9. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter1
Washington, February 14, 1977
SUBJECT
- DoD Inputs on US–PRC
Relations
1. I enclose a memorandum from Secretary Brown dealing with the significance of our relationship
with the PRC for our national security
policy, and a memorandum from Secretary Brown transmitting specific recommendations from General
Brown (JCS) pertaining to US–PRC military contacts.
2. With regard to the memorandum from Secretary Brown, let me note that I am generally
in agreement with his emphasis on the important security benefits which
we have derived from our relationship with Peking. We must, therefore,
be careful not to slight China in our dealings with the Soviet Union,
and an informal interagency group, with NSC staff member Michel
Oksenberg, is engaged in reviewing US–PRC relations from that standpoint.
3. With regard to the recommendations for US–PRC military contacts, my view is that your decision should
await the outcome of the interagency review. Subject to your approval, I
would recommend that you instruct me to request Secretary Brown to prepare a paper analyzing in
more detail the six specific recommendations submitted by General
Brown. His response would
then be included in the interagency review, on the basis of which a more
politically sensitive judgment can be submitted for your approval.2
[Page 34]
Enclosure
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter
3
Washington, February 9, 1977
SUBJECT
- The People’s Republic of China and US National Security
Policy
The security policy of the US is, and I believe should continue to
be, cast primarily within the framework of the Soviet-American
political and military balance. At the same time security planning
must increasingly reflect the more complex character of the
international system. This is particularly true with regard to our
policy towards the People’s Republic of China. Whatever the virtues
of “triangular” diplomacy, China constitutes a growing power center
of continuing importance.
We have gained important security benefits from our new relationship
with Peking. We have substantially reduced the danger of a conflict
in northeast Asia and eliminated the friction that our China policy
caused with major allies such as Japan. At least by comparison with
what would otherwise have been the case, the Soviets have so far
been forced to divide their military strength. Though this is a
consequence of Soviet-PRC tensions
rather than better US–PRC
relations, the two are not unconnected. Thus, the most important
factor for the next decade is that the US–PRC relationship will be a major influence on US-Soviet
relations.
I therefore conclude that this Administration must foster a
relationship with Peking which gives greater global balance to our
national security position. Failure to do so might give us some
short term benefits with the Soviet Union but at the price of
potentially larger long term costs. Retrogression in our China
relations could also have major political costs for you and hinder
your management of both domestic and foreign affairs.
[Page 35]
Security Concerns in the Evolution of China
Policy
In terms of our security interests as seen from my vantage point at
Defense, there are three major policy areas of interest which will
be affected by the evolution of China policy and the conduct of our
relations with Peking:
—US–PRC Relations
and Our Dealings with the Soviet Union. Our policies
regarding the Chinese will be a growing factor in Sino-Soviet
relations and in our efforts to deal effectively with the Soviets.
While to date the Russians have been reserved in their responses to
the more constructive relationship between Washington and Peking,
changes in this relationship are likely to stimulate important
reactions from Moscow. Improvements in US–PRC relations and heightened levels of Sino-American
cooperation may lead Moscow to inject the “China factor” into future
SALT negotiations and other
aspects of the diplomacy of détente. This could cause them to seek
parity as compared with the US plus China in
arms agreements, or could make them more eager to reach such
agreements with us and to ease relations with us. Stagnation or
deterioration in US–PRC relations
could relax Soviet anxieties, harden their negotiating postures with
us, and create opportunities for improvements in Sino-Soviet
relations.
—Effects of “Normalization” of US–PRC Relations. As you decide
how to pick up the unfinished task of establishing a stable basis
for future US–PRC relations, key
issues of concern to the Defense Department will be the timing, the
phasing, and the manner in which our present relationship with the
Republic of China or Taiwan—with whom we maintain a security
treaty—will be altered; [1½ lines not
declassified]; the impact of any changes in our
relationship with Taiwan on key Asian allies, especially Japan; and
what actions we might be willing to take to ensure that there is a
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themselves.
—US–PRC Relations
and Third Country Issues. There are a number of third
country areas—Korea, Japan, South Asia, the Middle East and
Europe—where the Washington–Peking dialogue has led to parallel
policies which have served the security interests of both sides.
Defense, of course, has great interest in this process and of how
the China relationship might be used to reinforce our security
interests on issues like Korea or in response to any future crisis
which might affect both countries.
Issues for Immediate Consideration
Our security interests in the evolution of our China policy are
clear. They may loom larger and acquire greater importance over the
next ten years as our present, “semi-normal” relationship with
Peking [Page 36] matures. However,
there are some issues that I believe should be addressed early.
These are:
—The impact of an enhanced US–PRC
relationship on Soviet-American relations and particularly on future
SALT negotiations;
—The effect of our actions with the Soviets on our ability to pursue
an effective China policy in the future;
—The security of Taiwan under conditions of normalized US–PRC relations; and
—The handling of our security relations in Asia (to include our
policies towards friends, allies and the PRC) in the interim, while our longer term China policy
acquires shape and direction.
I recognize that China policy raises difficult questions and there
may be great uncertainties involved in answering them. But I believe
that they need to be addressed in a thorough manner and that this
process should begin soon. They have significant implications for
our security policy and obviously for the Defense Department in
particular.
In the previous Administration China policy was formulated in a very
restricted forum by a very few individuals. I recommend against
continuing that practice. Our China policy is an integral part of
American foreign policy and should no longer, in my view, be managed
differently than other major elements of US national security
policy. Beyond that there is the need to fashion a broad policy
consensus on China policy within the United States Government. Nor
does the previous Administration’s practice in this regard fit with
the work style you have established for your Administration, a style
that produces particularly enthusiastic support among those who have
experienced both.
I believe there is a need to bring a broader systematic approach to
China policy. You may wish to establish a formal or informal group
to review the various aspects of China policy. I have explained all
this in greater detail in a separate memorandum to Zbig.4
[Page 37]
Enclosure
Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (Brown) to
Secretary of Defense Brown
5
SUBJECT
- US-Chinese (PRC) Military
Contacts
1. Purpose: To review briefly the record of US-Chinese military
contacts, to offer comments on the desirability of US initiatives,
and to recommend what military contacts might be undertaken.
2. Background: In 1945, the Chinese Communists requested from the US
military assistance in the war against Japan. For a variety of
reasons this never came to fruition. The ensuing 30 years saw US and
Chinese forces engaged in combat in Korea, and indirect military
confrontations in the Taiwan Strait in 1959, 1962 and in Vietnam.
This milieu included the signing in 1954 of the US–Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty and the absence of formal military contacts and
diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC.
3. Discussion:
a. Although the setting for future US–PRC military contacts is not propitious, such contacts
are necessary particularly in view of the recommendations made in
the reference.
b. Peking will see expanded US-Soviet military contacts as being
directed against the PRC, and as
additional evidence of US collusion with the “hegemonistic Soviet
social imperialists.” Damage will almost certainly be done to the
US–PRC leg of the strategically
important US–USSR–PRC triangular relationship.
c. “Even-handedness” in our relations with the PRC and the USSR, therefore, requires similar military contact
initiatives in the case of China, even though these do not elicit
quick responses.
4. Recommendations:
a. Expedite and expand contacts between US and PRC Defense Attaches in all third
countries. Use our DATTs to convey substantive messages to the
PRC military leadership.
b. Reciprocal visits by DLO Hong Kong military personnel and
appropriate PLA officers.
c. Reciprocal visits by US Army, Chief of Military History and his
equivalent in the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA).
[Page 38]
d. Initiate talks with PRC military
staff at the UN on military
implications of ongoing Law of the Sea negotiations, and offer US
military equipment/technology.
e. Invite PLA personnel to observe
US exercises in the Pacific region.
f. Institute exchanges between National Defense University/National
War College and higher military academies in the PRC.
