We forward herewith the attached memorandum on the subject of Arms Sales
to the Republic of China. The memorandum was prepared jointly by the
Departments of State and Defense in response to an informal request from
the National Security Council. Although it sets forth in the
introduction the general recommendations of the two Departments on the
policy which we believe should govern weapons sales to the Republic of
China in the context of our overall normalization policy, it does not
provide specific recommendations with respect to the individual weapons
systems discussed. It is intended that these specific weapons systems
recommendations would emerge from a discussion meeting, to be chaired by
NSC and would then be forwarded to
you in a supplementary paper.
Attachment
Joint Memorandum Prepared in the Departments of
State and Defense3
SUBJECT
- Arms Sales To the Republic of China
I. Introduction
This paper addresses the question of arms sales to the Republic of
China within the framework of a policy of affording the ROC “limited access to new weapons”.
Within the context of avoiding serious complications in our
relations with Peking, the paper is based on the premise that we
will approve sales to the ROC of
new military equipment and technology so long as it is essentially
defensive in nature and its provision:
—does not, in our best judgment, pose a serious threat to our
normalization policy with Peking;
—does not distort the military balance in the Taiwan Strait;
—does not contribute to the ROC’s
nuclear, long-range/intermediate missile, or chemical warfare
development programs;
—is consistent with the President’s policy on arms transfers.
The paper attempts to evaluate pending ROC requests for the purchase of U.S. military
equipment in the light of these considerations and with the
objective of helping the ROC
maintain a reasonably high cost-inflicting defense capability
against the PRC. We would be
prepared to risk some PRC
displeasure over our actions in the arms supply area, but would
continue to give high priority to avoiding serious problems in our
relations with Peking.
ROC and PRC Views.
The ROC leadership recognizes that
political factors—the PRC’s stake
in good relations with the U.S. and Japan, and continuing
Sino-Soviet tension—are increasingly important elements in stability
in the Taiwan Straits area. But for the foreseeable future most in
the ROC will continue to believe
that the island’s survival depends upon maintaining a credible
military deterrent. Taiwan hopes that political factors
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in the U.S. will delay
full normalization of relations with Peking, and force the U.S. to
continue to guarantee the island’s security even after
normalization. The ROC, at the same
time, has attempted to expand its own arms production, develop new
weapons systems and find non-U.S. sources of supply. A recent U.S.
intelligence memorandum concluded, however, that for the foreseeable
future, the ROC will be dependent
on the U.S. as its source of modern weapons and that Taiwan’s
self-defense capability will continue to be linked to its ability to
buy arms from the U.S.
For Peking, continuation of U.S. arms supply to Taiwan, however
distasteful, is only one factor in a complicated equation. Pending
normalization, there are some indications that Peking views our
existing relationship to Taiwan as a deterrent to Taipei’s looking
elsewhere for support, or seeking unilaterally to alter the island’s
status. It is far from certain, however, that Peking would establish
full diplomatic relations with the U.S. on terms which included
continuation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. At a minimum, Peking
could be expected to oppose U.S. military support at a level which
might cause the ROC leadership to
conclude it was invulnerable to pressure.
Implications for the U.S.
There is inter-agency unanimity in the view that serious PRC–ROC fighting in the Taiwan area would be highly
damaging to U.S. policy interests; and agreement as well that
serious political or social instability on Taiwan would greatly
complicate the normalization process. Maintenance of a credible
military deterrent in the ROC not
only works to preserve military stability in the area but also
provides the sense of psychological confidence on Taiwan which helps
to protect against potential political instability on the
island.
Consistent with the broad policy framework laid out above, the U.S.
should continue to maintain a balance between accommodating both
PRC sensitivities and the
ROC’s need to be confident in
its security, and should do so in the following ways:
—Continue to consider ROC military
requests on a case-by-case basis.
—Avoid, as far as possible, periods of massive arms flow alternating
with periods of unresponsiveness to ROC requests. Instead, communicate responses, whether
positive or negative, in timely fashion employing as criteria the
President’s arms transfer policy, interpreted in the light of our
overall normalization policy, and the importance to us of a credible
military deterrent in ROC
hands.
—Avoid, as unhelpful to our dealings with both Peking and Taipei,
major variations in the flow of arms to Taiwan. This would be
particularly true at the time that normalization approaches, when we
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would want to avoid an
“Enhance Plus” arrangement.4 Accordingly, deliveries should be scheduled
in a way that presents an image of steady but modest flow, and of
U.S. restraint.
[Omitted here are Section II on aircraft and air defense related
items, Section III on naval related items, and Section IV on land
armaments.]
