123. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
5380. USUN for Shelton. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 67: The Mediation Process Advanced.
1. Summary: Today (October 26) the NG significantly advanced the mediation process: the FAO–PC gave us final version of its document containing a proposal for a provisional government of national reconciliation (Managua 5348)2; we presented the document to President Somoza; Somoza designated the three PLN negotiators and we scheduled our first meeting with PLN negotiators for tomorrow. The NG also countered the public impact of the G–12’s defection, asylum and published statement denouncing the mediation and the FAO. We issued a brief communique intended to back up the FAO which was broadcast on radio and TV and given to local and international press. La Prensa, by agreement, balanced its coverage of G–12 statement with [Page 328] the NG press statement, FAO communique and an editorial. In addition we continued our extensive individual contacts: consulting with the Archbishop, and meeting separately with National University Rector Dr. Mariano Fiallos and PLN leader and former Vice President Alfonso Callejas Deshon. End summary.
2. These steps were taken advancing the mediation process:
(A) NG met with FAO–PC composed of Cordova Rivas, Alfonso Robelo, Rodolfo Robelo and advisors Noel Rivas Gasteazoro, Chagutillo and Rudolfo Robelo’s newly designated advisor Dr. Socrates Flores. (Reynaldo Tefel and Roberto Arguello Hurtado have reportedly withdrawn from PC advisor roles because they sympathized with G–12 position.) Jimenez told PC of our call on La Prensa and read NG communique to them. They appeared pleased. Jimenez said FAO document provided a good basis for negotiations and NG would present it to Somoza today. Jimenez’ only suggestion was that members of technical council which would advise the Junta on reorganization of the Guardia (Section IV of document) should be active duty officers. Alfonso Robelo explained that reference was broadly stated to permit Junta to have advice of some of the valuable retired GN officers, if it wished. There was no intention to exclude either active or inactive officers. Jimenez did not persist. PC then noted a few non-substantive editorial changes it would make to clarify document. Meeting closed with Alfonso Robelo thanking NG for its efforts, adding that best support FAO could have now is for negotiations to proceed rapidly and produce results that will demonstrate to people value of mediation.
B) At NG meeting with Somoza, Jimenez explained that the NG yesterday received the FAO document containing its proposals. Jimenez then gave Somoza a copy, which he put aside without attempting to read. Jimenez suggested that as next step NG would appreciate Somoza naming three plan representatives with whom we could meet. Somoza said this should be done by PLN Plenum which would be difficult to convene since they were scattered through country. However, he could probably name representatives now and the Plenum could change them later if necessary. Somoza asked when NG would like to meet with PLN representatives and Jimenez replied tomorrow morning if possible. Somoza said he believed he could comply. Jimenez suggested that it would be best if PLN fielded three negotiators, as does PC, adding up to six others as advisors if it wished. Somoza then observed that there had been some movement out of and within the FAO. Jimenez acknowledged that there had been but avoided being drawn into a discussion. With this the eight-minute meeting ended.
C) Somoza this evening informed Jimenez that the PLN representatives will be FonMin Julio Quintana, National District Minister Orlando Montenegro and PLN Secretary Dr. Alcedo Tablada Solis. The latter [Page 329] two will open discussions with NG tomorrow (October 27); Quintana has not returned from Rome. Comment: NG is pleased with selection of Quintana, who was our own first preference. An intelligent, articulate and experienced political figure known for his independent views, he nevertheless has been loyal to Somoza. Montenegro is not a bad choice. A somewhat shadowy figure, he fell from grace some years ago (after ascending to the Presidency of the Congress) by acquiring a personal political following in Managua where he is still the long-time PLN leader.
His fortunes have revived in recent years as a result of his having reassured Somoza of his loyalty. Tablada is generally regarded as a party hack and stooge of Somoza. As the number-two in the PLN hierarchy he is a logical choice. End comment.
3. To counter the public impact of the G–12’s defection, asylum and anticipated attack on the FAO and the mediation, NG this morning met with La Prensa directors (Chamorro brothers and Carlos Holman) and editor Danilo Aguirre. Jimenez told them that FAO had given NG good document but to counter actions of G–12 we now urgently needed La Prensa’s support. For its part, NG would issue communique (Managua—septel) text of which Jaime Chamorro (Public Relations Secretary for FAO) agreed fully, stressing importance of mediation moving rapidly to produce visible results on basic issues. He gave us G–12 communique (Managua—septel)3 which La Prensa would publish today. After lengthy discussion, La Prensa Directors agreed to offset G–12 communique and counter climate of fear resulting from G–12 asylum by also publishing today (1) NG communique, (2) FAO resume of FAO document and (3) an editorial.
B) La Prensa came out this afternoon with carefully balanced front page made up of stories bearing on G–12 walkout and advances in the negotiating process. Lead headline was “FAO: No Hay Retroceso”. They placed the G–12 communique above the main headline with the lead “Asilo y Documento de los Doce”. To one side of the main headline they placed the FAO communique (Managua 5379) under subhead of “Sin Somoza y Sin Pacto o Componenda”.4 On the other side they placed the NG communique under lead of Mediacion Informa: Documento a Somoza. Conveniently tucked between FAO and NG communiques, were two AP photos of columns of allegedly heavily armed Sandinista guerrillas reportedly taken “somewhere in Central America”. Accompanying editorial (which was more of an ultimatum than [Page 330] a boost) stated that as a result of G–12 withdrawal, mediation had lost force and representativeness and therefore should rapidly produce a solution which would eradicate the dictatorship as system and implant the process of democratization. Noting that FAO had made the departure of the Somoza family from power a basic condition for resolving the crisis, La Prensa added that a definitive solution also required compliance with the FAO’s 16 points. If the mediation did not produce such a solution, it concluded, the G–12 position would be vindicated. Somoza-owned Novadades appearing this morning missed the big news. It carried only a fairly straight report of the G–12’s withdrawal from FAO and asylum accompanied by a GON communique stating that the G–12 asylees must be fleeing from leftist terrorists since the GON was not seeking or bothering them.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780442–1061. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, San José, Bogotá, Panama City, Caracas, Santo Domingo, and USUN.↩
- In telegram 5348 from Managua, October 26, the Embassy noted that the “FAO gave the NG the revised document which contains a comprehensive and realistic proposal for handling the transition from the departure of Somoza to the establishment of provisional government that we have been seeking.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780441–0142)↩
- Septels not further identified.↩
- Telegram 5379 from Managua, October 27, included the Spanish-language text of a bulletin issued by the FAO Information Committee and reported in La Prensa on October 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780442–0957)↩