4. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Specific Recommendations: Afghanistan
1. Our existing intelligence capability in Afghanistan is miniscule as compared to the like-sized producing region in the “Golden Triangle”.2 The Central Intelligence Agency’s mission in Afghanistan has been essentially limited to activities regarding the Soviet Union. [7 lines not declassified]
2. The Afghan Minister-in-Charge of Foreign Affairs, Waheed Abdullah, will be attending the upcoming U.N. General Assembly in New York. We have suggested that Secretary Vance meet with him to express our deep concern over Afghanistan’s increased opium production. This is the next logical step in a series of demarches to Afghanistan, which have included U.N., as well as U.S. initiatives.
3. Our Ambassador to Kabul has suggested that President Daoud would like to visit you, and recommended that such a visit could have impact on our narcotics effort. In Afghanistan, nothing happens [Page 8] without Daoud’s approval and direction. We cannot expect further progress in the narcotics field without his personal interest, and continuing surveillance. While Afghanistan is not a priority country in the context of global affairs, in addition to being one of the world’s poorest countries it is the single most significant threat to our long term narcotics efforts, and meeting Daoud could in fact move him to take a more active role in containment of the illicit narcotics of the region. We would therefore suggest acceptance of a Daoud visit early next year. The timing of such a visit is important and would be most beneficial during the early Spring, since late Spring is harvesting season and Daoud could, in fact, cause the interdiction and destruction of large amounts of opium on his return to Kabul. Such a meeting would also be a logical follow-up of the Vance-Abdullah meeting this Fall.
4. By far the most important decision to be made in support of our efforts is on selection of our next Ambassador to Kabul. In order for us to be able to follow through on our devised strategy and escalate anti-narcotics efforts at the earliest possible moment, it is important that in addition to a firsthand knowledge of Afghanistan and its political constraints, our next Ambassador should be competent in the narcotics field and have an existing relationship with the leaders of Afghanistan at the Ministerial level.
An individual with these qualifications is available. He is not, however, a career Foreign Service Officer, and consequently a determination must be made that the appointment to Afghanistan should be considered by the Ambassadorial Review Commission, which it has not been up to this point. The Commission has the name of the individual before it, as well as Congressional recommendations and would in all likelihood include that name in any list submitted to you. I would therefore suggest that Afghanistan be considered a country to which a non-career assignment would be appropriate. With your approval, such a suggestion will be made to Secretary Vance.3
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77–3/79. No classification marking.↩
- A reference to the area of Asia, comprising parts of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, that produces opium.↩
- Carter wrote: “OK” and initialed “J” in the right margin next to this sentence. The Ambassador to Afghanistan, Theodore Eliot, had been in that position since November 1973 and did not leave the post until June 1978, when he was succeeded by Adolph Dubs, a career Foreign Service officer. The individual referred to by Bourne was Charles O’Keefe, Deputy Director for International Affairs in the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy.↩