Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIII, China

147. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 26, 1978

SUBJECT

• Arms Sales to Taiwan

In presenting our response to Taiwan’s arms sales requests, State would like to maximize the chance that the Taiwanese will accept our offer. Therefore, in addition to Taiwan’s major request for a follow-on aircraft, there are two additional requests which have reached the point for a decision and could be included in our presentation. The State memorandum at Tab A recommends their approval.

Taiwan has requested two types of precision-guided munitions: 500 laser-guided bombs and 400 Maverick air-to-surface missiles. Given the limited range of the F–5, these munitions would not pose a threat to targets in the PRC, but would improve Taiwan’s defenses particularly against the numerically superior PRC navy. The Maverick production line closed in April 1978 and no Maverick missiles are currently available; however, as U.S. inventories are replaced with later models of the Maverick, some missiles may become available for sale but not in the quantity requested by the ROC. All agencies (State, ACDA, DOD, and JCS) support the sale of these munitions to Taiwan.

In addition, Taiwan has requested 15 Harpoon surface-to-surface anti-ship missile launchers and 300 missiles to counter the PRC’s 185-ship Styx missile fleet. Although we are not prepared to offer this number, all agencies support our offer of 12 launchers and 72 missiles to outfit the six high-speed patrol boats which the ROC has on order.

Both of these systems are defensive in character and could be approved to meet Taiwan’s legitimate security needs without unduly damaging our relations with the PRC.

In describing your aircraft decision to the ROC Government, State would like to couch your decision on the follow-on aircraft in terms that would prevent the Taiwanese from concluding that our support in modernizing their air force was forever after at an end. Accordingly, they would like to say that the U.S. cannot authorize the purchase of F–4 or F–16/18 aircraft but that “the USG has not made a decision to authorize creation of a follow-on aircraft to the F–5E.” State also proposes that we indicate our willingness to extend the F–5E coproduction agreement beyond the 48 aircraft currently under consideration if requested by the ROC.

My own view is somewhat different:

1. I believe the F–5Es should be offered or, as you previously indicated, Taiwan could go for the Kfir.

2. It might make sense to include the 500 laser-guided bombs and 400 Maverick air-to-surface missiles, since both items are connected with the air package.

3. For the time being, I would prefer to defer the 12 Harpoon launchers and 72 missiles, since I believe we will have to demonstrate later our dedication to Taiwan’s defense. Doing it now buys us nothing.

4. I would prefer to avoid the suggested phrase that “the USG has not made a decision to authorize creation of a follow-on aircraft to the F–5E” because it might imply something which I understand we do not intend to do in any case.

Recommendation:

1. Approve the entire package, as recommended by Cy and Harold.²

2. Please check off your specific approval in the choices provided in the attached State memorandum, if you do not approve #1.

3. Please indicate whether the phrase “the USG has not made a decision to authorize creation of a follow-on aircraft to the F–5E”.³

Tab A

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Newsom to President Carter⁴

Washington, October 20, 1978

SUBJECT

• Request for Decisions on Conventional Arms Transfer Cases

I am recommending that you approve the following Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for the Republic of China: co-production of an additional 48 F–5E aircraft, sales of 72 Harpoon missiles and 12 launchers, 400 laser guided bomb kits, and 500 Maverick missiles. These cases fall within the current policy guidelines and should have no significant adverse effect on normalization. The Department of Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concur in this recommendation.

The ROC has asked for co-production of an additional 48 F–5E aircraft and co-production in the future of 50 of a proposed follow-on aircraft, the F–5G. In approving the 48 additional F–5E’s, I believe we should agree to the ROC request that this be done by extending the present co-production/co-assembly arrangement now due to expire in Spring 1981. Approving the sale of the F–5E’s and, particularly, keeping the production line open, will provide concrete assurance to Congress, as well as to the ROC, that we plan to continue defense ties with Taiwan on into the future, regardless of a change in our relationship with the PRC.

Co-production/co-assembly of the F–5E has gone on since 1974. Last year you agreed to permit added co-production of 20 aircraft. Given the history of this program, we believe it is not contrary to our arms transfer policy and can be tolerated by Peking. Since we are not approving the development of the F–5G, 48 F–5E’s will be inadequate for Taiwan’s defense needs. We should, therefore, be prepared to inform the ROC that we would consider favorably a request for additional F–5E’s as well as telling them that we have given our approval for Israeli sales of the Kfir aircraft to the ROC.⁵

Provision to the ROC of the Harpoon missile system and precision-guided munitions (PGM) will serve U.S. interests in enhancing the credibility of the ROC deterrent capability against a PRC seaborne attack. Also, because of expectations fueled by press play and aircraft corporation gossip that a favorable decision had been made to provide Taiwan with the F–5G’s, ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo will find our response on aircraft a bitter pill. A favorable response on the Harpoon and the PGM will soften the impact and demonstrate to the ROC and Congress that we are responsive to legitimate ROC defense needs.

The total value of these four cases is $199 million and can be accommodated in the FY 79 worldwide ceiling on arms transfers. Subject to your approval we will report them as required by law to Congress when it reconvenes in January.

The attachment describes the four cases, including means of payment, and provides a space for you to indicate your decision on each case.

Attachment

Type Case	Country	Value ($M)	Description
FMS	Republic of China	107.0 (Cash)	Continued co-production of 48 F–5 aircraft

In 1972 the USG approved a program which would permit the ROC to co-produce F–5 aircraft. This case will add to the 20 aircraft you approved last year and will extend the agreement to increase the co-production to a total of 248 aircraft.

Decision:⁶

Type Case	Country	Value ($M)	Description
FMS	Republic of China	55.0 (Cash)	72 Harpoon Missiles and 12 Launchers

These surface-to-surface Harpoon anti-ship missiles and associated launchers are to be used to outfit six high-speed patrol boats, which the ROC has on order from Tacoma Boat. Acquisition of this system will provide the ROC Navy with a modest and necessary anti-ship capability to enhance their naval defenses and specifically to counter the threat of the PRC Styx missile fleet of 185 ships.

Decision:⁷

Type Case	Country	Value ($M)	Description
FMS	Republic of China	20.5 (Cash)	500 Maverick Missiles (AGM65A), 48 modification kits, and 100 launchers

The Maverick is a relatively small, television guided-missile designed for use against small concentrated targets such as armored vehicles, revetements, gun positions, communications vans, etc, and will provide the ROC F–5E aircraft with a limited air-to-ground capability. Given the limited range and number of F–5 series aircraft, ROC acquisition of Maverick would not constitute a significant offensive threat to the PRC but would improve the ROC defensive capability.

Decision:⁸

Type Case	Country	Value ($M)	Description
FMS	Republic of China	16.5 (Cash)	400 Laser Guided Bomb kits and 29 laser designation kits

The laser guided bomb kit modifies standard bombs so as to provide precision delivery against a wide spectrum of targets. Acquisition of these kits will provide the ROC F–5 aircraft with a limited air-to-ground capability and a limited capability against sea-borne targets, such as invasion barges, etc. Given the limited range and number of F–5 series aircraft, ROC acquisition of these kits would not constitute a significant offensive threat to the PRC but would improve the ROC defensive capability.

Decision:⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Matthews Subject File, Box 3, Arms Sales: Taiwan (Aircraft): 9–11/78. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten “C” at the top of the page indicates that Carter saw the memorandum.
2. Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked.
3. Carter checked the “should be used” option and initialed “J.”
4. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive.
5. In the margin, Carter wrote, “ok.”
6. Carter checked the Approve option and initialed “J.”
7. Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked and Carter wrote, “defer.”
8. Carter checked the Approve option and initialed “J.”
8. Carter checked the Approve option and initialed “J.”