5. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN
Introduction
Soviet economic assistance and trade have become dominant external forces in Afghan development, and military assistance is virtually the exclusive province of the USSR. In the 23 years since Moscow’s first commitment to Kabul—also its first to an LDC—the Soviet presence has become pervasive and the Soviet role in Afghan development critical. Despite Kabul’s efforts to maintain a non-aligned position by balancing Western and Communist interests, we see no major change in Afghanistan’s reliance on the USSR for military or economic aid in the short term. This is particularly true for the military supply relationship, since Kabul would be hard put to find alternate sources for modern weapons on terms as favorable as Moscow’s.
The Soviets have given Kabul aid on unusually easy terms to ensure a special Soviet-Afghan relationship which Moscow believes is important to its security interests. This assistance has always been far more concessional and has included more grant aid than Moscow’s aid to its other clients. Moscow also has agreed to frequent rescheduling of Kabul’s debt and has covered most of Afghanistan’s local project costs, a concession rarely allowed other aid recipients. Soviet military contracts generally have allowed a 75 percent discount from list prices and are payable over 15 to 25 years at two percent interest. Large economic credits have allowed up to 25 years for amortization, after as much as 25 years grace, with interest at 2–2.5 percent. These compare with the usual Soviet terms of 10 years repayment at 2 percent for military contracts and 12 years at 2.5 percent for economic aid.
Military Aid
Afghanistan’s 1956 border dispute with Pakistan led to the signing of a $100 million arms agreement with the USSR, the first of a series of accords that have made Moscow responsible for all modern arma[Page 10]ments in Kabul’s inventories.2 Soviet deliveries of more than $600 million of military equipment since 1956 have supplied over 95 percent of Afghanistan’s total military receipts. Deliveries have included MIG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft, medium tanks, surface-to-air missiles, helicopters, and armored vehicles. Even though the USSR has not signed a major new arms accord with Afghanistan since 1975, deliveries are continuing under the $50 million of orders still outstanding. Thus far in 1977 Afghanistan has received AN–26 transports, SA–3 and SA–7 missiles as well as field artillery, radar and ground equipment.
Moscow also has borne almost sole responsibility for support and maintenance of Afghan weapons systems. Despite more than 20 years of Soviet technical assistance, Kabul still is dependent on Soviet advisors and training. The number of Soviet technical personnel in Afghanistan has varied with the flow of arms. In 1967 their number peaked at 525, and in 1977 about 350 Soviet military personnel were present. By the end of 1977 the USSR will have trained 3,700 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union, of which about 650 will still be in training. We expect the number of Soviet technicians and trainees in the USSR to increase next year to service and instruct Afghan’s military on the new, more technically advanced equipment now being delivered.
Economic Aid
Despite US assistance of almost half a billion dollars and Afghanistan’s recent success in attracting almost $900 million of OPEC pledges (only $65 million of which has been disbursed) the USSR continues as Afghanistan’s single most important source of economic aid and its principal trading partner. A $425 million credit, extended in 1975 for Kabul’s current Seven Year Plan (21 March 1976–20 March 1983) accounts for one-third of Moscow’s total $1.3 billion commitment to Kabul and is the largest single Soviet commitment to Afghanistan to date. If the ambitious Fifth Plan is actually carried out, Kabul probably will turn to Moscow for additional aid. In the meantime, Soviet deliveries will continue under $600 million of credits still outstanding.
The Soviet program—on which Moscow has already delivered $700 million of aid—has provided about one-half of the foreign exchange component for projects under Afghanistan’s four five-year plans. With this assistance, two-thirds of Afghanistan’s roads and one-half of its [Page 11] electric power capacity was built. The USSR constructed major airfields, developed an extensive power transmission network, and put some 100,000 acres of land into cultivation. Moscow also built several small industrial plants and developed Afghanistan’s natural gas industry, which now provides the USSR almost 3 billion cubic meters of gas a year through a Soviet built pipeline.
We see no diminution in the Soviet economic presence over the near term. The 1,000 Soviet technicians are presently employed in mineral, oil and gas exploration, fertilizer production, and power, irrigation, and transportation projects. Additional technical personnel probably will be requested as work progresses on two power projects and a $600 million copper-smelting complex, now on the drawing boards.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00071A: Production Copy Files (1976–1979), Box 6, The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Cooper to Limberg, December 6, in response to Vance’s request for information on Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Vance’s request was not found.↩
- A reference to the Afghan-Pakistani dispute over the Durand Line, named after the British diplomat Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, who negotiated with the Amir of Afghanistan a border demarcating the territories of British India and Afghanistan in 1893. Following the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the Durand Line became a contested boundary dividing the Pushtun tribal lands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. See Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VIII, South Asia, Documents 103, 112, 114, 117, and 120.↩