Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

24. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 1, 1978, 5:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Belize

PARTICIPANTS

• UK

  • Edward Rowlands, Minister of State
  • George. E. Hall, Assistant Under Secretary of State
  • John Martin, Private Secretary to Rowlands
  • William Squire, Counselor, British Embassy
  • Joe Millington, First Secretary, British Embassy

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary Todman
  • Lee Marks, Deputy Legal Advisor
  • Linda Pfeifle, ARA/CEN (Notetaker)

Rowlands said he had had a rough couple of weeks, he was bruised but not bowed. The Kingston meeting was a failure.² Price lost his nerve because of the domestic situation in Belize, was egged on by the Caribbeans and received comfort from the Mexicans. He took Price to London in order to pick up the pieces. Rowlands acknowledged that he had a rough time at home, the leaks of the previous week hurt. The London meetings, however, just about pulled the negotiations out of a nose dive because they got an agreement on a referendum and they allowed Price to beat the British over the head which he needed to establish himself back home. What emerged were three basic Belizean concerns:

1. Cession of the black Carib village of Barranco south of the Moho.

2. Cession of both cays.

3. The offensive features of the draft treaty.

The British agreed to explore these points with the Guatemalans to see if there were any give. If they get a revised package from the Guatemalans, Rowlands then will ask Price if he would accept the settlement or not, if he would put the issue to the Belizean people. He will try to get Price to say not an inch, but - - - - -.

In the worst case, if Price says no, the British will seek a way to wind down the negotiations without provoking a crisis. If they do not find a solution, others will try but will not be successful. The British will attempt to keep the dispute under control, but others will try to exacerbate the situation.

The way forward is through a revision of the package. Rowlands would open the question with the Guatemalans the following day. He would not try to get an agreement then but explore ideas. The Belizeans want the line moved south to the Temash River, but Rowlands would only try for Barranco, which would reduce the cession only 25 square miles. If he gets Barranco, he will not push the Guatemalans on the cays.

Rowlands requested the Secretary to follow up with Molina. The Secretary agreed and asked what Rowlands wanted him to say. Rowlands suggested the Secretary tell Molina that: (1) The facts of life are that what is planned is the worst thing, transferring people. The cession of Barranco is the type of issue which evokes a strong reaction in the international community. (2) A sounding from Price indicates Barranco is a people problem. (3) Possibly mention the cays (not as a serious problem). (4) There are serious problems with the treaty. (5) Urge maximum flexibility.

The Secretary said he would urge the Guatemalans to reflect seriously and communicate with President Laugerud. He would tell them not to let the chance for a settlement slip away.

Rowlands said if there is no settlement, the situation would become worse. Worse for Guatemala also.

Rowlands opined the Guatemalans had played their part well. Skinner-Klee is ahead of the pack and what he says may not reflect the government’s position. General Mendoza is the closest to Laugerud.

The Secretary asked Rowlands if he had received the message that we could not consider appointing a U.S. official as negotiator. Sol Linowitz said he was unable to serve. Rowlands said he understood and that names mentioned were only illustrative. William Fulbright was an exciting name. The original idea was to pour ideas into the mediator and he would emerge with the same package. Now that so much is out in the open, if there is an agreement including a time frame for a settlement, there is a case for dropping the idea of a negotiator. This would be advantageous since a negotiator causes some problems in Belize because it evokes the unsuccessful Webster mediation.³ If the Guatemalans want a mediator, however, the British will go along.

If there is no agreement, a special negotiator could look at the areas of disagreement. It would be one more stage that Price would have to explain. The British can play it either way, but do not want to appear to be going back on something else discussed with the Guatemalans. The press play in Guatemala indicates that the Guatemalans are steeling themselves for a settlement.

Rowlands apologized because he was unable to get Price’s agreement as he told the Secretary previously. Rowlands reported they have a problem with Guyana and the Caribbean. He would tell Price he could beat the British on the head for domestic reasons, but should not cause problems internationally.

The British know money is being passed in Belize. If two or three people defect, Price can lose in Parliament. Price fired one man and this action prompted some defections. The British do not know what outside influences are at work and what their aims are. The Secretary promised to check into this and inform the British.

Rowlands concluded Price is the best of all the Belizeans. Rowlands has been asking Price to let him speak with the opposition, but Price has always said no. When he gets Price’s go ahead, it would be helpful if the message were seconded.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Nodis 1978 Memorandum of Conversation for Secretary Vance. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on February 2 by Pfeifle; cleared by Todman; approved by Anderson on March 3. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. See footnote 3, Document 20.
3. See footnote 2, Document 2.