22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1
67316. Subject: Nuclear Representation to the ROC.
1. We have decided that determined and far-reaching action is required to eliminate the nuclear proliferation risk we now face on Taiwan. Accordingly, the Ambassador is requested to call on Premier Chiang at the Premier’s earliest convenience to make a representation on the nuclear issue based on the talking points presented below. Following oral presentation, Ambassador should leave formal note embodying our position. We also wish to provide the ROC a suggested response to our note (texts provided). It would probably be awkward for the Ambassador to do this with the Premier; we leave it to the Embassy as to how this might be best handled.
[Page 63]2. Department appreciates Embassy’s helpful comments and suggestions which contributed significantly to this important effort.2 The Embassy’s recommendation on the modalities of the approach was given careful consideration, but we believe that our objectives would be best served by confining our effort to the highest level. The presentation of our position in writing should minimize the danger of confusion over technical issues.
3. At the present stage, we seek ROC agreement to basic principles. There is no give in our position on these principles, although obviously implementing details will have to be worked out between the two countries at a technical level. Once the ROC agrees to our basic position this process can begin shortly.
4. You should inform the ROC that a prompt response would be greatly appreciated.
Talking points:
—I have been instructed to impress upon you President Carter’s determination to do everything in his power to prevent nuclear proliferation.
—We welcome your recent statement of support for the President’s position, as well as the ROC’s adherence to the NPT, your own public avowals that the ROC would not manufacture nuclear weapons and your assurances of last September on reprocessing.3
—As you probably realize, our non-proliferation policy is global in scope and must be based on long-term considerations. We must be able to demonstrate that assurances and obligations are not subject to violation, particularly in countries where there is a high potential for the development of a nuclear explosive capability. This is especially true in those countries which have been closely associated with us in the nuclear field.
—The ROC clearly fits into this category. You have publicly acknowledged that the ROC has the capability to develop nuclear weapons.
[Page 64]—By now you are probably aware that the US team found serious problems with the activities carried out at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER).
—I must frankly state that following a review of all the available evidence, the US is convinced that much of INER’s current activities have far greater relevance to a nuclear explosive research program than to the ROC’s nuclear power program.
—This is of greatest concern to us and unless the ROC’s nuclear program is significantly modified to eliminate all proliferation risks, we will not be able to continue cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy matters. Other important relationships between us will also suffer.
—We recognize that we are requesting major changes in the ROC’s nuclear program, some of which arise from a change in our own attitude toward certain types of research. Nevertheless, we see no other means of sustaining both our deep commitment to non-proliferation and our peaceful nuclear relationship with the ROC.
—We believe our mutual interests are served by continued cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy matters. For us to be sufficiently assured about the ROC’s nuclear program to permit such cooperation, we desire your government’s agreement on the following steps:
1. Include all present and future ROC nuclear facilities and materials under the US/ROC bilateral agreement for cooperation.
2. Dispose of spent fuel from existing and future reactors under mutually acceptable conditions.
3. Terminate all fuel cycle activities and reorient facilities involving or leading to weapons-usable materials, such as the separation or handling of plutonium and uranium–233, and development of uranium enrichment and heavy water production capabilities.
4. Avoid any program or activity which, upon consultation with the US, is determined to have application to the development of a nuclear explosive capability.
5. Transfer all present holdings of plutonium to the US under appropriate compensatory arrangements.
6. Pending establishment of a mutually acceptable research program, disposition of spent fuel in a mutually acceptable manner, and a mutual determination that effective safeguards could be applied to the reactor and associated facilities, suspend operation of the TRR and notify the IAEA of your government’s action.
—We have heard that the IAEA is also concerned about the direction of your government’s nuclear research program. Prompt and favorable ROC action on the above points might ease these IAEA concerns and perhaps reduce the possibility of IAEA measures which could complicate both our efforts to deal with this problem.
[Page 65]—While these steps will involve substantial reorientation in your nuclear research program, in our view they will not have an adverse impact on your current nuclear power program.
—To avoid misunderstanding, we are providing you the US position in writing and would appreciate your government’s reply in writing.
—Following receipt of your reply, we would be prepared to send a team of nuclear experts to work out with your scientists the details and technical arrangements required to give effect to the basic agreement reached between our governments.
—Additionally, we are willing to provide technical advice and assistance in reorienting INER’s research activities toward exclusively peaceful purposes.
—In conclusion, I again wish to stress that we are counting on complete ROC cooperation of proliferation facing mankind. I believe we both have an opportunity to demonstrate to the rest of the world our joint commitment to non-proliferation.
—If asked about the US attitude toward ROC development of a heavy water reactor, you should state that we would have to study the matter. Implementation of the other steps we discussed should not await a decision on this question.
—If asked whether compliance with our requests will result in a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply, you should reply that while we cannot make an absolute commitment because of congressional and independent regulatory agency prerogatives, we would do our best to satisfy ROC requirements.
US Note to the ROC:
(Complimentary opening)
The Government of the United States views the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons as one of the most important tasks facing the international community, and considers it vital that countries avoid activities which in any fashion cast doubt as to their nuclear intentions.
The US believes it important in that regard, that the Republic of China take certain steps to reorient its program for the peaceful uses of atomic power in order to dispel any residual doubts as to ROC intentions or capabilities. Toward that end, the US believes the following measures should be adopted:
1. All nuclear materials, equipment and facilities currently in the Republic of China or which may subsequently be acquired or constructed would henceforth be covered by the provisions of Articles VIII, X, XI, XII of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Govern[Page 66]ment of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of China Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed at Washington, April 4, 1972, as amended,4 in the same manner as if such materials, equipment and facilities had been received from the United States. In that regard, we would appreciate reaffirmation by the ROC of its offer to open all of its nuclear facilities to the US Government on a continuing basis.
2. All spent fuel from existing and future reactors located in the ROC would be disposed of under conditions mutually acceptable to our two governments.
3. The ROC would terminate all fuel cycle activities and reorient facilities involving or leading to weapons-usable materials, such as the separation or handling of plutonium and uranium–233, and the development of uranium enrichment and heavy water production capabilities.
4. The ROC would transfer all present holdings of plutonium to the US under appropriate compensatory arrangements.
5. The ROC would henceforth avoid any program or activity which, upon consultation with the US, is determined to have application to the development of a nuclear explosive capability.
6. Pending establishment of a research program acceptable to our two governments, disposition of spent fuel in a mutually acceptable manner, and a mutual determination that effective safeguards could be applied to the reactor and associated facilities, the ROC would suspend operation of the TRR and would so notify the IAEA.
Agreement to these measures by the Government of the Republic of China will be of significance in assuring a continuation of our mutual cooperation in the use of nuclear power to produce electricity. Moreover, by undertaking these measures the ROC can make an important contribution to a reduction in the dangers of nuclear proliferation, and to the solution of global energy problems.
(Complimentary closing)
Suggested ROC Reply:
(Complimentary opening)
The Government of the Republic of China, as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and as a party to safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency strongly supports the goal of non-proliferation, and reiterates its determination to utilize nuclear power exclusively for peaceful purposes. To [Page 67] that end, the Government of the Republic of China in its note of September 17, 1976, indicated that it would henceforth not engage in any activities related to reprocessing.5
In order to put permanently to rest any question as to its determination to utilize the atom solely for peaceful purposes, the ROC has decided upon the following additional policies:
1. All nuclear materials, equipment and facilities currently in the Republic of China or which may subsequently be acquired or constructed shall henceforth be covered by the provisions of Articles VIII, X, XI, and XII of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of China Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed at Washington, April 4, 1972, as amended, in the same manner as if such materials, equipment and facilities had been received from the United States. In that regard, the Government of the Republic of China reaffirms its offer to open all of its nuclear facilities to the US Government on a continuing basis.
2. Any spent fuel from existing and future reactors located in the ROC will be disposed of under conditions mutually acceptable to our two governments.
3. The ROC will terminate all fuel cycle activities and reorient facilities involving or leading to weapons-usable materials, such as the separation or handling of plutonium and U–233, and the development of uranium enrichment and heavy water production capabilities.
4. The ROC will transfer all present holdings of plutonium to the US under appropriate compensatory arrangements.
5. The ROC will henceforth avoid any program or activity which, upon consultation with the US, is determined to have application to the development of a nuclear explosive capability.
6. The Government of the Republic of China has decided to reorient the activities at INER. Accordingly, the ROC has suspended operation of the TRR pending establishment of a mutually acceptable research program, disposition of spent fuel in a mutually acceptable manner, and mutual determination that effective safeguards can and [Page 68] will be applied to the reactor and associated facilities and has so notified the IAEA.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850106–1942. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Levin (EA/ROC); approved by Holbrooke; and cleared by Christopher (D), Nye (T), Mink (OES), Davies (ACDA), and Romberg and Kalicki (S/P). Repeated on March 26, 0507Z, to the White House for Brzezinski.↩
- Telegram 1050 from Taipei, February 25, suggested approaching Taiwanese scientists and Foreign Ministry officials before meeting with Jiang. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850106–1955)↩
- On January 27, the Republic of China released remarks by Jiang that expressed support for Carter’s statement in his January 20 inaugural address advocating global elimination of nuclear weapons, preceded by the halting of all nuclear tests. Jiang also noted, “the Government of the Republic of China has been consistently advocating the peaceful use of atomic energy; and although the Chinese Government has the capability of developing nuclear weapons it will never engage in the production of such weapons.” (Telegram 532 from Taipei, January 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770031–0703) In September 1976, Taiwan reportedly agreed to stop reprocessing nuclear fuel. (Don Oberdorfer, “Taiwan To Curb A-Role,” The Washington Post, September 23, 1976, p. A1)↩
- The U.S.–ROC Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy was signed on April 4, 1972, and entered into force on June 22, 1972. (23 UST 945) It was extended and amended on March 15, 1974. (25 UST 913)↩
- Vice Foreign Minister Chien delivered a note, dated September 16, 1976, to the Embassy in Taipei setting forth non-proliferation assurances. (Telegram 6330 from Taipei, September 17, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760351–0199) Unger proposed revisions to this note. Chien gave a revised version of the note to the Embassy, which informed the Department that the new note “fully meets our request for assurances regarding ROC’s nuclear intentions.” (Telegram 6336 from Taipei, September 18, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760352–0983)↩