Honduras ratified the accord within weeks. El Salvador, beset with a
series of internal problems, has yet to ratify. At present,
therefore, the two countries are not negotiating.
However, it should be pointed out that high GOES officials have informed us that they are preparing
public opinion and seeking popular support for the ratification of
the accord within the very near term.
OPTIONS
The most helpful action the USG
could take at this stage, would be to focus upon Salvadoran
ratification.
[Page 905]
1. Continue indirect supportive assistance with emphasis on OAS initiatives, and refrain from
bilateral involvement.
Pro:
—Would underscore OAS role in peace
keeping.
—Would carry weight of multilateral concern.
Con:
—Tends to perpetuate status quo; no progress.
2. Supplement our assistance supportive of OAS measures with a more active bilateral role,
exhorting El Salvador to ratify rapidly.
Pro:
—May, at least, help bring the two countries to the negotiating
table.
—Would provide a useful mixture of bilateral and multilateral avenues
of impressing concern for progress on resolving the issue.
—May give impetus beyond a mere “holding pattern”.
Con:
—Would entail pressuring El Salvador anew precisely as its new
government is trying to be responsive on human rights, after a long
period of strained bilateral relations.
3. Go beyond exhortation to exerting pressures on both
countries—through bilateral incentives (or disincentives)—not only
for negotiations but for a resolution. This would include such
measures as increasing economic assistance, resuming security
assistance (which El Salvador has renounced) or—in the other
direction—limiting various forms of economic support until the issue
is resolved.
Pro:
—Would certainly stimulate a reaction from both parties, if
implemented with vigor.
Con:
—Would place the US squarely in the middle, with the US assuming
responsibility for possible resumed hostilities.
—Would tend toward what might be considered an “interventionist”
policy.
Recommendation:
That you approve Option 2 at this stage, exhorting the Salvadoran
President to have the mediation formula ratified rapidly so the two
countries can at least begin negotiations.5
ALTERNATIVELY, that you adhere to Option 1 which has been our
traditional position in recent years.
