153. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
6205. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 183: Private Conversation With Somoza.
1. I spent 3½ hours with Somoza at his house perched above “the bunker” but it was not a very productive session. Much of the time was spent in going over the same ground that I covered in my previous private talk and in sessions with the NG. I delivered the message contained in State 301569.2 His only reaction was to the reference to consequences on US/Nicaraguan relations if he refused a negotiated solution or the plebiscite approach. He thought this singled him out for harsher treatment than the USG gives to other countries with which it has disagreements.
2. The only new element which came out in the discussion was his clearly stated preference for a plebiscite over other approaches to his possible departure. He said he had not ruled out leaving, but it had to be dignified. The short route of resigning and negotiating the formation of a transitional government did not afford a graceful exit. A plebiscite, on the other hand, would be a vote which, if it were adverse, the Liberal Party and the guard would understand and accept as justifying his abdication from power prior to 1981. I questioned him carefully on this because a volunteered departure would seem to afford a much more dignified exit than a national vote of no confidence. He insisted the plebiscite was his preferred route.
3. In expressing a willingness to use the “consulta popular,” Somoza made clear that he could not accept an up or down vote on his continuing in office. His clear preference was for a test of relative party strength. He did throw in, however, the variant of holding an election for a constituent assembly which could decide whether he should remain in office. This would also serve to measure relative [Page 406] strength of the parties. I told him that trying to hold the plebiscite on the basis of party affiliation is a non-starter. The opposition would not accept and neither could the NG. With respect to the constituent assembly idea, I told him the NG had not examined this idea in detail, but I could anticipate strong FAO objection because of an unhappy experience in the recent past and the competitive advantage which the Liberal Party, supported by the bureaucracy, would enjoy. I made clear, however, that this alternative would have to be examined with the FAO if the PLN presented the proposal.
4. I asked Somoza how he planned to reply to the NG’s latest communication. He first said that the response would express a willingness to discuss our proposal for a plebiscite. I told him that a simple willingness to discuss was not adequate. It would represent very little advance over their earlier reply. It could be taken as a dilatory move. If he and the PLN were prepared to accept our proposal in principle and discuss the details, they should say so. Somoza clearly got the message but made no firm commitment.
5. I told Somoza that while I appreciated the opportunity to talk personally, I was a member of an international commission and it was important that he meet with the three of us. I recalled his expressed willingness to see us informally to exchange views prior to his response to our November 27 communication.3 He promised to get in touch with FonMin Quintana this afternoon to set up a meeting with the NG.
6. Comment: Somoza was affable throughout the meeting. He took the talking points and some very candid remarks on my part as to how he is viewed by the opposition in stride. He did not accept these views but expressed concern over his position in history. He also sought refuge behind the need to protect Liberal Party and National Guard and prevent a Communist takeover.
While he expressed concern over American attitudes toward him and particularly future measures which the USG might take, he left me with the clear impression that he does not think the pressures bearing down on him are yet sufficient to compel him to throw in the sponge. Unlike his comments on previous occasions he expressed readiness to gamble on a plebiscite but his refusal to accept our formula led me to believe that he may also think that he can string this process out in order to gain time. (The CA stabilization fund balance of payments loan authorized yesterday provides some relief.) I concluded from this session that unless we take some of the specific measures contemplated in our options paper, our warnings are still not credible to him. A signal or two at this time may convince him that we mean [Page 407] business on prompt action to settle the crisis. It looks as if the FAO will tonight or tomorrow accept our version of the plebiscite in terms that will put Somoza on the spot. (Managua 6206)4 Announcement of aid suspension and intention to withdraw the MilGrp is the kind of pressure we need to push him to a decision. I am not convinced that a plebiscite is his preferred way out. It is more humiliating than a volunteered departure. If we are firm on a plebiscite as the NG has designed it and convince Somoza that the USG means business, there is a chance that we can edge him toward a decision to negotiate his departure with the FAO.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2531. Secret; Niact Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis.↩
- The Department instructed Bowdler in telegram 301569 to Managua, November 29, that he should make a démarche to Somoza informing him that if he continued to refuse to negotiate a transition government or to accept a plebiscite Bowdler would return to Washington and “our relations with your country will be very strongly affected.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2355) Bowdler had sent proposed talking points to use with Somoza as a “last effort to get him to accept the plebiscite or agree to step down in favor of a transitional government of national reconciliation” in telegram 6112 from Managua, November 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2371)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 152.↩
- See Document 154.↩