234. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State1
4875. Subject: Conversation with FSLN Provisional Government.
1. Ambassador Moss and I met with four members of the FSLN provisional government tonight at the home of Gabriel Lewis. Only member of the Junta not present was Moises Hassan. Daniel Ortega Saavedra had come from Matagalpa. Also present were Padre Miguel D’Escoto and a female associate of Ortega.
2. Meeting was in many respects a carbon copy of my first session with the FAO Directorate last October. I started the conversation with the same presentation I used with President Torrijos this morning. I then invited them to comment on the situation in Nicaragua and their future plans. They chose to focus primarily on two issues. One was the arrival of Ambassador Pezzullo in Nicaragua today. They thought this was a mistake since it would be viewed by the Nicaraguan public as a return to normal relations no matter what explanation we might give. Somoza would certainly play it in this vein and since he has total control over the media the public would have no way of knowing that he would not be presenting credentials. I pointed out that it was important to the accomplishment of the first point of the OAS resolution to have him speak directly with Somoza and we should not prejudge the results of that meeting. They grudgingly accepted the explanation but obviously were not convinced that he would be successful. The longer he remained in Managua, they argued, the less valid our explanation would be.
3. The second issue focused on how Somoza could be removed from power. Ramirez and Robelo argued that consistency with the first of the bases of the OAS resolution required a break in relations with the Somoza regime as Brazil had done. They argued that the USG should break with the Somoza regime and recognize the provisional government as the best means of undermining GN confidence forcing Somoza to leave and refurbishing the USG image among the Nicaraguan population. Otherwise they could not see how Somoza could be persuaded to leave. They pointed out that persuasion had been tried and proven ineffective. Only by cutting all ties with Somoza could [Page 596] the USG achieve its objective. Essentially they were reiterating the argument of last October that it was our responsibility to rid the country of Somoza and turn things over to the Frente and PG.
4. Three times during the conversation I tried to draw them out on their future plans with respect to composition, program and transfer to Nicaraguan territory. On the third try Ramirez produced a document released in San Jose today before their departure for Panama. Text of this document follows in a separate cable.2 Contrary to Torrijos predictions, the statement makes no provision for inclusion of GN representation in the council of state although the FSLN would be a major component.
5. Comment: In this initial contact with the PG I did not go into our scenario beyond the effort to obtain Somoza’s departure, in the process of which it might be necessary to get into aspects of the second point of the OAS resolution and to provide reassurances that retribution would not follow his exit. All PC members made protestations that the latter would not occur. Ortega referred to the consideration being given captured National Guardsmen. He denied the execution reported in Matagalpa. He did, however, admit that a Myrmidon (Esbirro) GN Captain had been executed in Leon and Col. Arguello had been shot while trying to escape.
6. Ortega emerged as a rough but articulate guerrilla leader. It was evident that he comes from a different social and educational background than Ramirez and Robelo. He seemed to go out of his way to stress the moderate, democratic orientation of the frente and the desire to get rid of Somoza and start the rebuilding process. A special effort had obviously been made to get him to the meeting with us since he had arrived shortly before our session and had not participated in the ceremonies involving the other three PG members.
7. The meeting was cordial throughout and served to establish the contact we sought. One sensed a special effort on the part of all members to reassure us of the moderation of the frente and representative charac [Page 597] ter of the PG. They did acknowledge, however, that they were a creation of the FSLN. They seemed to welcome having contact with me but, as one of them remarked as the meeting broke up, they would be much happier having Ambassador Pezzullo talking with them in Penas Blancas.
8. The group returns to San Jose tomorrow afternoon after which I will try to see Robelo alone.3
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/26–28/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Managua, and San José. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Pastor wrote at the top of the first page: “PG Conversation.”↩
- Pastor wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “get reftel.” In telegram 2793 from San José, June 30, the Embassy noted that La Nación reported on June 30 that a communiqué issued on June 29 in San José by the Nicaraguan Provisional Junta had “rejected US mediation in the Nicaragua crisis, a mediation which the Junta characterized as a four point plan contemplating the immediate departure of Somoza from Nicaragua but which ‛sets aside’ the Junta.” The communiqué described the “Washington Plan” as inherently “an inadmissible intervention in the political process of insurrectional character” underway in Nicaragua and stated that Washington’s “only role” should be “the breaking of relations with the Somocista regime and the immediate recognition of the Junta ‛provisional.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790297–0384) In telegram 2798 from San José, June 30, the Embassy included the full Spanish-language text of the GRN communiqué. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790297–0683)↩
- Pastor wrote at the bottom of the cable: “More on how they related to one another.”↩