Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

46. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 5, 1979, 1547Z

8384. Subject: (LOU) Soviet-Afghan Relations and the Insurgency in Afghanistan. Ref: State 73004 (Notal).²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: Availing ourselves of Department’s invitation (reftel) to comment on possible Soviet conduct in the evolving Afghanistan situation, we would note at the outset the obvious fact that the Soviets have a major investment in the Kabul regime which they will go to some lengths to protect. We doubt, however, that the Soviet leadership would seriously consider the large-scale dispatch of Soviet combat troops to Afghanistan under foreseeable circumstances.³ Moscow is more likely to increase its military advice and aid to Kabul while intensifying Soviet propaganda and diplomatic support for the DRA.⁴ Some forms of more direct Soviet military involvement are possible in situations where Soviet personnel or equipment were endangered, if foreign forces were seen as assisting the anti-DRA regime inside Afghanistan, or if fighting approached Soviet borders. We believe that Moscow is not irrevocably wedded to Taraki. In the coming weeks and months, it will be prepared to stick with him or to adopt other options, with the choice depending in large measure on developments within Afghanistan itself. End summary.

3. We continue to see Moscow’s policy toward Afghanistan as twofold: (A) to assist the Khalqi regime to consolidate power and eliminate its “counter-revolutionary” opponents, and (B) to draw Afghanistan into closer dependence on the Soviet Union in economic, military, administrative and other areas, while maneuvering to reduce Western and Chinese presence and influence in Afghanistan. The December 5, 1978, Soviet-Afghan treaty served to institutionalize close Soviet-Afghan relations and has been followed by further efforts by both governments to deepen their relationship.⁵

4. The Soviets have made a considerable investment in Afghanistan which they will go to some lengths to protect through additional steps to shore up the Taraki regime. Afghanistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union and recent setbacks to Soviet foreign policy interests and perhaps prestige in the Middle East and Asia will reinforce this commitment. So will any Soviet-perceived efforts by other outside powers—particularly China—to support the anti-DRA insurgency.

5. Under foreseeable circumstances, we do not anticipate the large-scale dispatch of combat troops to Afghanistan as an option that would be seriously considered by the Soviet leadership for the following reasons:

—such a move might worsen Soviet-U.S. relations during a delicate period when SALT and a summit are high on our respective agendas;

—the popular opposition to Taraki might only be exacerbated by direct Soviet actions, and would leave open the possibility that Taraki’s survivability would require the continuing presence and possible ongoing engagement of Soviet combat troops;

—the spectre of Soviet troops battling Islamic elements would redound to Moscow’s disadvantage throughout the Moslem world, especially in Islamic states which Moscow is currently courting, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia;

—Moscow’s chief interest in the region is its ties with India. New Delhi would presumably strongly oppose direct Soviet intervention, which would make clear Moscow’s intention to consider Afghanistan—like Czechoslovakia—part of the USSR’s “imperium”.

6. The provision of various forms of direct Soviet military assistance to DRA forces short of the dispatch of regular Soviet combat units is, however, more of a possibility. Such direct assistance could come as a result of Soviet attempts to protect or defend Soviet personnel or equipment already in Afghanistan, as may have already occurred at Herat. Or, depending on circumstances in combat areas inside Afghanistan, for example, in Badakhshan adjoining Soviet Tadzhikistan where the Soviet press has already reported some fighting has broken out, the Soviets could decide to provide support through the dispatch of Soviet aircraft, helicopter gunships, or increased advisory personnel on the ground to assist the DRA anti-insurgent efforts. The temptation to provide this type of direct if limited military assistance would be heightened if the Soviets believed that foreign forces from Pakistan or Iran had actually joined the resistance inside Afghanistan, or if the fighting approached Soviet borders. Even in these situations, however, we believe that Moscow, for the reasons cited above, would attempt to minimize the scope and visibility of direct Soviet military participation in the fighting.

7. To check what they may see as passive or active Pak support to anti-DRA insurgents, the Soviets, in coordination with the Afghans, may become more direct in warning the Paks about possible retaliation “in kind” through Soviet-Afghan support to Baluchi and Pushtu dissident elements inside Pakistan. Should the Soviets view the Paks as working with others, particularly the Chinese, in supporting a widening insurgency inside Afghanistan, these warnings could conceivably be translated into actions, despite the drawbacks mentioned in Islamabad 3775.⁶

8. The Soviets will be weighing the relative positions of strength of Taraki and his domestic opponents in making their decisions on providing assistance to the Kabul regime. If a growing domestic challenge to the regime should progressively spread and reach a point where it is poised to overthrow Taraki, or if Taraki is unable to maintain the military’s loyalty, we believe the Soviets will be prepared to consider other alternatives to Taraki. Soviet decision-making in such a situation would be guided by a combination of cold pragmatism and opportunism and would be directed at the longer-range goal of establishing a rapport with—or influencing the selection of—the individual, group or coalition most likely to emerge at the top.

9. In this connection we have picked up a number of indications that, behind the froth of public Soviet comments about Taraki, Moscow may not see him as the Afghan wave of the future. Our Soviet contacts occasionally express irritation at his indecisive pace in implementing socio-economic programs and his purge of what are seen here as “progressive” elements, such as the Parchamists. One leading specialist on “Middle Asia” who knows the Khalqi leaders personally once blurted out to an EmbOff that he “felt hatred” for Afghan First Minister H. Amin. In a recent conversation with two EmbOffs, the Deputy Director of Dushanbe’s Oriental Institute twice stated that “only time will tell” if the Taraki regime will be able to survive.

10. In sum, we see a range of considerations relating to domestic Afghan as well as regional and international factors—including, of course, the U.S. attitude—as likely to influence Soviet decisions on assisting what may be an increasingly beleaguered Taraki regime. Moscow will very likely be keeping its options under continuing review as events in Afghanistan unfold in the coming months.

Toon

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790156–0069, P850147–1923. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Baghdad, Beijing, Bonn, Colombo, Dacca, Damascus, CINCPAC for POLAD, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Kathmandu, Leningrad, London, New Delhi, Paris, Rome, Tehran, Tokyo, Berlin, USNATO, and USUN.
2. In telegram 73004 to Islamabad, March 23, the Department assessed the matrix of issues facing Zia with regard to the situation in Afghanistan: “We wonder if the Paks are more and more trying to have it both ways—maintaining a public stance of correct relations with the DRA while permitting increasing insurgent activity from bases in Pakistan. If situation in Afghanistan deteriorates further, Pakistan may be forced to make some hard choices and may no longer be able to have it both ways.” To that end, the Department asked a number of questions regarding future Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan, and repeated the telegram to the Embassies in New Delhi, Kabul, Moscow, Jidda, and Beijing. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0773)
3. In telegram 2778 from Kabul, April 10, the Embassy reported that the DRA believed that the Soviet Union would, in fact, offer direct military assistance to the Afghan Government, a request for which would not be made “unless the leadership were genuinely desperate in the face of a hopelessly deteriorating domestic security situation—fully beyond the control of Khalqi military and police forces.” (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (Jan 79–Apr 79)) In telegram 3626, May 9, the Embassy maintained that Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan remained possible but unlikely. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790170–0074 and P850147–1917) The Embassy in Moscow concurred in telegram 13083, May 24. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Soviets in Afghanistan—General Part #2)
4. In telegram 2710 from Kabul, April 8, the Embassy estimated that the Soviet Union had approximately 800–1,000 military advisers stationed in Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790160–0975)
5. See footnote 2, Document 33.
6. In telegram 3775 from Islamabad, March 30, the Embassy responded to telegram 73004 (see footnote 2, above). Regarding the fear of Soviet aggression, the Embassy laid out three assumptions about Pakistan’s policy: “(A) A crisis in Pak-Afghan relations may be unavoidable, in time, if the Afghans continue their present policies; (B) Pakistan would prefer that such a crisis come later rather than sooner; and (C) time may be on Pakistan’s side as dissidence inside Afghanistan mounts possibly to levels sufficient to threaten the regime itself or at least to temper the activist naiveté of the DRA leadership.” Regarding a question posed in telegram 73004, the Embassy answered that there were “undoubtedly elements within Pakistan’s political life which would support a more activist/interventionist policy in Afghanistan,” which included the various conservative religious, nationalistic, and tribal factions in the country. But the Embassy noted that such support had its limits: any interventionist policy in Afghanistan would have to be effective to remain popular, and not so confrontational as to provoke a hostile, Soviet-backed response by the DRA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790146–0118)