92. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Holbrooke), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Abramowitz), and Michael Armacost and Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1


  • Issues for Decision on Korea and China

We need to make decisions on pressing, interrelated issues in East Asia: (1) the Korean troop reduction/compensatory package; (2) deter[Page 325]mining a strategy for seeking to normalize relations with the PRC; (3) deciding whether to seek normalization before or after the fall elections; (4) selecting the weapons to be sold to Taiwan; and (5) deciding whether to continue the case-by-case approach for expediting technology transfers to the PRC.


In making decisions on these issues, a few considerations ought to be kept in mind:

—Our aim is to create the ratcheting effect we were able to obtain in 1971–1973 when our moves toward both Moscow and Peking were carefully staged to be reinforcing. Success depends upon our capacity to weave our China and Soviet policies into a coherent strategy. This means that our strategy for normalization cannot be considered in isolation, but must be jointly designed with our Soviet policy. Neither our Soviet nor our China policy should be derivative of the other; the two must proceed in tandem.

It is important that we act boldly. The public increasingly assesses the Administration as lacking the capacity for dramatic and decisive moves. Our prestige in Asia is low, and we need to act to reverse this before the impression is irretrievable. In response, we believe we should select issues on which we can act boldly and which fall preeminently in the executive domain.

Our Korean policy is at a critical juncture. Congress may not pass the equipment transfer legislation; Jaworski seems to hold the key at this time, and we cannot expect him to be helpful.2 If we go through with the first withdrawals without the compensation package, the JCS would withhold their support. As long as the Korea issue remains, it will be hard for us to generate broad support for our Asia policy.

Our China policy is stalled; there never seems to be an opportune time to move forward, and this robs our diplomacy of much needed flexibility.

—In the region as a whole—most notably in the eyes of the Japanese—our policies are perceived to lack decisiveness and a sense of priorities. Yet, our policies in Asia are basically sound and opportunities exist for consolidating our favorable position in the region. Proper management of our relations with Seoul, Peking, and Taipei in the months ahead will test our ability to exploit the opportunities that beckon.

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I. Korea

The equipment transfer legislation is stalled on the Hill, and our refusal to discuss modifications of the withdrawal plan is becoming a high-risk policy.

Jaworski still maintains a link between aid to Korea and Congressional access to Kim Dong-jo.

—The pertinent Subcommittee Chairman will not supply a strong lead on the transfer bill. Glenn because he favors postponement; Wolff because he is skittish for personal reasons.

—Most legislators prefer to finesse the Korean issue in this election year.

—Neither the HIRC nor the SFRC has reported our proposals out of committee. Even if the committees act favorably, we must expect floor amendments designed to reduce aid or block passage of the entire package.

In short, we will soon have to expend major political capital to protect the Korean package, and success is far from assured.

A defeat would be devastating for our credibility in Asia. We have consistently told the Koreans and Japanese that our aid would accompany the withdrawals. JCS support for the withdrawal plan is contingent upon honoring that pledge.

We cannot delay action on this matter for long. Support units are rapidly being withdrawn. House markup on the transfer bill is scheduled to begin in mid-April. If we are to introduce or accept modifications, they must be decided upon probably within the next two weeks.

The Options

We have four options. No matter which one is selected, we will have to seek planned levels of FMS credits for Korea in FY 79 (i.e., $275 million). These credits support the ROK Force Improvement Plan which runs through 1981. The ROK expects them. They serve our own interest in making South Korea more self-reliant. They are virtually “cost-free” to the U.S. taxpayer.

Option 1: Proceed to withdraw the first brigade by December 31. Even if Congress fails to act on the transfer legislation, the equipment of the withdrawing units would be placed in storage pending Congressional action.

This option would put Congress on the spot, and might prompt them to act responsibly on the transfer package this year. Unfortunately, such action would not be assured, and this approach entails very high risks of exacerbating the Administration’s relations with Congress, reinforcing Japanese doubts about our reliability, exposing to both North and South Koreans the hollowness of our pledges and [Page 327] evoking criticism from conservatives for taking actions which endanger the safety of remaining U.S. forces.

In order to offset these disadvantages, we might either deploy additional air units to Korea (e.g., a squadron of A–10 “tank killers”), [less than 1 line not declassified] or declare that there would be no more withdrawals until Congress acts on the package.

Each of these steps raises its own problems. Deployment of A–10s may not be cost-effective and would adversely affect our European plans and promises. [1 line not declassified] hence delay in those redeployments would not provide much general reassurance. The attachment of conditions to the withdrawals may have real merit but may not be believed.

Option 2: Postpone the December 1978 withdrawal of the combat brigade until 1979—either by six months or a year. The decisions would be justified on grounds that Congress cannot address Korean policy while the Tongsun Park affair hangs over it.

This option would remove a contentious issue from the Congressional agenda. It would enable us to avoid expending political capital on a possibly losing issue. It would be reassuring to the ROK and other Asian allies. It would not require the President to change the basic contours of the withdrawal decision. Withdrawals would still be completed within four to five years; the basic effect of the delay would be to “backload” the withdrawals further. It would permit us to reintroduce the transfer package next year in an atmosphere hopefully less dominated by the specter of Korean influence-peddling.

Such delays could, of course, be interpreted as giving Congress a veto over any withdrawals, embolden opponents to employ additional delaying tactics next year, and invite charges of another Administration flip-flop.

Option 3: Seek Congressional authority to transfer only that equipment associated with the withdrawals in the first phase (the “Stratton Solution”). The value of this equipment is estimated at $96 million (as opposed to the current request for $800 million in transfer authority).

This option would increase the possibility of favorable Congressional action prior to the withdrawal of the first increment by allowing Congressmen to “vote against Korea,” by slashing the transfer amount. Yet it meets our need to balance withdrawals with improvements in South Korean forces and should reassure the Koreans and our other Asian allies.

It also has several disadvantages. We cannot be certain that Congress would approve even a scaled-down request, in which case the effect would be even more devastating internationally than if Congress had simply failed to act on our original proposals.

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In addition, Stratton sees it as a means to avoid Congressional endorsement of the overall withdrawal program. It would establish a precedent for incremental Congressional review of the withdrawal program and would open the Administration to an annual legislative authorization of transfer plans. Such an approach would reduce U.S. and Korean capabilities to effectively plan and implement the interrelated elements of the plan (withdrawal, training, equipment transfer, and ROK force improvements) which have varying lead times.

Option 4: Delay all further withdrawals until Congress acts. Postponing the withdrawal of all remaining elements of the first increment for six months or one year would offer essentially the advantages and disadvantages of Option 2. It would be most satisfactory from the perspective of our allies and our military but would give maximum encouragement to Congressional initiative and those who oppose the withdrawal.

II. Strategy for Normalization With PRC

Issue for Decision: Whether to recommend to the President the strategy for trying to normalize relations with Peking outlined below. We propose a four-stage sequence of interrelated moves which we believe would increase significantly the chances that normalization could be completed no later than early 1979 and perhaps considerably earlier than that. After that, domestic political concerns will have taken precedence, and normalization may well slip until 1981 or later. If it unfolds successfully, the key stages of the strategy are: (1) the Brzezinski trip; (2) secret Woodcock talks; (3) a Vance trip; (4) a Presidential announcement and ensuing Congressional action.

In addition, we recommend ancillary measures which would seek to: (1) foster favorable public and Congressional attitudes by demonstrating that improved relations with China has tangible payoffs and need not undercut Taiwan’s security; (2) develop precise plans for the Congressional role in the normalization process and for our post-normalization commercial and security relationship with Taiwan; and (3) condition friends and allies to the prospect of decisive moves on our China policy.

The sequence of moves has been designed in such a way that:

—It does not require explicit Congressional approval until the last step.

—It entails reciprocity, permitting us to test Chinese interest in normalization.

—With minor exceptions it neither deeply involves the President nor requires extensive Presidential reflection until the last stage and can be carried out without major burdens on the President’s time.

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—It need not be made public ahead of time. The first two stages involve quiet diplomacy.

—It can be accelerated or decelerated as it suits our interests.

—The momentum we seek to generate should have salutory effects on relations with Moscow, reminding the Soviets that we have diplomatic options and are capable of initiatives at a time when we seem to be on the defensive elsewhere. Yet, the moves are not provocative; we eschew “gimmicks” in favor of substantive steps which stand on their own merits and are more likely to elicit a Chinese response.

Stage One: Preliminary Notification

A. Brzezinski Visit to Peking. The visit will be billed publicly as a discussion of our global foreign policy: SALT, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Asia. Underscoring the national security character of the trip, Brzezinski would also visit Korea and Japan. The trip would be announced after we are confident the identity of Brzezinski’s interlocutors will permit authoritative discussions and after the Chinese confirm a date.

However, to set in motion the sequence envisioned in this paper, Brzezinski would also privately indicate that: (1) the Administration intends to devote major attention to normalization with China; (2) Woodcock is prepared to discuss normalization in detail in talks we wish to keep completely secret; (3) another visit by a high-level official would be possible if the talks with Woodcock gave cause for an expectation of progress; (4) we hope that in the interim the climate for improved Sino-U.S. understanding would be improved through expanded commercial ties; (5) as an indication of the earnestness of our intent, in the months ahead we would seek to advance the relationship significantly.

B. During this stage, we would: (1) hint to the Japanese that the Carter Administration will accelerate the pace of our efforts to normalize relations with Peking later in the year; (2) give renewed emphasis to China in our public statements, and (3) complete the necessary legal studies on normalization issues.

Stage Two: Secret Talks and Ancillary Public Actions

A. Leonard Woodcock secretly would begin to discuss the details of normalization in Peking. Woodcock would tell the Chinese that we are ready to pursue the following course:

—Meet their three conditions;

—Establish a non-governmental office in Taiwan to handle continued economic, cultural, and other appropriate contacts with Taiwan;

—Issue a unilateral statement indicating our continued interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and expect that their own statements in response will be temperate;

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—Continue our efforts to prevent Taiwan from developing nuclear weapons;

—Maintain Taiwan’s access to defense equipment, an action we do not expect Peking to endorse;

—Submit necessary legislation to Congress to sustain our post-normalization relationship on Taiwan.

Woodcock would ask whether in the light of our intended actions and statements the Chinese are prepared to accept an American Ambassador by mid-1979, whether they are prepared to set a date for a visit to Washington by a very high Chinese official, and whether they understand our expectations concerning their rhetoric on Taiwan. If their responses were satisfactory, Woodcock would table a draft communique on recognition and would indicate that Secretary Vance would be prepared to travel to Peking to complete arrangements for recognition and an exchange of ambassadors.

B. Ancillary Measures

—The U.S. would further reduce the number of U.S. military personnel on Taiwan to approximately 600 by October 1.

—A government science delegation led by Frank Press would visit China to discuss an expanded S&T exchange program with the PRC.

—To pre-empt the Taiwan issue from arising during the fall campaign and to underscore to all parties concerned the Administration’s commitment to the security of Taiwan, we would proceed with major arms sales to the ROC.

—The President and Mrs. Carter would attend one of the performances of the Peking Opera at Wolf Trap Farm.

—We would have one or two Secretarial visits, each of which would be preceded by discussions through our Liaison Offices to ensure the trip would achieve the intended purpose: Bergland, Schlesinger, or Kreps.

Stage Three: Reaching an Agreement and Informing Taipei

Vance in Peking. It would be politically unwise for Vance to visit Peking again without solid expectation that the trip would be productive. Therefore, the decision on his trip must await the results of Woodcock’s exchange with Peking and the Chinese response to our ancillary measures. We can expect Peking to be tough and opaque, as they always are, but we will have sensed their likely response to a Vance trip.

The purpose of the Vance trip would be to complete the normalization deal—to bargain on those remaining differences which Woodcock’s discussions hopefully would have narrowed to a reconcilable stage. We believe the two critical issues will be Peking’s willingness to: (1) accept an American ambassador with the understanding we would [Page 331] continue arms sales to Taiwan and (2) moderate their rhetoric on their policy toward Taiwan, specifically refraining from using their formulation about “forceful liberation” of Taiwan. Vance would not go to Peking unless we thought reasonable chances existed for reaching an understanding on these two issues.

The leadership on the Hill would have been briefed prior to the trip as to its objectives and discreet soundings would have been undertaken as to the viability of the agreement we intend to reach.

A successful Vance visit would shift the focus from Peking to Washington and Taipei.

Consulting with Congress. Soon after Vance’s return, we would begin quietly to consult with our close allies on the Hill to map the legislative tactics for normalization.

Informing Taiwan. If the Vance visit is successful, we would begin the difficult, delicate task of informing Taiwan of the course ahead. We would impress upon them the irreversibility of our policy, so they would not seek to derail recognition, but we would also stress our desire to work with them to ensure their continued security and prosperity. We would cooperate to induce confidence and minimize such potential problems as capital flight.

Stage Four: The Presidential Announcement and Its Aftermath

A. Announcement. The President should announce recognition from Washington. The announcement should state that the U.S. national interest requires us to have full and normal diplomatic relations with the world’s most populous nation, and that the President has therefore decided to extend recognition to the government in Peking as the sole government of China. This will not threaten other nations, but will improve the chances of world peace. (It is important not to explicitly raise the specter of the Soviet angle, even though its appeal will be clear enough to many.)

The President could then proceed to outline the special circumstances that exist with regard to our relations with the people of Taiwan, and state that in order to protect their future well-being he was going to ask the Congress for immediate action on a single important piece of legislation which would permit all existing non-official relationships with the people of Taiwan to continue.

B. Subsequent Debate. The President’s announcement will arouse considerable public debate. We will certainly be accused of “abandoning” Taiwan. Senator Goldwater will introduce a resolution claiming that the President cannot terminate a treaty without two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate. During the debate over the omnibus legislation, we can expect pro-Taiwan elements to try to add on amendments concerning an American security commitment to Taiwan which [Page 332] would have the practical effect of nullifying the arrangements with Peking. We would expect that these amendments, which might be supported by men like Baker, Brooke, and perhaps Javits and Glenn, would be the moment of maximum danger for the Administration. We would have to make it clear that such amendments would be unacceptable and would open the possibility of vetoing the entire bill, with unacceptable risks for Taiwan.

C. Hua or Teng Visit to U.S. The sequence would end with a visit to Washington by Hua or Teng, timed for maximum domestic political benefit.

The Chances of Success

Is this scenario realistic? We do not know. We note these caveats:

—We do not know if the Chinese will agree to normalization on our terms. Our minimum demand on Taiwan—that we continue to sell arms after normalization—may be more than they are willing to accept. The Taiwan issue is an extraordinarily difficult one for them, and a weak or divided leadership may not be able to accept a normalization agreement which did not discernibly increase the chances of an eventual recovery of Taiwan. If the PRC cannot agree to our minimum demands, normalization obviously cannot occur, and we can either seek to sustain the relationship at its present level or seek to advance the normalization process through unilateral means.

—We doubt the Chinese will respond favorably to all our ancillary initiatives. They may wish to defer certain types of exchanges until after normalization.

—Our sequence will be more difficult on the Hill if the Korean troop reduction/compensatory package problem has not been resolved, at least for this year.

—Peking’s attitude towards the normalization process will also be affected by our global conduct in the months ahead. For example, Peking would be encouraged by signs of U.S. resolve in Africa and by any efficacy we demonstrate in the Mid East. The point is simple: our capacity to develop a favorable environment for normalization depends in part on our global effectiveness.

III. Timing

The Issue: Whether to pursue the above sequence rapidly, so as to complete normalization before the 1978 elections, or whether to adopt a more measured approach with Stages Three and Four coming after the elections.

Alternative 1: Achieve and announce normalization before the election.

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—If successfully handled, it would be a plus for the Administration.

—Quick movement should contribute to our ability to moderate Soviet behavior. It also serves as a sharp reminder to the Soviets that détente is not an “all or nothing proposition” and that we have other important interests that we intend to pursue.

—The Congressional calendar appears free. It is clear that we cannot obtain ratification of a SALT agreement this year and Congress will have completed action on the Panama Canal Treaties and the Middle East Aircraft Package before any successful normalization becomes public. Therefore, we will not be jeopardizing other high-value foreign policy legislation.

—Finally, it enables us to capitalize on a favorable political climate within China, where the always uncertain domestic political scene appears the best it has been in years for progress on normalization.


—It requires maximum political skill.

—The Chinese could be confused by our coming on strong—especially if we press them for an early agreement. They could see our urgency as weakness and spurn any obeisance to our internal needs.

—Domestically this alternative is inconsistent with the image of an “open Administration” and full Congressional consultations. Congressional and public reaction could be sharp. Conceivably the conservatives might make it an election issue to the President’s disfavor. However, we could enhance the political appeal of normalization by ensuring that Hua or Teng would visit Washington soon after the announcement of normalization. (The President, however, may want to keep a high-ranking Chinese visit in reserve until 1980.)

—A sudden normalization would be more likely to scare our Asian allies further about U.S. withdrawal from Asia. In particular, the Japanese—if unwarned in any way—would be totally surprised and would consider it a Carter “shock.”

—We would only have a limited amount of time to deal with the bureaucratic “loose ends” that were mentioned earlier.

Alternative 2: A More Measured Approach

Under this alternative we would gradually build momentum towards normalization through reciprocal steps if our initial explorations in Peking proved promising. Woodcock need not begin discussions sooner than mid-June, and the Vance visit would come in December.

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—It is consistent with the foreign policy process of an open administration. Congressional and public reaction may not be as sharp if they were consulted, lobbied and allowed to participate in the decision-making process. At the same time, the Chinese would be monitoring the Congressional and public debate and may become more attuned to U.S. domestic political constraints.

—It would provide us more time to get our own house in order—to tie up the loose ends and space out the Taiwan arms sales. We would also have more time to consult with our allies and with Taiwan.


—It gives opponents ready opportunity to mobilize public opinion against normalization and introduce crippling legislative or public relation efforts to stop or hinder the process. We would certainly have significant lobbying from Taiwan to that end.

—It could become entangled in next year’s SALT ratification effort or become delayed by unfortunate 1978 electoral results.

—To reach early agreement with China and fail to gain prior Congressional support (to include passage of any enabling legislation) would be a grave blow to U.S.–China relations and to our whole foreign policy credibility.

IV. Arms Sales to the ROC

Issue for Decision: How to respond to ROC requests for military items which have long been held in abeyance—60 F–4s, the Harpoon, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and the I-Hawk missile.


Arms sales to Taiwan are an important aspect of our normalization policy. The ROC must continue to feel confident of its own future security, but at the same time our arms sales must take into account PRC sensitivities and legitimate security concerns. We want to avoid the appearance of massive arms flows but this will be difficult given the backlog of requests and the difficulty of approving large sales once normalization is completed. We wish to maintain a military balance in the Taiwan Strait which would continue to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, a Chinese blockade of the island, or overly assertive PRC air or naval patrolling of the Taiwan Strait. Our arms sales to Taiwan should:

—Use weapons sales politically to demonstrate our continued interest in Taiwan security.

—Avoid giving the impression we are “packing the island” with arms prior to our military pullout, à la Vietnam.

—Employ as criteria for sales the military balance in the region, the political/psychological situation on Taiwan, and the effect on Peking.

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Briefly, air defense poses Taiwan’s most immediately pressing problem, for the PRC continues to develop its air force while Taiwan’s F–100s and F–104s are approaching the end of their service life. Taiwan’s request for the F–4 and the I-Hawk missile are its response to this threat. Naval defense poses a problem for Taiwan because of the PRC’s 185 ships which are armed with Styx missiles. The problem we face is deciding upon weapon systems for the ROC that would counter the PRC’s modest but growing naval capability. The ROC’s requests for the Harpoon and precision-guided munitions are to counter this threat.

Air Defense: We recommend sale of a third I-Hawk anti-aircraft missile battalion (115 million) and believe the letter of offer and acceptance should be signed as soon as possible this fiscal year. The sale would be non-controversial to Peking and helpful in Taiwan.

A decision on replacement aircraft cannot be postponed. Taipei wants the F–16 but this is out of the question. The choice comes down to more F–5Es or two to three squadrons of F–4s. Peking would more easily accept an F–5E sale but Taipei would complain the F–5E is not an all-weather fighter and does not carry enough air-to-air ordnance. The F–4 is the plane the ROC wants and U.S. agreement to sell would be popular with its supporters in Congress. F–4 sale would dramatize that the U.S. is not “abandoning” Taiwan. The sale could be made less distasteful to Peking by our insisting the planes not be flown closer than 50 miles from the PRC coast and selling them without ground attack systems.

Naval Defense: The ROC now has the Israeli Gabriel missile but does not consider this effective against the PRC’s large Styx missile fleet. The Harpoon is indeed superior to the Styx but the upgrading of ROC capabilities could be very disturbing to Peking but probably less so than the more visible F–4s. Other counters to the Styx would be electronic countermeasures and precision-guided munitions.

Because of their volume and the restricted time, the decisions we make on arms systems should be considered in a coordinated way. Peking will so view them. An F–4 sale would be viewed quite negatively in Peking, but whether it exceeds their tolerable bounds we cannot say. Sale of F–4s plus Harpoons and/or PGMs would be a heavy load in any one year for the PRC, although Peking’s tolerance might be increased if Peking believed it was the price of normalization. In terms of reassurance value, both with the Congress and on Taiwan, an F–4 sale is probably the most popular step we can take.


We believe I-Hawk should be sold this year. The principal issue involves the degraded F–4 with restricted use of naval defense weapons. Our options are:

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—Option 1: Sell 60 degraded F–4s, the Harpoon, and the precision-guided munitions.

—Option 2: Sell degraded F–4s, but neither the Harpoon nor PGMs.

—Option 3: Sell F–5s, the Harpoon, and PGMs.

V. Technology Transfer

Issue: Whether to expedite the licensing process on technology transfers to the PRC by adopting more flexible bureaucratic guidelines on this issue. PRM 31 and the ensuing PD 3 presents an immediate vehicle for enunciating the new guidelines.

Partly because of bureaucratic problems and partly because we are constrained from providing explicit guidelines to the bureaucracy, we have not been successful in expediting decisions on pending license applications for exports to the PRC. In fact, we conclude that our intervention on a case-by-case basis is an unworkable approach.

—Our efforts to expedite a case inevitably turns the case into a political matter. NSC and State, for example, begin to have contacts with the selling company. If the case is turned down on technical grounds, the denial has greater political ramifications than if the process had been strictly bureaucratic.

—By its nature, the evaluative process is bureaucratically cumbersome. A large number of technical people must examine the item. The pressure we exert—and we have intervened incessantly to speed the cases along—may accelerate decisions by a couple months, but at excessive cost of time and effort to us.

—Technical experts continue to demonstrate concern over establishing a precedent for similar sales to the Soviet Union. Yet we cannot tell them a favorable decision in the PRC case does not set a precedent for the Soviets.

Indeed, it is impossible to avoid setting forth an explicit policy at some point. When one of the cases we currently are attempting to expedite goes before COCOM, we would have to state that in our view the case does not set a precedent for sales to the Soviet Union. We would have to justify licensing of PRC sales on the basis of China’s level of technology and capability of diverting the item from civilian to military use.

We have two options:

Option 1: Through PRM 31 and the ensuing PD, adopt a policy which states: “We pursue a policy of evenhandedness in the transfer of [Page 337] technology to communist countries which takes into account their technological level and their capability of diverting the item or technology from civilian to military use with adverse security consequences to the U.S.”

The Draft PRM 31 contains language along these lines, but some would prefer to replace it with a strong affirmation of our current, rather inflexible, policy.

An explicit statement of our new policy would be helpful within the bureaucracy. Commerce and DOD would understand that decisions for one communist country do not set a precedent for another. The consequences of any leaks would be manageable, for the wording carefully avoids creating the impression that we are adopting a “China tilt.”

Option 2: Select the best possible case as a way of establishing a precedent within the bureaucracy and at COCOM that a sale of an item to the PRC does not set a precedent for sale to the USSR.

This option would have us back into our policy change. Its advantage is that the change would attract less attention in the next few months. Its disadvantage is the continuing confusion it would cause.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 56, Policy Process: 1–4/78. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
  2. Leon Jaworski was then serving as the Special Counsel for the House Ethics Committee. He had threatened to ask Congress to cut off all aid to Korea unless that government cooperated with his investigation into influence-buying.
  3. See footnote 19, Document 59. The ensuing Presidential Directive has not been identified.